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Abstract
American Arctic explorer Robert E. Peary tried for twenty-six years to be the first 
man to reach the North Pole. The dissertation focuses on Peary’s stateside efforts to raise 
money for his multiple expeditions. During his first trips, Peary recruited individual 
scientists to pay passage in return for the opportunity to do fieldwork in the remote 
Arctic. By 1898, Peary’s public affiliation with scientists and the organizations that 
funded them, such as universities/colleges, the National Geographic Society, the 
American Geographical Society, the Smithsonian Institution, and the American Museum 
of Natural History, changed the way he organized his expeditions. He attracted the 
attention of a small group of wealthy philanthropists and patrons of science who formed 
the Peary Arctic Club (PAC), an organization devoted to placing Peary at the pole. In 
part, the dissertation examines the connection between Peary’s problems finding 
affordable rental ships and the United States’ late nineteenth-century domination of the 
whaling industry. In 1905, the PAC raised enough money to build Peary the first 
powerful American ice-breaker ship, the Roosevelt. Peary’s correspondences with 
various scientists, patrons, philanthropists, geographical organizations, book publishers, 
and zoo and museum officials receive close attention. Overall, the dissertation follows 
Peary’s various money-raising campaigns and explains them within the context of 
American science, philanthropy, and nationalistic motives of exploration.
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Introduction
“I shall find a way or make one.” Navy Lieutenant Robert E. Peary scratched this 
phrase, in Latin, onto the wall of a makeshift dwelling in the Arctic after realizing he had 
failed to reach the North Pole in 1899. He would have to return a seventh time. 
Heartbroken, facing painful recuperation from frostbite and the recent amputation of most 
of his toes when he wrote this phrase, Peary nevertheless captured the enduring sentiment 
of exploration history. The lesson was simple: the quest is of value; keep trying. It 
turned out to be a good attitude for Peary, who required ten years more to claim his prize. 
Even then he could not rest, because American Frederick Cook announced that he had 
reached the pole days before Peary did, and the international fight for history's title of 
“First Man to the North Pole” lasted for years. Without the motto, the historian is left to 
consider the strange fate of a man who spent twenty-six years trying to reach a shifting, 
frozen, treacherous spot hosting some of the world's worst weather, merely to prove that it 
could be done. Emphasize the motto, and the drive required to believe it under the weight 
of personal failure and extreme physical hardship, and the historian has the enviable job of 
narrating the brave exploits of a dedicated explorer who risked all for self and nation. In 
either case, it is a good story. Exploration history demands more of its subjects, however. 
The relevant tale is not so much that Peary found a way, as is the one of how he found a 
way.
The "easy” part of Peary's Arctic career was the time he actually spent in the 
Arctic. There he endured months-long darkness, crippling cold, near-starvation, frostbite, 
exhaustion, and the constant threat of failure. Peary faced long odds and became a famous 
American hero. The commitment and energy required to create and maintain Peary's
image, however, almost rivaled the trials of his actual treks.
The histories of his expeditions and the debate over whether he or Cook (or 
neither) first reached the pole obscure the more significant story of American Arctic 
exploration. The United States was not well-equipped to enter the race for the North Pole. 
Placing a man at the top of the world was different from the nation’s recent century-long 
exploration and settlement of the American West. The North Pole was a new kind of 
“frontier.” Peary adapted part of America’s fascination with the West to his own 
purposes. By the end of the nineteenth century, scientists had edged out explorers, 
settlers, and soldiers as the dominant public informants about the development of the 
West.' Peary capitalized on the scientists’ interests, and turned the excitement of a fresh 
frontier to his advantage by entwining science with Arctic exploration. With that 
foundation, he built a network of alliances that helped him become the world’s most 
famous Arctic adventurer, yet he did so without federal support, consistent money, or 
even reliable transportation. This dissertation will consider the stateside career of Peary 
and place his Arctic trips within the scope of national science, philanthropic organization, 
and a new, remote frontier. Peary turned a loner’s quest into a thrilling contest that 
Americans longed to win because he learned how to sell Arctic exploration to his 
countrymen.
William H. Goetzmann, an historian of American exploration, explains that it is 
important to realize the difference between explorers and discoverers. Peary wanted to be 
a discoverer, but through necessity he became an outstanding explorer. The “discoverer” 
makes the first observation in a new setting. The explorer “seeks discoveries.” The 
process, the seeking of discovery, is the foundation of exploration. The distinction
' William H. Goetzmann. Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning o f  
the American Wic.rt (New York: Vintage Books. 1972. 1966), 424,429.
matters because explorers often move within spaces that were discovered long ago and 
explored several times over. Explorers want fresh information and ask new questions of 
previously distilled information. Each wave of exploration moves into a setting with 
preconceived ideas about what might be found. In this manner, argues Goetzmann, 
several different groups of people explored the American West. In each case, they 
brought with them existing knowledge of the history of the West, what it meant to the 
nation, and how their own observations might be fitted into these older ideas. In 
Exploration and Empire, Goetzmann follows the path from Meriwether Lewis and 
William Clark, into the homes and businesses of the settlers and farmers who followed 
behind them, considers the military sent to defend these people and map the land, and 
ends his study with the late nineteenth-century transition of science in the West from 
military to private, professionalized organizations. Goetzmann not only re-examines the 
impact of exploration in the American West; he also explains the significant effects of 
exploration on national culture. Each successive wave of explorers gave Americans a new 
way to explain the significance of the West, and in each case they saw their core cultural 
values reflected in the reinterpretation. In this manner, “the Western experience in the 
main appears not to have brought distinctiveness as such to bear on the country, but 
instead has offered a theater in which American patterns of culture could be endlessly 
mirrored.” '
It is not surprising that a process so vast as settlement of the West should produce 
numerous accounts. Remarkable discoveries almost demand further exploration.
Mankind is inquisitive, and the tales of grand discoveries serve also as the first set of 
maps for successive generations of explorers. As writer Barry Lopez observes, “The
Goetzmann. Exploration, xi-xiii.
desire to understand what is unknown is great. And the wish to create some human 
benefit out of new knowledge, however misconstrued, is one of the graces of Western 
civilization.”’ The “goodness” of exploration can be for an individual, an organization, or 
for a nation. For exploration to have merit, however, the results must matter to non­
explorers. There must be an audience to understand the novelty and allure of what is 
reported, to appreciate the sacrifice required to obtain the explorer's narrative. The most 
successful explorers are considered such because their target audiences absorb the full 
import of their reports. The results may be debatable, perhaps even overturned upon 
closer examination, but upon initial cultural consumption the top explorers report to 
receptive audiences.
In order to win society’s appreciation, explorers cannot assume that their own 
exploration accounts will suffice. Sometimes, a third party needs to explain the 
magnitude of the news. Lewis and Clark embarked on an enormous expedition, one 
guaranteed to encompass so many adventures and discoveries that it hardly mattered that 
they failed to find their goal: a northwest passage between the Missouri River and the 
Pacific Ocean, Their narrative resonates today, perhaps even more than it did in their own 
day, because their mission was so large that their smaller successes and courageous 
decisions inspire on several levels. In addition, the news of Lewis and Clark held value 
even for those who could not appreciate the enormity of their task. Americans knew that 
the pair would be merely the first, not the only ones, to make the trip. As early as 1814, 
the first year of the journals’ publication, the brief history of American settlement 
indicated that it was only a matter of time before other explorers and traders, if not
' Barry Lopez. Arctic Dreams: Imagination and Desire in a Northern Landscape (New York: Bantam 
Books. 1986). 319.
settlers, followed the pair/
Peary, however, had a different media problem. Anybody who reaches the North 
Pole must immediately leave. It is a lonely spot in a frozen ocean, and nobody stays 
longer than it takes to plant a flag or snap a quick photo. Unlike almost every other phase 
of American exploration, there was no successive wave of settlement or commerce. It 
mattered to Americans only so long as it was still possible for someone to reach the spot 
first. Peary realized early in his career that too few people understood his objective. He 
became a relentless proponent of Arctic exploration, so that after several years of media 
exposure he made Americans think they could win the race to the North Pole. One recent 
study within the history of exploration considers the cultural significance of the cross­
purposes of explorers and the media. Beau Riffenburgh explains that “the interplay 
between newspapermen and explorers not only reflects on the history of the press and the 
history of exploration, but relates to models of imperialism, modem nationalism, the 
growth of science, and the diffusion and incorporation of knowledge into society.” He 
also posits that British and American papers engaged in sensationalism to such a degree 
over the exploits of late nineteenth-century explorers that they created heroic myths. 
Riffenburgh offers Peary's Arctic career as an ideal example of such purposeful imagery.^
 ^Stephen E. Ambrose. Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening o f  
the American West (New York: Touchstone. 1996), 480. Lewis and Clark's account sold poorly, and 
the next edition of their work did not appear for ninety years. It was a remarkable trip that failed to 
generate any enthusiasm from the American public.
’ Beau Riffenburgh. The Myth o f  the Explorer: The Press, Sensationalism, and Geographical 
Discovery (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994). 3 .5 , 1.34-135, 166. American news editors of the 
late nineteenth century used the drama of exploration to sell papers. Two of the most sensationalistic 
papers, the New York Herald and the New York Sun. took ftill advantage of the perils of Arctic tales 
in headline-grabbing articles, and often removed or altered the explorers' perspectives to suit their 
audiences. A third paper, the New-York T/wu’.v knowingly printed an erroneous headline in 1892 
declaring that Peary had achieved a new Farthest North record. The accompanying article contained 
the truth, but the headline sold papers. Riffenburgh believes that such decisions also affected the 
explorers. Peary's journal marginalia during his last trip in 1909 show that he intended to rely upon 
his popular media image to buy patents and sell items like "Peary North Pole sledges " and "Peary 
North Pole snowshoes."
Peary certainly crafted his image as carefully as the press, in turn, used him. His power to 
dominate headlines took constant diligence and a team of helpers, though. Eye-popping 
exploratory feats were not enough.
Peary never compared his quest for the North Pole to the American West, but he 
likely would never have made more than one Arctic trip without reliance upon the 
successes of national frontier history.* He was making plans for his third expedition when 
historian Frederick Jackson Turner spoke at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893 and 
announced that America’s frontier era had ended in 1890. Turner’s thesis, “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History,” eventually became the most persuasive 
explanation of American history. Historians today still grapple with Turner’s idea that the 
process of conquering the West created special forms of American democracy and 
freedom and a unique national character.’ The theory gained impetus during the course of 
Peary’s Arctic career. It was a boon for Peary that Turner’s thesis became popular and 
that most Americans believed that the first era of their history was over. The North Pole, 
a remote and poorly understood spot, could have become the first frontier of a new 
national era. Peary, however, initially spoke of himself as a discoverer, the man who 
could be the first to stand on 90° N. It was actually an old dream. Men from around the 
world had been trying for over four hundred years to find the Northwest Passage (a water 
route connecting Europe to Asia) and the North Pole. When Peary first tried to reach the 
pole during the 1890’s, he was simply the latest in a long line of men who had failed 
while seeking the same dream.
Peary’s obsession with the quest, and his chronic need to find the funding required
" Peary first visited the Arctic in 1886 as a lieutenant on a US Navy cartographic mission. Each of his 
successive trips was undertaken while on military leave, using private financial backing.
’ John Mack Faragher. ed.. Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: "The Significance o f  the Frontier in 
American History and Other Essays" (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995). 1-3.
to try again and again, compelled him to broaden his perspective and to describe the 
Arctic as a whole region worthy of study. This focus made a difference. Professional 
scientists, the last group of people who explored the West even as Turner announced the 
end of the frontier era, recognized new opportunities in Peary’s rhetoric. Peary capitalized 
on the chances for mutual collaboration, and showcased the Arctic as a vast laboratory in 
return for the scientists’ paid passage. His connections to universities, museums, and 
other professional and philanthropic institutions gave Peaiy a larger community to whom 
he turned for support, prestige, and money. Together Peary, the scientists, philanthropists, 
and museum personnel made the race to the North Pole part of America’s frontier legacy. 
In familiar, but distinctly different ways, Americans again found national value in 
exploration.
Americans of Peary’s time believed they had inherited a remarkable frontier past. 
Peary used the cultural effects of this idea to explain to his countrymen the value of Arctic 
exploration. He argued that the Inuits who helped, guided, clothed, fed, and befriended 
him needed exposure to American civilization in order to prosper, just as explorers of the 
West argued that Native Americans needed to adopt American values and ways of living. 
The sentiment was familiar to an American public that had celebrated "American progress 
through time and space since 1492” at the same World’s Fair at which Turner spoke. 
Countless exhibits at the fair showed Americans the disparity between themselves and the 
supposedly less evolved, racially distinct groups of American Indians." Several fields of 
science, including anthropology, geography, and geology, became professionalized in the 
late nineteenth century, in part to organize and synthesize the overwhelming material
“ Robert W. Rydell, All the World's a Fair: Visions o f  Empire at American International Expositions, 
1876-1916 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 46-47,58.
gathered by scientists in the American West.’ Scientists worked to understand and impart 
the full impact of “frontier” information. Their interests in comparative frontiers, as well 
as their eagerness to test their new systems of organization and classification, lent 
themselves to Peary’s purposes. He counted on their excitement over doing fieldwork in a 
remote setting. The willingness of these individuals or their host institutions to pay for the 
opportunities he offered sustained the momentum of Arctic exploration during several 
years in which Peary operated virtually without public support on a quest of questionable 
merit.
Peary also benefited from the tendency of American scientists to channel their best 
information through institutions staffed by the first generation of professionals. His wife, 
Josephine, introduced him in 1895 to Morris K. Jesup, the millionaire curator of the 
American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) in New York. Without Jesup’s 
friendship, Peary likely would never have returned to the Arctic. Jesup had no formal 
scientific training, but he believed in giving scientists the tools to gather and organize 
their research so that it could be properly displayed and understood by everyone else. As 
president of the museum for twenty-nine years, he gave his curators significant freedom to 
collect their specimens, and he left the institution in excellent financial standing with his
" Nathan Reingold. Science, American Style (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 
1991). 25; Sally Gregory Kohlstedt “Institutional Science," Osiris 1 ( 1985): 17-36. Reingold discusses 
scientists' efforts to professionalize and to banish amateurs from their organizations. As scientific 
knowledge became more complex during the late nineteenth century, scientists demanded higher 
standards for training, as well as respectable career opportunities. The scientists also determined to set 
and safeguard their mutually agreed-upon field-specific guidelines. Kohlstedt, another historian of 
science, believes that studies of professionalization do not go far enough to show how information was 
absorbed by scientists or by the larger public. She sees greater merit in considerations of the roles of 
institutions in the development of American science. Kohlstedt believes that understanding the money 
and kinds of men associated with the museums, universities, and academic societies that employed the 
scientists offers better glimpses into how or why American science changed over time. Institutions 
became "core networks through which recognized scientists coordinated with philanthropists, 
academics, entrepreneurs, and institutional builders." In addition, the most outstanding American 
scientific institutions are often best understood through biographical studies of their founders or 
curators.
one million dollar endowment. Peary was extraordinarily lucky to find a man like Jesup 
as curator of the AMNH. Jesup protected his own attraction to romantic quests. Late in 
his life, he noted that “from the beginning of my business life I made up my mind to 
engage in such religious and philanthropic matters as would excite my sympathy, so that 
my business should not entirely engross my mind and make me simply a business 
machine, although naturally my ambition, pride, and interest were alike enlisted in making 
my business a success.”"’
American professional scientists at institutions like the AMNH enjoyed their 
positions for more than the opportunities for uninterrupted research. By the late 
nineteenth century, in anthropology and geography, the top scientists were less often 
explorers as well. They sifted through the collections and donations of amateurs, younger 
professionals, and other people with less training. Matthew F. Maury, chief 
oceanographer of the US Navy Depot of Charts and Instruments during the 1840's and 
ISSO’s, was an example of an “American style” of science. He used anybody's data, be 
they other scientists, midshipmen, or civilian whalers. Maury was unusual in his 
obsession to collect anyone’s data, but like other professional scientists he “saw as his 
primary duty the mobilization or mass production of practical information that could be 
put to the immediate service of the country.” In American science of Maury's day, the 
results were seen as the handmaiden of “commercial and territorial expansion.” Within a 
few decades, professional scientists affiliated with well-endowed institutions outnumbered 
men like Maury, who worked within the directives of the US Navy, where scientific 
enterprise ranked as a priority low.
"'William Adams Brov/n, Morris Ketchunt Jesup: A Character Sketch (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons. 1911 ), 42,154. 186. Jesup oversaw the collection of over $450,000 from donors during his 
presidency, and in his will he left provisions for a Permanent Endowment Fund worth one million 
dollars.
By the 1880’s, the science of exploration in the American West belonged to
institutions like the Smithsonian, the AMNH, and the US Geological Survey (USGS).
John Wesley Powell, director of the USGS, turned his agency into one of the top scientific
institutions of the nation, and the American geologists who worked for or learned from the
USGS were some of the world's best. Powell of the USGS and Jesup of the AMNH
symbolize similar trends in the management of American science of the late nineteenth
century." Powell created a mission statement for scientific exploration of the West.
According to Goetzmann, “Powell and his circle sought to put the explorer's experience to
practical use in promoting the fair, efficient, and socially useful development of the West.
And for every disappointment or failure, they left behind a record of large vision, new
ideas, and concepts that would one day change the face of the land." Powell designed a
systematic way to survey the West that did two things: divided vast tracts of open territory
into measurable, mapped blocs, and accounted for the geologic potential (or lack thereof)
of each plot. Powell’s plan to organize and evaluate the land and water resources of the
West worked well with the expectations of trained objectivity of the first generation of
institutional scientists. As a result,
though the United States Geological Survey continued to send expeditions into the 
West, they no longer had as their objective to discover the unknown, but rather 
concentrated on an assessment of the nation's resources. The formation of the 
Survey in 1879, therefore, marks the end of an era of American Western 
exploration—an era that began with Lewis and Clark's epic march to the Pacific at 
the opening of the nineteenth century and concluded with Powell['s]...institutional 
victory over the forces of frontier individualism. ''
" William H. Goetzmann, New Lands. New Men: America and the Second Great Age o f Discovery 
(New York: Viking. 1986), .129-331.400-401; Nathan Reingold. “Definitions and Speculations: The 
Professionalization of Science in America in the Nineteenth Century." in Alexadra Oleson and 
Sanborn C. Brown, eds.. The Pursuit o f  Knowledge in the Early American Republic (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 53. Reingold noted the same trend. Trained researchers, anxious for 
ways to set themselves apart from amateur collectors or “cultivators,” established “research enclaves." 
In places like the Smithsonian Institution or the Coast Survey, professional scientists could work 
exclusively with people with similar training and motivations.
'■ Goetzmann, Exploration. 530,534,592.
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Powell owed as much to Joseph Henry and Spencer Fullerton Baird of the 
Smithsonian as he did the USGS. Henry, the first secretary of the Smithsonian, snared 
funding for Powell’s remarkable exploration of the Colorado River in 1869, and Powell 
delivered his results to the Smithsonian. Later in his career, Powell organized the 
Smithsonian’s Bureau of Ethnology, where he managed massive ethnological studies of 
American Indians. The government funded Powell’s American Indian work for the 
Smithsonian. Powell also combined the USGS and the Bureau of Ethnology. More than 
any other person of his era, Powell linked the federal government to scientific exploration 
of the West.”
Despite clear connections to America’s exploratory past, Peary faced unique 
problems. He understood that the allure of the Arctic as a region would fade upon 
discovery of the North Pole, especially if America lost the race. In addition, the complete 
lack of federal involvement in any aspect of Arctic research or exploration set it apart 
from the American West. America’s Arctic frontier operated through the grace, selfish 
motivations, and fickle nature of private philanthropy. Peary’s single greatest problem in 
over two decades of trying to reach the North Pole was funding. His salary as a Navy 
engineer was inadequate to fund an Arctic trip. Ship rental, the most expensive 
consideration, cost a minimum of ten thousand dollars, and the ships available for that 
cost fared poorly in the rough Arctic ice. Peary explained repeatedly that in order to have 
a good shot at the pole, he needed to be able to sail as far north as possible so that his
' '  Goetzmann, Exploration. 595. John Wesley Powell. The Exploration o f the Colorado River 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), v-vi; Powell, Canyons o f  the Colorado (Meadville, PA: 
Flood & Vincent, 1895), iii-iv. The scientific results of Powell's Colorado River study were 
disappointing, but the trek captured national attention. Powell's exploration of the Colorado River was 
so popular that in 1874, Congress refused to appropriate the funds Henry sought for more work by 
Powell until Powell wrote a popular account of his historic river journey.
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overland journeys were minimal. For too long, the arguments for a solid icebreaker ship 
got lost in the larger context of exploration and the race for the pole. Too few people 
understood that sailing on smaller, weaker, cheaper ships undermined everyone’s 
investment. The philanthropic community that supported Peary, even in the midst of a 
national economic depression, focused on the forest rather than the trees. It accepted 
Peary’s vision of America’s polar victory and dominance of Arctic science and 
information, and failed for too long to heed his simultaneous plea for attention to detail. 
He needed a ship unlike anything America had ever built. Only when his philanthropist- 
friends completely understood that point did Peary stand a chance at success.
It will likely never be known if Peary actually reached the North Pole. It does not 
matter. History has overlooked him. Arctic historians focus primarily on which man 
actually first set foot on the North Pole. This dissertation seeks not only to place Peary 
within a fuller context of American exploration, but to connect Arctic history to other 
aspects of tum-of-the-century America. Certainly those individuals and institutions that 
joined his mission saw Arctic exploration as a special moment in the nation’s 
development. Peary’s stateside career reveals that America’s ability to claim the North 
Pole was more than an obscure aside to the nation's history.
Discovery is supposed to be obvious. Either a person is the first to recognize 
something, or not. Moments of discovery provide excellent marking points for history, 
which has few absolutes. The inability of historians to determine who discovered the 
North Pole has resulted in a narrow consideration of this subfield of exploration. Almost 
without exception, the ulterior motive in studies of American Arctic exploration has been 
to uncover the verity of Peary’s and/or Cook’s claims.
Peary’s tale occurs toward the end of nearly four centuries of Arctic exploration.
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during which different nations dominated, but none appreciated the true difficulty of the 
expeditions. Men first sailed from Europe across the North Atlantic during the late 
1400’s, looking for a Northwest Passage. For hundreds of years, ships sailed from ports 
in England, Sweden, Norway, Italy, and Russia looking for the route. They sailed in small 
ships that were easily damaged or froze in the unyielding Arctic ice. The search for a 
Northwest Passage prevailed, despite magnificent failures and gruesome tragedies. Most 
explorers assumed that the ship that found the elusive waterway would pass over the 
North Pole on the way to Asia. During the mid-nineteenth century, after an international 
frenzy over a lost English captain turned into a familiar tale of shipwreck, starvation, and 
brutal death, interest in finding the passage faded. The North Pole, however, topped all 
geographers’ lists of remote spots on the planet as yet unclaimed by man. For example, in 
1900 Gilbert Grosvenor, president of the National Geographic Society (NGS), submitted 
the following to the Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution:
In 1800, the year that Jefferson was first elected President of the United 
States and Napoleon won the history-making battle of Marengo, about one-fifth 
of the earth’s land surface was known. The physical features of the remaining 
four-fifths were partly supplied by imaginative map makers or left a blank on 
the charts given to the public. In all approximately ten-elevenths of the earth’s 
land surface may be described as known and only one-eleventh as unexplored.
In fact less than one-eleventh remains unknown, for the unknown areas are so 
distributed in both hemispheres that nowhere except at the North and South 
poles are there remaining large unexplored tracts...The eighteenth century had 
been noted for the explorers of the seas, as the nineteenth was preeminent in 
men who split open great continents and laid bare to the eyes of mankind their 
mountains, rivers, and seas.'^
The North Pole took on an allure of its own, unattached to the Northwest Passage. 
Americans moved into this story just as the two spots’ histories diverged. Viewed from 
this perspective, Peary’s appearance as the United States’ finest Arctic explorer simply
Gilbert H. Grosvenor, “The Geographic Conquests of the Nineteenth Century." in Smithsonian 
Institution Annual Report (Washington. D C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 19(X)). 417.
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adds another name and nationality to a long list.
As a result, Peary is often reduced to being either a hero or a disgraceful liar. One 
of the earliest objective appraisals of Peary appeared in 1967, in John Edward Weems' 
Peary: The Explorer and the Man. Weems believed that Peary discovered the North Pole, 
but proving that was not his main objective.'^ He was the first historian with full access 
to the Peary family papers now found at the National Archives II in College Park, 
Maryland. Weems produced a thoughtful biography of Peary that revealed him to be a 
competitive man obsessed with the one goal that might bring him everlasting fame and 
glory. The author gave a human dimension to Peary that had been lost in debates about 
whether he reached the pole. Despite continual disappointments and the anxiety he 
caused his family, Peary remained devoted to his quest. Weems' study was the first 
balanced examination of Peary, but he also paid no attention to the larger history of Arctic 
exploration or how it became important to Americans. He assumed that the quest was of 
value mainly because it mattered to Peary, not because of its larger significance.
Writing over a decade after Weems, William R. Hunt adopted the most common 
angle of North Pole exploration. In To Stand at the Pole, Hunt examined the details of the 
Cook-Peary controversy, alternating between each of the explorer's accounts to consider 
the details. Hunt brought objectivity to a subject in which the usual tactic was to choose 
one explorer and either "prove" the veracity of his claim or dismantle the other man's case 
so completely that the chosen perspective was the only possible “truth." When the furor 
over North Pole rights broke out. Cook's quiet demeanor and comparative lack of media 
exposure barely withstood the onslaught from Peary's camp. Peary had spent years
" John Edward Weems. Peary: The Explorer and the Man (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 
Weems defended Peary as discoverer of the North Pole in an earlier book. Race fo r  the Pole (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, i960), xiv. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, famous Arctic explorer and two- 
time president of New York’s Explorers Club, wrote the preface for Weems’ first book and applauded 
it as “Justice for Peary, clarity for Cook. ”
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establishing media contacts to assure himself positive press, and the young National 
Geographic Society (NGS) and American Geographic Society (AGS) had supported him 
financially and professionally. In addition, Cook’s lone millionaire patron could not 
sustain the sort of attention that the Peary Arctic Club (PAC) could muster. The PAC, an 
incorporated organization of millionaires devoted to seeing Peary reach the pole, ensured 
that their man’s assorted contacts worked hard in his defense.
Peary’s history of exemplary polar exploration eventually swung opinion in his 
favor, especially after news broke that Cook’s claim of also being the first man to scale 
Mt. McKinley [in Alaska] was likely fraudulent. Cook claimed in 1906 that he was the 
first person to reach the peak of Mt. McKinley. Speculation that he fabricated his success 
broke in late 1909, in the middle of the public fight waged between Cook and Peary over 
the North Pole. The Mt. McKinley fiasco permanently damaged Cook’s reputation. Hunt 
disliked the work of historians on both sides of the question. He thought little of one of 
Cooks’ best defenders, Edwin Swift Balch (author of North Pole and Bradley Land,
1913), whose overblown efforts to defend the minutiae of Cook’s claims rendered his 
conclusions ridiculous. Hugh Eames* biography of Cook, Winner Lose All: Dr. Cook and 
the Theft o f the Pole (1973), excused Cook’s inconsistencies too easily. Similarly, Hunt 
attacked Peary’s strident supporters, like biographers William Herbert Hobbs (author of 
Peary, 1931) and Weems, both of whom labeled Cook a fraud, and Hunt regretted any 
historical attention given to Cook. Hobbs, in particular, believed that the debate crushed 
Peary and filled his last years with sorrow and disappointment. Hunt also downplayed the 
conclusions of Dennis Rawlins, author of Peary at the North Pole: Fact or Fiction?
( 1973) Rawlins attacked Peary’s evidence, though not because he favored Cook. He 
believed that Peary never reached the North Pole, and lied about it upon return to the US.
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Rawlins based much of his opinion on the fact that Peary never successfully proved 
scientifically that he had reached the pole. Peary’s evidence was remarkably weak, 
especially considering his long history of Arctic exploration. Hunt expressed frustration 
that despite such observations, this strategy forces the historian into the realm of 
circumstantial evidence, where it can never be shown conclusively what happened.
Hunt also stated the most probable reason for continuing intrigue about the polar 
controversy. Cook was continually described as the underdog, the weaker force fighting 
against overwhelming prestige, money, and advantage. Hunt attacked that perspective. 
The Mt. McKinley fraud case and the geographical organizations’ favor helped Peary 
more than did the PAC, which did not spend its money in defense of Peary. Hunt argued 
that the “underdog” image that Cook himself tried to foster lost merit until historians of 
the 1960’s revived it in poorly conceived attempts to reverse the reputations of people 
whom history had overlooked.'^ Hunt showed equal distaste for each explorer. Of Peary 
he wrote: “In 1897 Peary stole the Eskimos’ only source of metal, a great meteor, and, in 
the name of science, robbed a poor people of their greatest spiritual and practical resource. 
Greed, cruel greed, drove Peary to this wretched act.” Cook fared no better. Hunt 
believed that
To understand Cook, we must consider his attack on his rival 
carefully, not for its truth— it contained a mixture of truth, lies, 
exaggerations, questionable inferences, and venom—but for its elucidation 
of Cook’s psychological state. He was angry, unjustly injured in his own 
eyes, and he would show the world how the truth had been tarnished by 
Peary’s diabolical conduct. Cook’s scourging of Peary was vicious and 
defies the accuracy of Peter Freuchen’s celebrated appraisal: “Cook was a 
liar and a gentleman, Peary was neither.”'"
William R. Hunt, To Stand at the Pole: TIte Dr. Cook-Adtniral Peary North Pole Controversy (New 
York: Stein and Day, 1981). 207. 214-215,242-245.
' Hunt, To Stand, 227.
"* Hunt. To Stand, 153. Historian Peter Freuchen published an earlier account of the controversy. 
Arctic Adventure ( 1935).
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The underdog theory is too simplistic for any decent consideration of Peary or 
Cook, but certainly it cannot be denied that Peary’s powerful friends gave him some 
advantages. They were loyal over many years. The influential men who backed him 
during the controversy were not glory-seeking fair-weather friends looking for celebrity. 
Most had spent money on at least one of Peary’s earlier expeditions, and had helped again 
either in response to Peary’s personalized pleas for help or his well-directed fears that 
another explorer might win the prize.
Hunt showed the pitfalls of considering the legacies of Peary and Cook merely 
from the perspective of their race for the pole. Neither explorer kept credible records, so 
while it is possible to attack one man's explanations, it is virtually impossible to prove the 
other’s claims. Moreover, too often the career of each explorer is measured by the events 
of 1909. Hunt’s dissatisfaction with other historians’ work springs from lopsided 
attention to this aspect of American polar exploration.
In recent years, scholars have paid more attention to the personalities of both men. 
Wally Herbert wrote an outstanding biography of Peary. Like Weems, Herbert used 
family documents to take a deeper look at Peary’s obsessive quest, but Herbert covered 
Peary’s entire life. Herbert, also an Arctic explorer, felt a special empathy for Peary and 
developed friendships with Peary’s descendants. He connected personally with his 
subject, and his well-researched book was also an elaborate defense of Peary’s claims of 
North Pole success. Despite this bias, however, Herbert also related more than any 
previous historian the extent to which Peary’s image was created by Peary’s close circle 
of friends and supporters.'" Herbert focused on the expeditions and the psychological toll 
that each disappointment took on Peary. However, he also revealed how heavily the
" Wally Herbert The Noose o f Laurels: The Discovers' o f  the North Pole (London: Grafton Books, 
1989). 107-109, 120.
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expectations of his eager benefactors weighed on Peary’s mind. As Peary grew older and 
the expeditions became more expensive, he felt increasing pressure to succeed not only 
for himself, but to reward the faith and investments of the PAC members. For example, 
when Peary returned with frost-bitten toes to Fort Conger in 1899, having failed to reach 
the pole, Herbert described the dual concerns of Peary. He was
...in Greely’s tomb of a hut at Fort Conger, going through what he later 
described as the ‘unrelieved blackness' of his ordeal—those forty days and 
nights of suffering in which he was fighting not only the pain and the 
horror of the amputations performed with primitive tools by Dr. Dedrick, 
but also the fear that he might never walk again. Nor had those friends of 
his in New York known at the time of their first meeting what sort of relief 
operation to mount when sending a ship in search of the Windward. Was it 
to be a re-supply mission, or were they to go north to bring Peary out?
These were men who were accustomed to seeing results for their money, 
and yet here they were finding themselves sending out one ship to search 
for another. “
Herbert examines Peary's psyche more than any other historian. Within his 
historical narrative are countless musings about Peary's thoughts during undocumented 
moments. For example, heading home on the Windward after the trip recounted above, 
Peary began to recover: “What advice Jo had offered him during their six weeks’ voyage 
home is not on record. We may, however, assume that she had warned him of the 
growing crisis within the Peary Arctic Club,... that the Club should be disbanded.... We 
may also assume that the healing privacy of those weeks with a soul mate who could share 
his burden had saved him on this, as on other occasions. Certainly by the time they 
reached Sydney, Peary had drawn enough strength from Jo at least to appear to be what 
the public expected a polar hero to be: an erect, weatherbeaten, courageous man.”'' 
Alternating between biography and the “controversy” has prevented a 
comprehensive history of American Arctic exploration. In Cook & Peary: The Polar
Herbert. The Noose, 144.
Herbert. r//e 148-149.
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Controversy, Resolved (1997), librarian Robert M, Bryce combined biographies of both
Cook and Peary as well as detailed study of each man's expeditionary history in one
massive tome. Bryce stated the case:
Some have seen Cook’s claims of 1909 as a transparent fraud, carried off by a 
cheap faker—an unfortunate affair that took away the luster from Peary’s richly 
deserved triumph. Others saw Cook as the ultimate victim and the story of his fall 
from hero to humbug as the tragic tale of the little man, helpless to resist a rich 
and powerful establishment bent on his destruction. In either case it was as plain 
as black or white. But life at its dullest is colored by at least shades of gray, and 
the truth often lies, inaccessible as the North Pole, somewhere in the deepest gray 
of the shadows that fill the inner recesses of the human mind."
He concluded that neither man reached the pole, which enabled him to present Cook as a
fraud without making him also an underdog. And Peary emerged as a man ruthlessly
dedicated to his singular goal, who had risked other people’s money, physical hardship,
and rough Arctic trips for so many years that failure on his last trip was simply not an
option. Bryce asserted that Peary knew he had failed to reach 90 N and that he lied out of
necessity and desperation. Despite the remarkable scholarship of Bryce’s book, his
conclusion that neither man reached the pole is simply one further opinion about a
question that likely can never be answered completely. The situation in which Cook and
Peary found themselves in 1909 still looks like an exploratory anomaly, the last public
gasp of the odd quest to find the North Pole. The impressive biographical information
about each man is buried within the ultimate need to prove why each man lied about the
same feat.
Scholarly consideration of the polar controversy inevitably narrows the history of 
American Arctic exploration. For this reason, the dissertation will end its consideration of 
Peary’s career before his last expedition in 1908-09, the one on which he claimed victory.
"  Robert M. Bryce. Cook & Peary: The Polar Controversy, Resolved (Mechanicsburg. PA: Stackpole 
Books. 1997). xvi.
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There is no need for another opinion about whether he reached the North Pole. The
funding sources and rationale for this trip were no different from the previous one, with
one exception. Jesup died before Peary had enough donations to cover the costs of ship
repair, but his widow contributed enough money to finance an expedition nearly identical
to the disappointing attempt of 1905-06. In addition, it seems necessary to explain why
the dissertation focuses on Peary rather than Cook, since both men were involved equally
in the debate over first claim of the North Pole. Unlike Peary, Cook was not singly
devoted to Arctic exploration. He explored the Arctic several times, but he also tried
Antarctic exploration, as well as a Mt. McKinley mountaineering trip. On most of these
adventures, he was a member, not a leader. Also, millionaire John R. Bradley financed
his supposedly successful 1907-09 trip, making it unnecessary for Cook to campaign for
money. By the time Cook led his own expedition to the pole, Peary had done the hard
work of making the nation care about the outcome. Finally, the obsessive drive that
compelled Peary to return again and again to the Arctic set him apart. His goal crippled
and almost killed him, ruined him financially, took him away from a wife he adored, and
forced him to be a public persona. No other explorer came close to matching his
dedication. Lopez speculates about the spell the Arctic wove on men like Peary:
The initial trip into that far northern landscape is perceived by the explorer 
As something from which one might derive prestige, money, social 
advantage, or notable awards and adulation. Although these intentions are 
not lost sight of on subsequent trips, they are never so purely held or so 
highly regarded as they are before the first journey begins. They are 
tempered by a mounting sense of consternation and awe. It is as though the 
land slowly works its way into the man and by virtue of its character 
eclipses these motives. The land becomes large, alive like an animal; it 
humbles him in a way he cannot pronounce. It is not that the land is 
simply beautiful but that it is powerful. Its power derives from the tension 
between its obvious beauty and its capacity to take life. Its power flows 
into the mind from a realization of how darkness and light are bound
20
together within it, and the feeling that this is the floor of creation.'’
My dissertation moves chronologically through American Arctic exploration, and 
Peary's stateside career. Chapter One provides an historical overview of Arctic 
exploration. It covers the history and international significance of the Northwest Passage. 
A nautical route from Europe to Asia appealed to different nations for over four hundred 
years. By the nineteenth century, England's maritime strength, as well as the success of 
its Arctic whaling fleet, made that nation dominant in the search for the Northwest 
Passage. Whalers' reports ensured current knowledge of unpredictable Arctic ice 
conditions, but the small wooden sailing ships could not handle the ice. Innumerable 
crews found themselves trapped or stranded in the uncomfortable darkness of an Arctic 
winter. Tragedy outweighed success in Arctic travel until well into the nineteenth 
century. In 1845, English captain John Franklin of the Erebus and the Terror disappeared 
while looking for the famed route, and dozens of crews searched for him for the next 
several years. Piecemeal evidence revealed that he and his men froze or starved to death 
after their ships sank and they left in search of rescue. After this disaster, England lost 
interest in concerted Arctic exploration. The international search for Franklin, however, 
resulted in significant cartographic advances regarding Arctic exploration.
Chapter Two discusses the passing of the Arctic exploration torch from England to 
the United States. The first American explorers had helped search for Franklin. The 
problems associated with searching for the Northwest Passage killed enthusiasm for its 
discovery. However, another locale still captured m en's imaginations. The North Pole, 
which previously had been discussed merely as a place one passed by on the way to Asia, 
held its own allure. The North Pole became of value as a remote point that might
Lopez. Arctic Dreams. 351-352.
21
guarantee historical fame for its claimant. Also, late nineteenth-century explorers 
embraced the erroneous Open Polar Sea Theory, which stated that an open ocean lay 
beyond the ring of ice that formed annually at approximately 80 N. Nobody yet realized 
that the North Pole lay in the middle of an ocean, and that most of it was frozen year- 
round. By the 1850’s, most explorers believed that enough was known about Arctic travel 
that finding the North Pole was simply a matter of time, and it became a race. Americans, 
therefore, paid minimal attention to the Northwest Passage. Three men in particular paved 
the way in American Arctic exploration. Charles Francis Hall, Elisha Kent Kane, and 
Adolphus W. Greely each sailed to the Arctic in search of fame and international respect. 
None succeeded, and they left a weak legacy for Peary. Greely, the last of the three, 
commanded a US Navy-funded scientific expedition that ended with tales of starvation, 
cannibalism, and unimaginable suffering. Greely survived, but the tragedy compelled the 
federal government and the military to give up all formal interest in Arctic exploration. 
When Peary first saw Greenland five years after Greely’s return, he planned immediately 
to look for the North Pole, and thus began his ceaseless efforts to replace the patrons that 
Greely had lost. The one overlapping point of interest between these earlier endeavors 
and the later efforts of Peary was the Americans’ commitment to collection of scientific 
data. Clearly, in most cases, their excitement over new geographical observations, Inuit 
descriptions, or cartographic information was merely the most acceptable substitute for 
accomplishing their larger goals. But their habit of announcing that the Arctic was of 
unbounded scientific value helped Peary. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
Peary’s first several trips, during which he learned how to maximize his time in the Arctic 
as well as expand his philanthropic network. In order to be able to devote his own time to 
exploration, he learned how to entice scientists to accompany him (as paying passengers).
and then use their institutional networks to his advantage upon return to the states.
Chapter Three focuses on one trip only, the expedition of 1897. Peary was famous 
by then, and he also improved upon his methods for asking scientists to join him. His 
massive summer fund-raising campaign of 1897 took place at a crucial point in his career. 
He had recently delivered the (then) three largest known meteorites in the world to the 
AMNH. In addition, he had left six live Inuits in the care of Franz Boas, chief 
anthropologist at the AMNH. These “donations” brought tremendous prestige to Peary, 
and in return Jesup, the president of the museum, became a significant money-raising 
force on Peary's behalf. Peary spent the summer organizing the sale and delivery of his 
top specimens as well as preparing for his next trip, during which he planned to spend four 
consecutive winters in the Arctic. He proposed each spring to try for the pole. Nobody 
had ever purposely spent four years in the Arctic, and the plan required more money and 
organization than earlier trips. The summer fund-raising campaign also showed clearly 
how much Peary's inability to secure a decent ship affected his goals. American 
shipyards made ships strong enough for Peary's needs, but because whaling was an 
important economic activity during the late nineteenth century, there were no ships 
available for sale or rent that could handle the ice. Peary rented other nations' ships, and 
inevitably the ships that he could afford were too small and weak to take him far enough 
North. Peary's ship woes receive close attention, since ship rental comprised the largest 
percentage of his expedition expenditures. Peary's summer of 1897 rush to make his 
usual scientific connections and to plan his most ambitious trip offers interesting insights 
into his methodology.
Chapter Four delves into the expedition of 1898-1902. Peary probably had his 
most solid, most enthusiastic support during these years, but each of his four spring
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attempts on the pole ended in failure. His most dedicated backers formally organized into 
the Peary Arctic Club while he was away. Jesup, Herbert Bridgman (wealthy owner of 
the Brooklyn Standard Union), and Peary’s wife Josephine used Peary’s pre-established 
network to maintain his media attention and to keep Arctic exploration viable and 
newsworthy. The NGS and the AGS, organizations of importance to Peary’s scientist 
acquaintances, each published any and all news of Peary’s expedition in their respective 
societal journals. Bridgman, Jesup, and Josephine also maintained Peary’s media 
contacts, so that they would be well prepared to write positively about anything Peary 
accomplished. During and after this expedition, Peary relied less on the actual presence 
and money of individual scientists, and more on their patron institutions. The change was 
as much about the increasing cost of his expeditions as it was the movement in American 
science toward sifting all scientific data through professional organizations.
Chapter Five, the last chapter of the dissertation, considers Peary’s penultimate 
expedition. Once again, Peary subtly changed the way he sought funding. Peary had no 
personal interest in science, but he understood that without the support of scientific groups 
he could not continue to explore. However, his past failures forced him to be clear about 
his main concern: he needed a better ship. At the same time, the PAC underwent 
substantial membership turnover. Several men who believed in Peary refused to pour 
more money into the quest. Peary declared that if he had a big, steel-hulled, steam- 
powered ship, he could win the race. Peary completely bypassed individual scientists and 
went directly to better sources of money. Once more culling the ranks of top scientific 
institutions and wealthy philanthropists, Peary raised the hundred thousand dollars 
necessary to build America’s first Arctic ice-breaker, the Roosevelt. Confident of success, 
Peary again sailed North. He failed, but there the story ends. The significance of the
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story will be addressed in my conclusion.
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Chapter One
The Open Polar Sea and the Northwest Passage: Pre-Peary Arctic Explorations
The Arctic region has been brutal to explorers and visitors. Until the late 
nineteenth century whalers, traders, navies, and others who traversed the Arctic Ocean 
had little familiarity with the region. It attracted northern whaling fleets, but it was so 
dangerous that only a few sailors dared travel further north than necessary. Men often 
achieved fame merely by taking their ships into the Arctic Ocean, especially if they never 
returned. It took time for even the best explorers to realize that successful Arctic sailing 
required different preparation and technology than did other oceans. Slowly, over 
hundreds o f years, the Arctic became a destination of intrigue and scientific adventure for 
the individuals and nations that tried to claim it. People variously viewed the Arctic as a 
possible link to the other side of the world, an adventurous quest, a destination of 
scientific opportunity, or an intimidating environment hindering passage to the North 
Pole. Humans remained fascinated with the Arctic, despite changing explanations of the 
region's value.
The Arctic Ocean is, in fact, never completely ice-free. Sailing conditions were 
difficult, regardless of the season, because even slight damage to a ship could prevent its 
safe return. The Arctic Ocean was full of ice blocks, chunks, bergs, and sheets, and 
unpredictable tides made their presence a nightmare. The southern limits of the ice packs 
changed annually, which frustrated sailors who might reach a record Farthest North one 
year but encounter thick ice much further south on the same route the following year. As 
a result. Farthest North records often held for years.
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Arctic exploration became a legitimate goal as early as the 16“^  century, and at 
first men considered the harsher sailing conditions an endurance test. Arctic history is a 
chronology of successive sailors of one country working to best the records of other 
nations' ablest seamen. Until the early 20*'’ century, England, Sweden, Norway, Italy, 
Russia, and the United States took turns achieving Arctic records and trying to discover 
the easiest routes around or through the region. Thousands of sailors traveled the Arctic 
Ocean between 1500 and 1900. The majority did so during the nineteenth century in a 
climate of intense international competition over exploratory goals and whaling profits, 
but it was a destination of interest long before. For much of the time, not one ship’s 
captain knew exactly where he was going after he passed approximately 80 N. This 
circle o f latitude passes through the northern tip o f Greenland and cuts across 
Spitzbergen, a familiar landmark for western European navigators. Most ships could not 
handle the severe ice above 80 N. and ship captains feared that falling temperatures 
would block escape routes with ice sheets that could reduce a ship to a pile of splintered 
wood. The Arctic Ocean was so difficult to navigate that every nautical degree or minute 
reached beyond 80 N won international admiration.
The Arctic Ocean envelops several small clusters of islands, and places like 
Spitzbergen and Franz Josef Land were early stopping points for the first Arctic 
explorers. (See Appendix, Figures 2-3.) The enduring question for Arctic travelers was 
land further north. Nobody knew where or if there was land beyond the few known 
islands, nor did they know where the Arctic Ocean ended. Land offered the possibility of 
harbor, hunting options, and trading opportunities with the native Arctic peoples. Early 
explorers speculated that one of the Arctic islands might extend northward over the North
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Pole and extend to Asia. These were important considerations for crews which feared 
being trapped on ice-bound ships. Starvation and cold ended many explorers’ dreams of 
finding safe harbor before winter arrived in the Arctic.
Farthest North records were usually consolation prizes. There were two greater 
achievements to claim in the Arctic. For the first 350 years o f Arctic exploration, the 
main quest was the Northwest Passage, a nautical route between Europe and Asia that 
would allow travel to the Orient in less time than easterly paths.' Countless sailors edged 
around the southern coastline of Greenland, expecting thereafter to ease through open 
waters on the westward trip to Asia. They were faced, however, with such barriers as 
Baffin Island, Ellesmere Island, Hudson’s Bay. Victoria Island, Lancaster Sound, and 
others. The men searching for the Northwest Passage wanted to avoid land and find the 
clearest, easiest path to the Pacific Ocean. The Arctic Ocean north of Canada holds 
dozens o f islands, which made the Northwest Passage a difficult, elusive route. It was 
navigated in 1906 (by Norwegian Roald Amundsen), but by then the second great prize 
of the Arctic was in greater demand.
Interest in the North Pole resulted from the quest to find the Northwest Passage, 
and after the 1850's dreams of reaching the North Pole outweighed those o f creeping 
through the passage. Until that time, the Arctic was little understood. Many explorers 
still believed in the "open polar sea theory,” which entered popular debate during the 18'*^  
century, and was the mistaken impression that an open polar sea lay on the other side of 
the ring of ice that hovered around 80 N. If explorers could simply push their ships 
through the ice barriers, they could sail over the North Pole and on to Asia. Belief in the
' John Noble Wilford. The Mapmakers: The Sion- o f  the Great Pioneers in Cariography-from Anticpiin- to 
the Space A^e York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1981). 140-143.
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open polar sea theory occasionally revived when someone reached a new Farthest North 
and declared that there was less ice in front o f him than behind. It fascinated humans for 
hundreds of years. Until the late nineteenth century, most uncommon geographic 
discoveries were made by sea. so overland Arctic exploration was not a consideration. 
Most explorers believed that it was possible to sail to the North Pole if only the proper 
route could be found.
Eric (the Red) Thorvaldsson sailed northwest out of Norway on a heavy Viking 
ship in 986, and in so doing earned the title o f "first Arctic explorer.” He established 
several short-lived colonies on Greenland, and his son Leif (the Lucky) Ericsson later 
became the first European to reach Baffin Island. They began a long tradition in which 
Europeans sailed into the Arctic, briefly stayed near or on coastline shores, and turned 
around without leaving much of a record of their presence.
England produced the first serious Arctic explorers. John Cabot, an experienced 
Genoese sailor, led the pack. Cabot first asked Portugal and Spain for patronage, but 
both nations believed they had better plans. Spain's King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella 
trusted their support o f another Genoan. Christopher Columbus. In 1493, as Cabot began 
organizing his first western sailing trip. Columbus simultaneously toured Spain, showing 
off the Caribbean finds that he mistook for Asian trophies. Spain's monarchs were not 
interested in funding Columbus' potential competition. Portugal also ignored Cabot, 
choosing instead to send explorers around the coast o f Africa in a different variation of 
eastern routes to India. Europeans used various overland routes, but they were lengthy 
and perilous due to illness, fatigue, and crime. Portugal chose to send its sailors East, but 
Cabot intended to try the other direction. Spain's daring investment in Columbus looked
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lucrative in 1493, to Cabot’s detriment, Columbus found land and exotic cultures exactly 
where current maps marked India. Nobody yet appreciated the degree to which 
cartographers who relied on Ptolemy’s calculations had underestimated the size o f Earth. 
Most fifteenth-century sailors agreed that it was spherical, but they did not realize its full 
circumference. In addition to believing that India lay closer to Europe than it does, these 
same thinkers never imagined that another continent separated Europe from the spice 
market." Cabot asked England for financial support after Spain and Portugal refused aid.
England’s King Henry Vll realized that his nation might lose easy access to the 
Asian spice market if  he did not fund exploration. Cabot intended to navigate a route 
further north than Columbus, exposing himself to the more severe weather o f the North 
Atlantic as he sailed along a line o f  latitude unfamiliar to most Europeans. Cabot 
believed, however, that if he sailed further north the curvature of the earth at his chosen 
latitude might result in a shorter trip. King Henry gave Cabot permission to lead an 
English expedition westward, on the condition that he not sail south, possibly intruding 
upon the exploratory ventures of Spain or Portugal.^
Before departure, Cabot faced another problem, however. He needed a ship. The 
king gave no money, though he announced that Cabot could command as many as five 
ships. The reaction of local businessmen indicated a low level o f enthusiasm for Cabot's 
quest. English merchants agreed to build only one ship."* Cabot became unusual in
■ Peter Firstbrook. The o f  the Matthew: John Cahot <H the Discover}' o f  North America (San
Francisco: Bay Books & tapes, 1997), 19, 36-37. 53. Second-century AD mathematician, geographer, and 
astronomer Claudius Ptolemaeus produced the most popular theories about the relative size and shape of 
the planet until sailors o f Columbus and Cabot’s era demonstrated his cartographic errors. Before 1300, the 
overland haul o f  spices from Asia to Europe took years. The average sea voyage was also a lengthy three 
years, and only a fraction o f merchant ships survived the trip. The spice trade was lucrative enough, 
however, that merchants risked the loss o f  four of every five ships.
Firstbrook, The Torage, 109. 112.
* Firstbrook, The Toyage, 112; Frank Rasky. The Polar I'oyagers: Explorers o f  the North (Toronto:
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Arctic history because he commanded a recently constructed ship. Most of his successors 
used any ship available for sale or rent, regardless o f the vessel's initial purposes and 
strength. Nations that paid insufficient attention to their Arctic explorers’ modes of 
transportation risked lives and money. The sailing ship of Cabot’s era, “along with 
cathedrals and castles[,] was the most complex piece of construction of pre-industrial 
times. For thousands o f years, the ship combined technical complexity with versatility in 
a way that was not matched until the development o f the steam engine. Sailing ships 
were the top technologies o f their time and were built to meet the needs of commerce or 
war.”'  Despite the ships’ artistry, however, Arctic exploration tested most ships beyond 
their limits of endurance.
Bristol merchants secured the Matthew, a small 50-ton ship, for Cabot.^ He and 
his three sons sailed from Bristol, England to Labrador, and so became the first 
documented Europeans to penetrate the Arctic Circle. Cabot reported little about the 
Arctic, though he was a fine cartographer. His maps were invaluable to those who 
followed him because fifteenth-century navigation in longitude was a dangerous, hit-or- 
miss activity. ’ Most sailors still relied upon stargazing, mariners' needles (to track the 
magnetic north pole), astrolabes, and dead reckoning.** It was risky to head into the North
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited. 1976). 71. It is not clear why the merchants refused to give Cabot the four 
additional ships. He was a foreigner and favored an unknown route for the financially risky spice trade, so 
the English merchants may have been unwilling to gamble further.
 ^ Firstbrook, The t'mogc. 55.
" Firstbrook. The Voyage. 65. The tonnage o f  ships refers to the carrying capacity of a ship, not its weight. 
Seafaring tradition adapted the old English word "tunne." a reference to a barrel o f liquid, into "ton." By 
common usage, a wine barrel holding 252 gallons weighed roughly 2500 pounds, slightly over one 
(modem) ton.
'  Rasky. The Polar i'oyagers. 76.
Dava Sobel and William J. Andrews. The IlliistraleJ LongUude: The True Story’ o f  a Lone Genius Who 
Solved the Greatest Scientific Prohlem o f  his T/me ( New York; Walker and Company, 1998), 18. Dead 
reckoning was very unreliable. The captain might throw a log tied to a rope overboard, record the speed at 
which the ship moved away, consult the stars or a compass for direction o f travel, consider approximate 
wind speed and direction, and calculate the speed and longitude from this information.
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Atlantic. Since the sailors had trouble determining how far west or east they were of any 
known location, they could never be sure where or if  land might suddenly appear. The 
few maps o f the oceans northwest o f Europe were poorly drawn and often distorted 
relative distances. Cabot’s maps were valuable assets under those conditions.
England’s interest in the Northwest Passage increased in 1589 when geographer 
Richard Hakluyt suggested the presence o f a northern route to the Orient in Principal 
Navigations. Hakluyt read about and mingled with England’s leading explorers and 
travellers, and from these observations wrote about the Northwest Passage as the nation’s 
next mercantile opportunity.'^ Russia was a constant presence in Siberia and eventually 
in western Canada, but England was the first leading Arctic exploratory nation, and 
Hakluyt’s publications prompted the first well-funded expeditions to prove the existence 
of the Northwest Passage. In 1607, the Muscovy Company, a whaling business, 
commissioned Henry Hudson to find the shortest path to Asia. He got stuck in ice west 
of Greenland, and so gathered more information about the northernmost regions of North 
America than about the Northwest Passage. He found and named the Hudson River of 
New York, as well as Hudson's Bay, which he discovered was a major whale feeding 
ground. Unlike Cabot. Hudson never begged for funding. The Dutch East India 
Company offered him more money than the Muscovy Company after his first successes, 
and eventually he won the favor of King James I. who paid for his 1611 trip on the
During the 1760's. English ciockmaker John Harrison developed what became known as the chronometer, 
an instrument that enabled sailors to determine accurate time on the ship and compare it to the known time 
at zero degrees longitude (which runs through Greenwich). They could then determine longitude Longitude 
was measured by time, unlike latitude. Until then, mechanical compasses, which required special 
knowledge of the curvature of the earth to account for magnetic variations, were the most useful 
instruments.
'' Clements Markham. The Fifty Yeats ' Work o f  the Royal Geographical Societ}' (London: John Murray. 
1881). 5.
Discovery}^ His information exemplified the problems of Arctic exploration west of 
Greenland. Hudson and his followers had little difficulty sailing around the southern tip 
o f Greenland. He showed, however, that it would be difficult to continue straight west 
along that route past the southern tip o f Baffin Island. It would be necessary to maneuver 
northward between the two islands before heading further west." Hudson, in fact, found 
it impossible to find a northern exit from Hudson's Bay without running into 
impenetrable ice. He established a new Farthest North at 80 23'. but in 1611, with his 
ship stuck in the bay, his crew mutinied and he was never seen again.'"
The sailors' decisions about when to turn north were crucial. If a ship were 
damaged early or stuck in ice late in the season, there might be no hope of escape. 
Hudson's connection with the Muscovy Company, therefore, was not unusual. Explorers 
in search o f the Northwest Passage depended upon reports from earlier discoverers as 
well as those of whaling fleets. Even by the early 17th century, it was clear that it would 
not be possible to head North anywhere between Svalbard and Greenland. Whalers 
repeatedly reported the solid ice conditions between the two islands. The region between 
these two landmasses contained many whales because where the cold Arctic waters 
mingled with the warmer Atlantic Ocean, conditions were ideal for plankton. Krill, the 
Greenland Right whales' favorite food, ate plankton. Whalers, therefore, hunted in the 
same areas that posed the most serious navigational concerns for explorers. The whalers 
knew that the ice between Svalbard and Greenland was deep and thick and that explorers
Peter C. Newman. Empira o f  the Bay: The Company o f  Advamurers that Seized a Continent (New York: 
Penguin Books. 1998). 30-31.
"  It was not determined that Greenland was an island until Robert Edwin Peary walked across its northern 
tip in 1892. The northern part o f Greenland lay too far North for most ships. It was impossible for them to 
sail around the northern point of the island partly because they did not know where that point lay. and also 
because no ship could handle the severe ice that far north.
'■ Clive Holland. Farthest North: A Histoiy o f  North Polar Exploration in Eye-Witness Accounts (New
would never be able to puncture it.’^  As a result, Hudson and those who followed him 
had to navigate west of Greenland before they tried to ram through the ice barrier.
Hudson tried to find both the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage.''*
The Northeast Passage was ideal for the same reasons as the opposite route, but few 
nations tried it. England, Italy, Norway, and later the United States all found it easier to 
head west and hope for clear passage. The Northeast Passage had thicker ice further 
south and the possibility of hitting land barriers was more obvious. Russia tried to send 
men through the Northeast Passage during the eighteenth century, but with no success. 
The Russian government funded Vasiliy Yakovlevich Chichagov in 1765 and 1766. He 
planned to sail from Svalbard to eastern Siberia in a straight line that would take him over 
or near the North Pole. He failed, but did beat Hudson's Farthest North when he reached 
80 28’ N. Russia gave up on serious Arctic exploration until the development of stronger 
ships during the twentieth century.'^
Hudson’s problems proved discouraging for England, despite the brief success of 
William Baffin on a similar route in 1616. Baffin hung close to the North American 
continent, like Hudson, but managed to turn his ship further North and chart what became 
for several decades the most recognizable landmarks of the Arctic. He saw Whale 
Sound, Smith Sound. Jones Sound. Lancaster Sound, and what became known as Baffin 
Bay. He did not fully explore any of these waterways, any one of which might
York: Carroll and GraF Publishers. Inc.. 1994). 13.
’ ’ Holland. Furthest North. 14-15.
'■* The Northeast Passage is the water lane extending east o f Svalbard to Asia. In theory , the Northwest 
Passage and Northeast Passage might somehow have been connected, but since nobody knew exactly 
where more landmasses might be. or how far north they extended, few sailors assumed that navigating one 
passage meant passage through the other. Those attempting to find the Northeast Passage avoided the 
problems o f the Northern Atlantic, but usually faced tougher ice conditions.
Holland. Farthest North. 15.
34
potentially have led to the Northwest Passage, but he sighted and named them.'*
The Russians made two failed attempts at the Northwest Passage and Britain tried 
again, but Arctic explorers accomplished little during the eighteenth centuiy. The real 
problem was that the small converted whaling ships could not handle the ice.’’ Only 
bigger, heavier ships stood a chance o f pushing beyond 80 N. Even when the English 
Admiralty agreed to convert a ship for Arctic travel, the ice was often overpowering. The 
best English sailors of the eighteenth century used ships o f at least 200 tons, and more 
than one ship had to be abandoned in crushing ice.'* Ship captains usually turned around 
when they encountered sizable ice chunks in the water or when the temperature dropped 
and more ice began to form. Occasionally, these ships stayed afloat under such 
conditions by using ice anchors (iron hooks) to pull the ships into ice floes, which 
prevented them from being hit by floating icebergs. The anchors also ensured that the 
ships would not scrape bottom, another serious concern.N evertheless, the ships were 
unable to withstand Arctic weather conditions.
Few dared to follow Hudson, but his reports proved beneficial to the Muscovy 
Company, one of his patrons. He saw large pods of whales near Spitsbergen, an area 
soon known as the Greenland fishery. Both the British and the Dutch turned their 
attention to Arctic whaling grounds, and soon whaling shore stations dotted the northern
M. J. Ross. Polar Pioneers: John Ross amiJames Clark Ross (Montreal and Kingston: McGili-Queens 
University Press. 1994). 24.
Holland. Farthest North. 14.
"* Ernest S. Dodge. The Polar Rosses: John and James Clark Ross and their Explorations (New York: 
Harper and Row. 1973). 45. The English Navy sent two separate expeditions to the Arctic with two ships 
each in 1818. To prepare them for the Arctic, the whaling ships were double-planked, and extra timbers 
were added to the interiors to strengthen them to handle the ice pressures. The bows were reinforced with 
steel, then sharpened, so that they could push through the ice. These were routine improvements for Royal 
Navy Arctic expeditions. Even so. the ships were too light to handle substantial Arctic ice.
' ' Holland. Farthest North. 34.
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Canadian coastlines?® After one spectacular exploratory failure, the Dutch focused on 
whaling rather than the Northwest Passage. In 1619, King Christian IV commissioned 
two ships for Jens Munk, and sent him to find a way through Hudson’s Bay. Munk made 
it to Churchill River on the western side of the bay, but no further. His ships froze, and 
his crew suffered all winter from the effects of scurvy. The following summer, Munk 
and two other men left the bodies of their sixty-one shipmates behind, and somehow 
sailed home. Survival surprised Munk, who at one point scrawled into his journal: 
"Herewith, good-night to all the world—and my soul into the hands o f God.”"'
The Dutch already had expertise in handling northern waters, having established 
themselves as the best herring fisherman around Europe. Dutch sailors also were more 
adventurous, willingly working outward toward Greenland and Davis Strait in order to 
kill more whales. English whalers, however, stuck close to Spitsbergen and sent out 
comparatively few expeditions.""
England's delayed entrance into the whale oil market partially explains why the 
eighteenth century produced few English Arctic explorers. Arctic interest revived again 
for two reasons. England's textile industry profited from a cycle of increased 
urbanization and population growth. Demand grew for whale oil for items like street 
lamps and textile instrumentation oil/grease. The national government recognized the 
situation and doubled the bounty paid to whaling ships."'’ The English whaling fleet 
became internationally competitive. In addition. England remained interested in the
■" Lance E. Davis. Robert E. Bailman. and Karin Gleiter. In Pursuit o f  Leviathan: Technolog\\ Institutions. 
Productivity, and Profits in American IVhaiing. ISI6-IÇD6 (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago 
Press. 1997). 3 1. The shore stations also helped the ship situation. With a more accessible home port, it 
was less o f  a disaster for a ship to face southern or early ice.
■' Newman. Empire. 34-35.
■■ Davis. Bailman. and Gleiter. In Pursuit. 33.
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Northwest Passage, despite repeated failures, because Spain and Portugal dominated the 
other known routes to the Orient via the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans."''
England’s Captain Constantine John Phipps took two ships, the HMS Racehorse 
and the HMS Carcass beyond the western edge of Greenland in 1773. Phipps agreed to 
the trip after Judge Daines Barrington convinced him of the open polar sea theory. 
Hudson's voyages hinted that the theory was wrong, but Barrington renewed interest in 
it. llnfortunately for Phipps. Barrington based his ideas on weak evidence using 
scattered evidence from various whalers and explorers. He hypothesized that the ice 
barrier at 80 N was not present every year, and he convinced the Board of Admiralty, 
through the Council of the Royal Society (of which he was a member), to approve an 
Arctic expedition."^ Phipps led the trip and encountered the same problems as Hudson, 
though he stole the Farthest North record from the Russians by reaching 80 48’. At that 
point, he saw a wall o f ice and returned to England convinced that the open polar sea 
theory was dead.
The expedition accomplished little, but the support of the Royal Society changed 
forever the pace of English exploration. The Royal Society first organized in 1665 as 
way for some of England's most devoted travellers, amateur and professional scientists, 
and would-be explorers to work together " 'for the improvement of natural knowledge.'”"^ ’ 
The Royal Society began publishing its collection of travellers' and explorers' accounts 
in its Philosophical Transactions. The organization also worked to involve the 
government in all types of exploration. Barrington misled Phipps, but through his Royal
Holland, Farthest North. 2 
■■ Holland. Farthest North. 19.
Markham. The Fifh- Years '. 1. The Royal Society's earliest members looked back fondly at the efforts of 
Hakluyt and his attempts to push England ahead in quests for new mercantile partners and routes. Hakluyt.
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Society connections he secured English government support for Arctic exploration. The 
government offered unwavering support for such endeavors for the next two hundred 
years, although its financial dedication proved less steady. The Royal Geographic 
Society later emerged from this early Council o f the Royal Society and maintained the 
organization's oft-stated devotion to “The desire of increasing—not wealth, but 
k n o w l e d g e . E n g l a n d ’s best explorers joined and promoted the Royal Society ever 
afterward, another factor in the nation’s eventual placement as the world's top 
exploratory power.
Captain .lames Cook, another Englishman, searched for the Northwest Passage in 
1776, but the expedition failed. Like Cabot, Cook was a skilled cartographer, but he was 
unable to get as close to the South Pole or the Northwest Passage as he had planned.
Cook sailed south and east out of England, and in three expeditions during the 1760's and 
1770's managed to explore and map an impressive number o f the coastlines of the Pacific 
Ocean. The Royal Society gave Cook its fullest support, knowing that the organization 
would benefit from any navigational information he collected since it served already as 
England's official scientific repository. In 1768, Cook also took as passenger Joseph 
Banks, a young aristocrat naturalist and Fellow of the Royal Society."'* Cook planned to 
mark the transit o f planet Venus as he circumnavigated the globe."'' England actually 
used the transit of Venus as a guise for sending Cook to discover whether a southern 
continent (Antarctica) existed. Also, intense mercantile competition prompted the 
English, French, and Dutch to look constantly for better and faster routes to Asia. The
in fact, misled many explorers with his poorly researched Principal Ncrvigaiions.
Markham. The Fifty Years 8.
■’* Markham. The Fifty Years ' . I I .  Banks later served as president of the Royal Society (1778-1820). always 
maintaining a special interest in Arctic exploration. He also won the honor of knighthood, the first
Admiralty knew that sending Cook with orders to observe the transit o f Venus, keeping 
the other purposes secret, would not arouse suspicion from jealous neighbors.^’’
The Resolution, Cook's famous ship, eventually encountered impenetrable ice 
near the western edge of Alaska, but this roundabout attempt to find the Northwest 
Passage grabbed England's attention.^' During his third and last trip in 1776, Cook 
visited both the Antarctic and the Arctic, stopped in New Zealand and Australia, and died 
in Hawaii. He did not find a Northwest Passage, but he was one of the first Arctic 
explorers to describe the native peoples he saw.^" It took several more years for 
Europeans to document and appreciate the Eskimos who met the ships upon landing. His 
predecessors, and most o f his followers, rarely left their ships and carefully avoided 
extensive land exploration. Eric the Red. for example, was the last European to land on 
Greenland until the early nineteenth century.
The number of expeditions sent to the Arctic increased dramatically during the 
nineteenth century, despite few tangible results. The Northwest Passage remained 
elusive, and those who aimed for the North Pole had no hope of success. Several more 
Farthest North records were set and more attention was paid to the Inuits and their ability 
to live in the severe Arctic climate. The English continued to lead the efforts to find the 
Northwest Passage and the pole. They also, however, remained poorly prepared for the 
region and sent underweight ships full o f large crews with lightweight winter clothing
Englishman awarded the title for scientific efforts.
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and incomplete maps.
Nobody had yet found the Northwest Passage, so the British Parliament decided 
to stimulate exploration. In 1776, it offered twenty thousand pounds for the first ship to 
sail from the Atlantic to the Pacific on a northern route.^^ It also promised five thousand 
pounds for the first ship to sail above 89 N. an impossibility for the small ships. The 
rewards were inadequate incentive. It took the excited observations of William Scoresby, 
Jr., the son of a famous English whaler, to revive serious interest in the Northwest 
Passage. In 1815. he read a paper entitled “On the Greenland or Polar Ice" before the 
Wernerian Society o f Edinburgh. In it he announced that he believed that the North Pole 
could only be reached overland, using sledges and dogs. Nobody had tried that method, 
mostly because every other noted Arctic explorer believed it might still be possible to sail 
across the North Pole. The English refused to adopt the native Inuits* mode of travel by 
dog sled. Scoresby's plan was decades ahead of its time. He did not believe that the 
North Pole was ice-free. He believed that the Northwest Passage existed, but he had no 
faith in the open polar sea.^ "*
These assertions by themselves meant nothing. Two years later, however, upon 
returning from a whaling expedition, he announced news that changed the course of 
English Arctic history. He said that he had sailed easily within sight of Greenland, a 
remarkable feat, and believed that the southern edge of the great ice pack was melting. 
Therefore, he suggested, interested explorers could now navigate around Greenland. He 
wrote to Sir Joseph Banks that "1 found... the surface of the Greenland sea. between 
parallels of 74 and 80 N, perfectly void of ice, which is usually covered with it....l do
” Ross. Polar Pioneers, 26. 
Ross. Polar Pioneers. 26.
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conceive there is sufficient interest attached to these remote regions to induce 
Government to fit out an expedition.” '^' At the time, he did not realize that he sailed 
during an unusually warm summer. The southern ice pack simply loosened early that 
year.
Banks, now president of the Royal Society, was a close friend of John Barrow, the 
2"‘* Secretary of the Admiralty. Banks told Barrow of Scoresby’s news, which added to 
Barrow's interest in the Northwest Passage. He had read Bamngton's book The 
Possibilitv o f Approaching the North Pole Asserted (originally published 1775). In 
response to news of the disappearance of the southern ice barrier, a second edition of 
Barrington’s book appeared in 1817. Barrington claimed in this error-laden book that the 
ocean was clear beyond Spitzbergen.^^ Barrow published his own account of the 
possibility o f reaching the Northwest Passage in the Quarterly Review, a favorite choice 
for Arctic fans.^^ Barrow's enthusiasm had far-reaching effects. He helped convince 
Parliament that the monetary reward for securing the Northwest Passage was insufficient. 
In response. Parliament instituted a graduated scale of payment in 1818. The first ship to 
reach 110 W or the mouth o f the Coppermine River would receive five thousand pounds, 
the first to find 130 W or the mouth o f the Mackenzie River would get ten thousand 
pounds, and the ship that made it to 150 W would earn fifteen thousand pounds. Efforts 
to reach the North Pole would also be rewarded: one thousand pounds at 83 N, two 
thousand at 85 N, and still five thousand pounds at 89 N."’* Barrow played a significant 
role in the events o f English Arctic exploration. His position as the 2"‘' Secretary of the
Ross. Polar Pioneers. 28. 
Dodge. The Polar Rosses. 37.
Ross. Polar Pioneers. 30. The Quarterly Review was founded by London publisher John Murray as a foil 
to the Edinhurs’h Review. Many Arctic explorers and backers published in the Quarterly Review over the
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Admiralty (1804-1845) gave him power over who should secure command of Arctic 
expeditions/^ Banks forwarded a letter from Barrow to Lord Melville, 1st Lord of the 
Admiralty, asking for funds to look for the Northwest Passage; funding won approval/® 
English Arctic exploration escalated dramatically.
Barrow ushered in a new phase o f English exploration. England had no 
competitors in the Arctic for the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. The French 
Revolution and monetary' problems in Spain and Portugal kept them from manning ships 
for such a dangerous and expensive trip. England’s Royal Navy, however, was powerful 
after the Napoleonic Wars, and had no more battles with which to occupy itself. The 
Navy accepted Barrow’s proposal to use exploration as a worthwhile use of these men 
and ships. Barrow had previously sailed on a whaler and knew the challenges involved.’*' 
He wanted England to beat any competitors “’to accomplish almost the only interesting 
discovery that remains to be made in geography.' namely the North-West Passage.’”*" 
During the next forty years. Britain sent over thirty expeditions into the Arctic. The 
Northwest Passage was still the primary goal, but the crews were also directed to chart 
and map the Arctic. Modem maps reflected these efforts. The Canadian Arctic looked 
less like a giant blank space, though the open polar sea theory still had backers.
Another factor kept Britain interested in the Arctic. A portion o f the Royal
years. All o f the reviews were anonymous.
Dodge. Thu Polar Rossus. 40.
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Society, dedicated to geographical discovery over other types of scientific achievement, 
established itself as the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 1830. The RGS became 
the world’s most prestigious geographical organization, and its evolution from elements 
of the Royal Society ensured a solid reputation from the beginning. Barrow, in addition 
to being an Admiralty officer, eventually became president of the RGS. Banks listed 
several exploratory goals for the Arctic, among them to '"circumnavigate Greenland, to 
ascertain the existence of Baffin's Bay, to solve the question of the continuityof sea 
round the northern coast of America....’"^  ^ He used his friendship with Barrow to 
pressure the navy to maintain this regional focus. It worked, and when Barrow assumed 
the RGS presidency he continued the momentum. Like Banks. Barrow had seen the 
Arctic. As a young man he had sailed on a whaler to Greenland, so personal experience 
again played a role in Arctic support.'*'* Barrow also encouraged non-professionals to 
foster interests in geographical knowledge and promoted the RGS as a collection of all 
people dedicated to international geographical pursuits."*  ^ One additional decision on the 
part of the RGS heightened its international prestige. Members o f the RGS believed that 
the information gathered by the navy. army, professional and amateur explorers should be 
collected in one area, but more importantly there should be a publication venue. In 1847. 
the Hakluyt Society organized '"for the purpose o f printing rare and unpublished voyages 
and travels." and the RGS worked closely with this group.'**’ A strong navy and a 
dedicated, well-funded, reputable geographical organization propelled England unrivalled 
into the Arctic. The RGS had substantial funds at its disposal and often gave money
' Markham. The Fifty Years'. 14. 
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grants to non-federal expeditions. The RGS also began handing out two medals to honor 
geographical achievement: the Patron's Medal and the Founder's Medal. Each of them 
also attached a monetary award, but the medals themselves became the highest 
internationally prized symbols o f exploration and/or leadership."*’
The open polar sea theory was tested again in 1818. Scoresby was not a Navy 
man, so he was passed over. The Navy supplied two separate expeditions, one to aim for 
the North Pole, the other for the Northwest Passage. Captain David Buchan {Dorothea. 
382 tons) and Lieutenant John Franklin {Trent, 249.5 tons) set sail for the North Pole. 
Buchan experienced ice problems and returned to England convinced that the open polar 
sea theory was wrong. He predicted that men would never reach the North Pole by ship.
Also in 1818, John Ross and William Edward Parry took the Isabella (385 tons) 
and the Alexander (252.5 tons) on a quest for the Northwest Passage. Both men became 
Arctic legends during their careers. It was a landmark trip for several reasons. One of 
the most remarkable occurrences was the ships' encounter with a small group o f Inuits in 
Greenland, further North than any other native group had ever been seen. The 
Englishmen communicated with them to a limited degree thanks to the efforts of their 
native Inuit translator. John Sacheuse. Sacheuse was a famous Greenland Eskimo who 
learned English after being discovered as a stowaway on the English whaler Thomas and 
Ann two years earlier.'*** He became a Christian and traveled with Ross as an interpreter. 
Ross' orders were to sail into Davis Strait, travel as far north as possible, round the 
northeastern comer o f the North American continent and sail on to the Pacific through the 
Bering Strait. Russia controlled Siberia and western Canada, so Ross was expected to
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hand his orders and paperwork to the Russian governor at Kamchatka and ask that it be 
sent to London. He could then return to England via the route of his choice.'*  ^ Ross 
stopped for the usual salutations with the Danish settlement on Whale Island, which 
consisted of a handful of Danish officers and a larger Inuit settlement.^® Arctic explorers 
often met and traded with Inuits on the islands around 70 N. but it was unusual to see 
anyone, even familiar English whalers, much beyond that point.
On the western coast of Greenland. Ross met a new group of Inuits. He named 
them the “Arctic Highlanders," a name applied to most groups of Greenland Inuits for the 
next several decades.'' Sacheuse had trouble understanding their dialect, but the two 
parties had a brief exchange. Ross and Parry apparently took remarkably little time to 
investigate the differences between their preparations for Arctic conditions and the 
lifestyles o f the Inuits. They were so oblivious to the differences that they first tried to 
indicate their peaceful intentions to the Arctic Highlanders by painting an olive tree on a 
white flag, an image meaningless to the native group. Their only familiarity with wood 
came from occasional pieces of driftwood.'"
Cook had seen Eskimos in western Canada, but this was one of the first meetings 
between Inuits and Europeans in Greenland. Ross also noticed that some of the Inuits 
had knives with iron blades, which was unexpected. The Inuits told Ross about the Iron 
Mountains, a group of several large masses approximately twenty-five miles away. The 
weather prohibited Ross from investigating the iron source, but he secured a few flakes of 
the metal and had them examined upon his return to England. A geologist determined
the North Pole. IHlH-1909 (New York: Penguin Books. 1998). 15.
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that they were of meteoric origin/^ The Iron Mountains meant nothing more to Ross, 
though they did eventually secure a spot in Arctic history. Ross and his crew found the 
Inuits more intriguing than useful, an unfortunate oversight for him on later expeditions. 
He could have capitalized on the Inuits’ familiarity with Arctic geography and climatic 
adaptations.
The expedition reached Baffin Island and moved into Lancaster Sound, a possible 
route to the Northwest Passage. Ross’ ship was faster than Parry’s, and due to a strange 
decision by Ross. Parry did not see much o f Lancaster Sound. Ross claimed to have seen 
a mountain range blocking further westward travel and turned his ship around for home. 
He only reached 76 N. He met Parry at the mouth of Lancaster Sound and told him of the 
mountain range, which he named Croker Mountains after the 1 st Secretary of the 
Admiralty. John Wilson Croker. Had Ross continued on, he might well have discovered 
a plausible entrance to the Northwest Passage, but he was convinced that the sound was 
blocked by land, and therefore actually a bay."”* Parry did not challenge Ross.”
Back in England, Barrow fumed at Ross for turning back and the two fought each 
other publicly over this decision. Ross published his account o f the trip. Voyage o f  
Discovery, in 1819. in which he recounted his vision o f the Croker Mountains and 
proclaimed that the sound had been blocked by ice. Parry knew nothing about ice in the 
sound. It was a surprisingly fast publication of such a memoir, and it was clearly meant 
as a means of pre-emptive self-defense.'^ Barrow wrote a review of the book in the
whom he became so familiar.
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Quarterly Review’, in which he excused Buchan for his similar failure, but attacked Ross 
for cowardice and mocked many o f his narrative descriptions/^
Parry also joined the fight. He finally broke his silence and responded angrily to 
Ross’ assertions in an article in the Quarterly Review. Both he and Ross wanted badly to 
command further voyages to the Arctic, but did not agree on what occurred during the 
1818 trip.'^ ** The Admiralty disliked having two of its own hurting each other publicly 
and so made a decision favoring one of the men. The Admiralty asked Ross to retire and 
offered him no more commands, and tapped Parry to lead another effort to find the 
Northwest Passage.
Parry returned to the Arctic in 1819 on the Hecla (375 tons) and proved Ross 
wrong. James Clark Ross, nephew of John Ross, sailed with Parry. He had also been 
with Parry and his uncle in 1818. He was not yet a commander, but these early trips 
helped his career. Parry found no land barriers as far as Lancaster Sound. His ship 
proceeded further west and won the five-thousand-pound prize when it passed HOW.
He and his men had to wait to claim the money, however, because the ship then got stuck 
in ice near Melville Island. They spent the winter trapped onboard, the first European 
crew to do so. Parr) had to wait until August for the ice to release its grip on the ship, 
and even then ice frequently blocked the vessel for days. He did not find the Northwest 
Passage, yet he became a celebrated hero. As the expedition's leader, he was entitled to 
one-fifth of the prize from the British parliament, and he earned another one thousand 
pounds for the sale o f his published account o f the o r dea l . Ba r r ow appreciated Parry's 
achievements and recommended him for more Arctic commands.
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In 1821, Parry again set sail for the Northwest Passage. George Francis Lyon 
commanded with him and was in charge o f the Hecla. Parry led the Hecla’s sister ship, 
the Fury. Parry went through the usual routine of equipping the ships for Arctic travel. 
For example, he increased the hulls' thickness to six inches and made the rudder-cases 
larger. He also broke with Navy tradition and took two ships of exactly the same size. 
Previously, the Navy recommended using one smaller ship for greater mobility in 
shallow water. Parry, however, argued for sister ships so that in case one ship had to be 
abandoned, the other could hold the entire expedition and supplies. He also took the new 
’‘Sylvester" stove with him for extra ship-board warmth and lined the decks of both ships 
with cork to trap heat. Even small considerations like switching from cots to hammocks 
on this trip made a difference. On previous trips, any sort o f condensed moisture in the 
bedding froze, making the crews uncomfortable during the long Arctic winter. Parry also 
took extra precautions to prevent scurvy.^" These were the extent o f the accommodations 
that Europeans made to the Arctic during their long exploration of the area.
Parry equipped the ships for a three-year voyage, though he only intended to 
spend two winters in the Arctic. He also brought plenty o f entertainment in the form of 
books, theatrical equipment, a piano, and writing equipment so that the crew could 
endure the dark, months-long Arctic winter. The men even had a ship newspaper, the 
North Geotyia Gazette and Winter Chronicle. Parry intended to attempt the passage 
from further south, near Hudson's Bay. Part o f his orders also addressed his behavior 
towards the Inuits. The admiralty expected him, with ’’ever)' means within your power to
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cultivate a friendship with them, by making them presents of such articles as you may be 
supplied with, and which may be useful or agreeable to them.” He was also directed to 
be careful, however, lest the Inuits attack him.^'
The first year. Parry ran into land at Melville Peninsula and could go no further. 
He spent another winter in the Arctic and planned to find a better, more northerly route to 
the Pacific the following spring. This winter was much like the previous one Parry spent 
in ice. About sixty Inuits, including women, visited the crew several times. Parry 
described them as "good-humored and ever-cheerful people,” and the Englishmen 
seemed genuinely to enjoy their company. They especially appreciated the Inuits' 
imitation o f the English habit of giving three cheers each time a ship landed. Parry did 
not fully understand the Inuits. He wrote in July, 1822. of his crews' excitement over 
another visit from the natives. The Inuits gathered to receive presents, which Parry was 
happy to see. though he worried that "they should go mad on account of them.” 
Apparently, the Inuit women's tendency to scream over each gift disturbed him. Indeed, 
on this trip he talked about little else than the Inuits.
During the spring of 1822. Parry sailed further up the coastline of Melville 
Peninsula, relying at one point on maps drawn by the same group of friendly Inuits who 
so appreciated his gifts. He believed that he saw a waterway that could be the Northwest 
Passage and named it the Fur) and Hecla Strait. Parry decided to winter at the northern 
tip of Melville Peninsula at a camp called Igloolik. which required him to depend upon a 
large group of Inuits for support. Parry and Lyon each took extensive notes of the Inuits 
and their lifestyles, which were later published as parts of their accounts o f the
York: Greenwood Press. 1969: T' printing London: John Murray. 1824). iii-v. 
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expedition. The Englishmen looked upon the Inuits as poor children o f an unforgiving 
environment, however, and remarked upon them as little more than objects o f curiosity. 
The explorers made virtually no attempt to copy the Inuits’ clothing, diets, or modes of 
transportation, which would have helped them live more comfortably in the Arctic. Parry 
was unable to head into his special strait in 1823. The ice never cleared and he sailed 
back to England with no passage and a scurvy-ridden crew. He fared better than his 
future sailing companion John Franklin, who had also recently returned from a horrific 
trip to the Arctic.
Naval officer Franklin left England in 1819 with orders to explore the 
Coppermine River and either hook up with Parry (leading his first Arctic expedition), or 
make it to Repulse Bay. one of the few known areas on the western side o f Hudson's 
Bay. He covered five thousand miles by canoe and foot, despite the fact that he had no 
canoeing e.xperience and inadequate supplies.*^ It was a miserable assignment. His hired 
men and guides fought constantly with each other, Franklin could not maintain discipline, 
his health deteriorated, and his Cree hunters abandoned him out of fear o f the Inuits and 
repercussions from an old battle.*^ Franklin managed to drag a small group as far North 
as Point Tumagain on the other side of Coronation Gulf, but waited too long to turn back 
and doomed his party to starv ation and death. They ate shoes, lichens, and leather tatters 
as they walked back to the Coppermine River to canoe south to safety. Franklins' 
charges split into three parties, each looking for local Indians to help them survive the 
ordeal. One group met a local Iroquois Indian who offered them deer meat. The men
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thought that the meat tasted odd and when the Indian, Michel Teroahaute, behaved 
strangely upon questioning, the men realized that he had given them the remains of a 
dead member o f their group.*"'
After another member of their group died mysteriously, John Richardson, the 
young leader o f this branch of Franklin’s group, convinced that Michel intended to 
murder all of them, killed him First. Richardson met Franklin at Fort Enterprise, though 
the men were still starving, and several more died. Eventually. Franklin made it home to 
England, and the awful story made him a hero. Despite the deaths of eleven of his men. 
he had successfully navigated the Coppermine River and charted that then poorly known 
part of the Arctic. He was promoted to post captain and, incredibly, immediately sought 
to return to search for the Northwest Passage.
In 1824. Parry again took the Hecla and the Fury to find the passage. The Navy 
knew that even if it were found, the route was too tortuous and would never be a 
profitable way to reach Asia. The passage remained of value as an adventurous quest, 
however. Parry never got close to his previous bases and had to abandon the Fury after it 
ran aground in Lancaster Sound, surrounded by bergs. The expedition lasted one year 
and was a total failure. Not surprisingly. Pany lost faith in the open polar sea theory.** 
Franklin left again for the Arctic in 1825, knowing that his new wife Eleanor was 
dying of tuberculosis. The couple believed that he would lose the expedition, which was 
ready to sail with ship and supplies, if he delayed. She died six days after he left.
Franklin thoroughly explored the Great Slave Lake and the Mackenzie River, a vast
some Cree Indians traveling with him killed several Inuits. The massacre clearly affected both groups for 
several generations.
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expanse of previously unknown territory.^^ A large stretch of the northern coastline of 
North America was familiar to Europeans by the early nineteenth century, though no 
single explorer had yet connected the few known openings. Parry and Franklin believed 
that they could connect their routes and find the Northwest Passage, but more tragedies 
stopped this plan.
The 1820’s were busy years for English Arctic explorers. By 1827, Parry 
believed that he could reach the North Pole. Despite their problems navigating the 
Canadian Arctic, many explorers of Parry's era considered the North Pole a more 
manageable goal. They assumed that sailing north required mere persistence. 
Theoretically, a dogged commander with a strong ship could easily find 90 N. Efforts to 
find the Northwest Passage, however, required superlative navigational skills, lest one 
sail into one of the countless bays, sounds, islands, channels, and straits that had already 
disrupted dozens of expeditions. The Royal Society, not yet the RGS, appreciated this 
new twist on Arctic exploration and offered Parry a money grant. Another future 
president of the RGS, William Beechey had traveled with Parry when he won the 
parliamentary prize for reaching 110 W.^ ’* The familiarity between England's explorers 
and benefactors created a confidence and preparation necessary for good exploration, and 
the lack of such ties later proved a problem for America's top explorers.
Parry experimented with overland travel to the pole. He designed two "sledge- 
boats" for ice travel. They were big and unwieldy: 20' long, T  wide, with a flat bottom 
and two sledge runners underneath. Parry and James Clark Ross took the Hcda  to 
Spitzbergen and tested the sledges. Parry planned to pick up several reindeer in Norway
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to pull the two sledges.^’ In June 1827, Parry and Ross aimed the sledges. Enterprise and 
Endeavor, toward the North Pole. The reindeer proved impractical, so the men hauled 
the sledges themselves. It was a difficult trip. The sledges were too heavy and too rigid 
to handle the uneven terrain, and the steel runners froze to the ice. They also piled 
unnecessaiy equipment like books, clothes, and rum onto the sledges, which only added 
to the burden. Loaded, the sledges weighed 3753 pounds/^ Parry returned convinced 
that reaching the pole or finding the Northwest Passage was more difficult than 
previously thought.
Reaching the North Pole was far beyond the capabilities o f the expedition, but 
Parry did secure a new Farthest North o f 82 45' N, which stood until 1875.^' The trip 
was so exhausting and oveiwhelming. however, that the open polar sea theory lost all 
backers until the 1850's. Parry picked a bad spot to launch an overland expedition to the 
pole. He launched from Spitzbergen, which was covered with thick Arctic ice. The 
oceanic flow between Greenland and Spitzbergen carries abundant ice between the two 
islands each year. The southern drift of the ocean left heavy ice in the exact area where 
Parry began his overland trips.’" Later pedestrian explorers chose different starting 
points with greater success. Nevertheless, Parry accumulated an impressive amount of 
information about the Arctic Ocean and its ice conditions. His accomplishments shook 
faith in the open polar sea theory and also discouraged the Royal Navy from sending 
more crews and ships into the North. English exploration dwindled until the 1850's.
It did not completely die, however. John Ross, humiliated over Parry's public
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attacks and proof that the Croker Mountains did not exist, ached to redeem himself. In 
1829, after Parry and Franklin had returned with little to report, Ross proposed in A 
Treatise on Navigation by Steam to find the passage. The Navy refused to finance him, 
so he found a private backer, Felix Booth. Booth initially put up several thousand pounds 
but, worried that people would believe he only wanted the prize money for reaching the 
Pacific, soon withdrew his support. Ross again asked Parliament for help, but rather than 
support him it cancelled the prize money entirely. Booth no longer worried about the 
prize money, so once more he offered to help Ross sail into the Arctic. He put up 
eighteen thousand pounds and Ross contributed three thousand of his own.^^ Ross and 
his nephew, James Clark Ross, sailed the Victory past Lancaster Sound and across Baffin 
Bay with no trouble. Eventually, Ross sailed as far west as King William Island, further 
than Parry had reached on his best voyage. He also spent four consecutive winters in the 
Arctic, a new record. Nobody else had spent more than two consecutive winters that far 
North.’-*
The expedition achieved few o f its goals, though in 1831 Ross discovered the 
North Magnetic Pole, the single most impressive feat of the trip. The Victory got 
hopelessly stuck in ice in late 1829 and the men spent the winter on the dying ship. Once 
again, friendly Inuits offered food, company, and cartographic aid.’  ^ After the third 
winter. Ross' crew limped onto Fury Beach, where Parry had once abandoned the Fury, 
and hunkered amid the ruins o f that ship and their own supplies to survive a fourth 
winter.’ ’^ That same spring, James Clark Ross rowed one of the smaller boats to the North
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Magnetic Pole. He claimed it in the name of King William IV on June 1, 1831.^^ In 
August of 1831, the Rosses and their crew rowed several small boats into the whaling 
lanes and, amazingly, the familiar Isabella, the first ship Ross commanded, picked them 
up. Ross lost only one man during the four-year ordeal, and he attributed his success to 
the use of Eskimo seal blubber to stave off scurvy, his smaller crew (a fraction of the size 
o f usual Royal Navy expeditions), and his small store of supplies, easier to transport 
when the ship failed him.^* The Navy did not follow his example, though these were 
exactly the sorts of decisions that brought American Robert Peary success several 
decades later. Ross did not prove conclusively that the routes of Parry and Franklin met 
somewhere, but he redeemed himself and returned home a hero.
The British Parliament finally acknowledged Ross” success. They paid Booth 
eighteen thousand pounds, his original investment, and awarded Ross five thousand.^'^ 
Ross was a success, but his nephew brought negative publicity to him once again. The 
two Rosses contributed in this episode to another Arctic tradition: jealous possession of 
anything positive accomplished during the trip. The rift's cause was uncertain, but part 
o f the problem lay in James Clark's paranoia over his claim for the North Magnetic Pole. 
In 1846. John Ross hinted that the cause went further back in time, to his relationship 
with his nephew. Both had been on the expedition o f 1818. during which the uncle 
claimed to have seen the non-existent Croker Mountains. Ross' nephew was one of 
several crewmembers on the trip who signed a petition circulated by a science officer 
stating that nobody else saw the mountains. The petition was ammunition for Barrow,
moved their supplies to Fury Beach. They planned to sail towards home on small boats from the Victory 
and hope that they ran into a whaling fleet to take them home to England the following spring.
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who had purposefully hindered the elder Ross’ career. In addition, it upset Barrow that 
Ross’s success occurred on a civilian voyage. To this date, the Royal Navy organized all 
English Arctic expeditions. Barrow scoffed at the idea of a private Arctic venture, and 
wondered how “’the real object that could have induced a captain of the navy to take the 
command of a merchant ship, without a commission, without official instructions, and 
without any authority but such as is given to the skipper of a trading vessel.”’*^”
Ross' nephew also upset him in 1834 by indelicately asking whether Ross 
intended to take part o f the acclaim for having reached the North Magnetic Pole. He 
wished, he wrote, “to receive from you [John Ross] an explicit admission of that fact, as 
putting that question, if any there exists, to rest." James Clark wanted his uncle to state 
clearly that he did not intend to share the spotlight.**' The two men corresponded over the 
years, but their close partnership was over. Each played a bit part in the next phase of 
English exploration, but they did so separately.
When England revived her interest in Arctic exploration during the 1850's. she 
was no longer alone. The rest of the world wondered what could be found in the Arctic, 
especially because an 1845 Northwest Passage expedition under Captain John Franklin 
disappeared.**■ It was not unusual for Arctic expeditions to be gone for over a year, but 
when Franklin failed to return after two years, people noticed.**  ^ The British Admiralty 
worried about the loss of 130 men. and Franklin's second wife. Lady Jane, grew
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desperate over his safety. Men aboard the whaler Prince o f  Wales last saw Franklin’s 
ships in Disko Bay in 1845 tied to an iceberg. When he failed to return in 1846, there 
was hope that he had made it through the passage. By 1847, with no word from him or 
sightings from whalers, the Admiralty considered sending other ships in search of 
Franklin.
The Rosses were once again at the fore o f  English Arctic planning. John Ross 
was more convinced than anyone else that Franklin needed help. He appealed to the 
Admiralty in 1847 for permission to lead a relief expedition. He was turned down mostly 
because the nation's other explorers, including Ross's nephew, believed that Franklin 
could easily survive several winters in the Arctic. Ross, however, knew that the only 
reason his crews had survived four years in the Arctic was because they had found the 
abandoned Fury and her boats and supplies. Without them, they probably could not have 
made it through the fourth winter.^"* Even Lady Franklin ignored Ross’ pleas, though she 
later became her husband's greatest advocate and personally financed several relief 
efforts. In 1848. with still no word from or about Franklin, the Admiralty outfitted three 
relief expeditions. Parliament offered twenty thousand pounds to anyone who could offer 
assistance to Franklin. One ship had orders to proceed through Lancaster Sound, another 
was sent through Bering Strait, and the third effort, a land party, was sent to search the 
Mackenzie R i v e r . L a d y  Franklin believed that Commander Ross was too old to lead a 
rescue attempt, so the younger Ross returned to the Arctic alone. In 1848. he took the 
Enterprise and the Investigator, supplied for a three-year voyage, on a disastrous trip to 
find Franklin. He prepared poorly for scur\ y. which killed six of his crew and weakened
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many others, mistook Franklin’s probable course and searched too far north, and suffered 
through a hard winter.*^
The Admiralty continued to ignore the elder Ross. Eventually, he appealed to the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, which agreed in 1850 to sell him a small ship to search for 
Franklin. Finding nothing, he returned home and sold the Felix in 1851 The Rosses 
ended their active Arctic careers with independent failures, but they were not alone in 
their frustrations with the Franklin myster)'. Ross was one of six searchers that year.
The rest of the world was equally interested, and dozens of missions launched to 
find some trace o f the two ships and the men onboard. All sorts o f messages were left for 
Franklin throughout the Arctic, but still no word came.**** Lady Franklin did not leave the 
matter solely to the Royal Navy. She sent letters to whalers in Shetland, won agreement 
from the Tsar o f Russia to search the Siberian coastlines, and asked President Taylor of 
the United States to send expeditions in search o f her husband.**  ^ The English media 
grew obsessed with the stoiy. The entire country wanted to know what had happened to 
its Arctic hero.
No trace was found of Franklin’s voyage until 1850. when American and English 
crews both found signs of Franklin's first winter home on Beechey Island. They 
discovered that by 1846 much of the meat for the expedition had already spoiled, and 
three of Franklin's men had died and were buried there.'**' These findings only made the
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disappearance more confusing, however, and more ships sailed to find him. The signs 
pointed to tragedy, but devoted followers postulated that perhaps Franklin had discovered 
the Northwest Passage and might still be alive, in need of aid or congratulations.^'
The continuing searches did little more than fill in the Arctic map, however. 
Robert McClure won the offered twenty thousand pounds for discovering the Northwest 
Passage, though he did not actually sail it. He entered the passage from the Bering Strait, 
lost his ship, the Investigator, to ice in Mercy Bay. walked on land to Barrow Strait, and 
sailed the rest of the passage on a rescue whaler. He saw the Atlantic Ocean from the 
point at which he had abandoned his ship.*^ " Thus, the search for Franklin indirectly led 
to the end of the search for the Northwest Passage. Norwegian Roald Amundsen was the 
first to sail the Northwest Passage in 1906 on the Gjoa.
News of what actually happened to Franklin did not reach the world until 1854. 
John Rae of the Hudson's Bay Company ran into a group of Inuits who reported an 
earlier encounter with forty white men heading south to hunt deer. The Inuits had seen 
them in 1850 near Boothia Peninsula, and through sign language had learned that the 
men's ships had been destroyed by ice. and they were heading elsewhere for food. The 
Inuits told Rae that a while later they came across many white men's bodies, presumably 
from this same group. The English newspapers reported the story, and apparently
Beechey Island. The three captains were all there at the same time. They found several large meat canisters 
sitting on the beach, filled with gravel. Had the meat still been fresh or transportable. Franklin would have 
left it in the canisters.
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included as much information as Rae had learned from the Inuits, including descriptions 
o f the final death scene and signs of cannibalism.^^ Rae eventually received ten thousand 
pounds from Parliament for solving the Franklin case, but others refused to give up the 
search.
Lady Franklin continued the search for her husband. She became a national 
heroine, as well as an Arctic expert, due to the effort. Men from Franklin's crew were 
found further south than anyone in the Admiralty had looked, and his ships had still not 
been seen. The full story remained a puzzle. She believed that he may have indeed found 
the Northwest Passage via this more southerly route. "^* She corresponded with American 
philanthropist Henry Grinnell, who sympathized with her and outfitted an American 
search expedition under Edwin De Haven.‘^ ' Grinnell became a fixture and repeat 
sponsor of American Arctic exploration. De Haven took the Advance and the Rescue too 
far north, just like his English predecessors. His ship surgeon, however, was Elisha Kent 
Kane, the most famous American Arctic explorer before Peary, who read Kane's 
narratives as a child. Kane's initial trip, the First Grinnell Expedition, was an eventful 
one. Most of the men caught scurvy, including Kane himself, and the ice-bound ship was 
released Just in time for the men to sail home after one winter in the Arctic.^ *^’ Kane 
returned again to the Arctic, and his efforts brought interest in the Arctic to America. As 
England's Arctic strength dwindled, the Americans' interest in Arctic prizes began.
Before the Americans became serious contenders in the Arctic, however, England 
managed to solve the great mystery. In 1857. Englishman Francis Leopold McClintock
Berton. The Arctic GraiL 30-31. 
Berton. The Arctic Grail. 173. 
Berton, The Arctic Graii. 182-184.
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took the Fox, a ship purchased by Lady Franklin, to look for Franklin. She knew 
McClintock because he had sailed with James Clark Ross in 1848, during that failed 
Franklin search. McClintock found the same Inuits who had spoken to Rae, and they 
repeated the story. They saw one ship sink and watched the other break to pieces in the 
ice. The Inuits took the ship's wood for their own uses. They also saw the men walk 
away and reported that they “fell down and died as they walked along.” McClintock's 
lieutenant found a cairn left by Franklin's expedition holding two messages, the only 
clues ever found to explain what happened. The first message reported that the first 
winter was spent on Beechey Island and that all was fine. The second reported that the 
ships had remained stuck in ice for another year and had never broken free. It also said 
that the ships were deserted in April. 1848. Franklin died June II . 1847. and as of April 
25, 1848. twenty-six men had died. In addition, the note stated that the men intended to 
walk south, presumably to hunt and look for help. Franklin had died before the Admiralty 
began looking for him. McClintock and Hobson also found two skeletons in a boat 
further south, which the men apparently intended to use to sail down the Back River if 
they reached it. The story was clear. Ice trapped and crushed Franklin's ships, the men 
abandoned the ships and tried to walk south hauling a huge boat behind them for future 
use, and they died o f starvation.
Yet by 1857. the Northwest Passage was no longer a viable goal, and Arctic maps 
were impressively full. There were few unknowns left in the Arctic, and there remained 
one great goal: the North Pole. America. Italy, and Norway engaged in Arctic 
exploration after the Franklin mystery, and English expeditions dwindled. It took time 
for explorers to abandon completely the idea of the open polar sea and to pay closer
Conefrey and Jordan. 31-32.
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attention to the invaluable aid o f the Inuits. In addition, funding sources became as much 
a part o f the story as the expeditions. England’s Navy supported Arctic exploration 
during most of the nineteenth century as a way to occupy its large post-Napoleonic 
crews, and its most impressive scientific organization, the RGS, offered publication 
opportunities and occasional funding. The steady support, however, could not overcome 
a basic lack of climatic preparation, and insufficient sailing vessels. Future explorers 
took these encounters a step further and realized that adopting some Inuit customs made 
the Arctic easier to bear. The next phase of Arctic exploration was different, however. It 
was less romantic, more competitive, and more difficult to explain. The North Pole never 
had the initial significance that the Northwest Passage did. as a door to the other side of 
the world. It was simply a place to be found. Eventually, under pressure to justify a 
quest to the pole, explorers said that they intended to note, for scientific purposes, 
everything they saw on the way to this lone spot. The search for the Northwest Passage 
created a map of the Arctic. The search for the North Pole provided descriptions of the 
landscape and its inhabitants. Kane and Peary, two Americans, set the standards for 
another level of Arctic exploration.
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Chapter Two
“Especially for Making Geographical Discoveries”: Americans in the Arctic
The mystery of John Franklin's disappearance appealed to people the world 
over. England tried first and hardest to find her missing sailors. All clues indicated 
tragedy, but as the search progressed other nations and explorers jumped in. 
Americans became the next dominant Arctic presence. Unlike the English, however, 
the Americans did not simultaneously organize the information collected by their 
explorers and scientists. The Americans lacked a counterpart to the Royal 
Geographic Society (RGS), which led to years of disorganized stock-piling of random 
bits of Arctic material by several scientific institutions. The first Americans to 
explore the Arctic did so because it was historically significant and because there was 
federal, military, or private money at their disposal. The combination of ready money 
and interest in the Franklin saga launched several American Arctic expeditions.
These explorers contributed to the debate over the open polar sea theory, learned to 
use the Inuits” climatic adaptations to their advantage, and mapped the Arctic, but the 
leaders, funding, and overall emphases in Arctic geography differed in each case. 
American explorers mobilized their national scientific organizations to fund and 
support Arctic exploration, a significant break from the historical pattern.
As interest in the Northwest Passage dwindled. American explorers groped for 
good reasons to follow Franklin into a region of so many tragedies and failures.
Robert Edwin Peary began his polar career over thirty years after the first popular 
American endeavor. His predecessors tended to want either to find Franklin or to
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reach the North Pole. Peary learned to cage his polar attempts within broader 
agendas of furthering science, helping the Inuits, and exploring a new frontier.
Several Americans tried to find Franklin or the North Pole before Peary took over, 
but only three men left permanent legacies. Elisha Kent Kane, Charles Francis Hall, 
and Adolphus W. Greely each led men into the Arctic, and each one represented a 
new phase o f American northern exploration. Their struggles to justify Arctic 
discovery gave him starting points when he looked for his own financial assistance. 
Their trips also affected the national mood regarding Arctic exploration, and it made a 
difference that Peary began his northern work soon after Greely's tragedy. Peary had 
to find support for sending men and money into a rough region that had claimed 
American lives in addition to countless international crews.
Americans began Arctic work at the height o f the Franklin craze. In 1850. 
five years after Franklin left England. Lady Jane Franklin asked Americans to look 
for her husband, prompting wealthy American philanthropist and shipping tycoon 
Henry Grinnell to fund the First Grinnell Expedition. Nine British relief expeditions 
left the same year. Never before had the Canadian Arctic hosted so many Anglo 
visitors. Grinnell. with Lady Franklin’s permission, bought two ships and gave them 
to the federal government so that the US Navy might control the search. Navy 
Lieutenant Edwin DeHaven led the Advance and the Rescue into the crowded region 
around Lancaster Sound, where mo.st sailors erroneously believed Franklin might yet 
be found.' (See Appendix. Figures 3-4)
' Pierre Berton. The Arctic (Jrail: The Quest fo r  the Northwest Passage anJ the North Pole. 18/8-1909 
(New York: Penguin Book. 1988). 175. It was simply called The Grinnell Expedition until Elisha Kent 
Kane led the second one in 1853. Franklin's men and encampments were much further south, on King 
William Island. As will be seen, it was not uncommon for the Navy to allow an officer and a few men
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DeHaven spent the winter of 1851 ice-locked in Wellington Channel. Most of 
the English vessels were trapped as well, but a separation of even a few miles made 
visiting impossible. It was too difficult to walk across iced ocean. The majority of 
the crew developed scurvy and all thirty-three o f them spent several months huddled 
in one room on the Advance after the Rescue suffered ice damage. The only high 
point came when the Americans and two British commanders came upon what 
appeared to be the 1845-46 winter encampment of Franklin. Unfortunately, Franklin 
had left no sign o f where he and his men went from there.^ Clearly, the Americans’ 
first foray was a disappointing one. It became remarkable in later years only because 
it was the first one for ship surgeon Elisha Kent Kane, who became an international 
hero.
Kane had a weak heart and seemed to know that he had to cram much 
adventure into a short time span. He was only thirty-seven years old when he died 
eight years after the DeHaven trip. In 1853. Kane commanded the Second Grinnell 
Expedition and in doing so became the most famous American Arctic explorer until 
1909. the year Peary claimed success. Before Kane died, he published an incredibly 
popular account o f the voyage he led into the Arctic. Kane also maintained contact 
with Grinnell after the trip and even printed an open letter to him in New York 
newspapers explaining where he thought Franklin could be found. Kane was a 
flashy, emotional writer and he drew the public into his dreams. His Arctic interests
to obtain special leave for various Arctic quests. The Navy did not want the expense o f  supplying the 
expeditions, nor did it wish to put one of its own ships into jeopardy. However, the men who wanted to 
go were often already pursuing naval careers, and it was an easy matter to receive special pennission 
for these first privately funded endeavors.
■ Berton. The Arctic Grail. 179-184. DeHaven met and worked with British leaders William Penny and 
legendary John Ross before he got stuck in ice for the winter. They found three graves, several tents, 
and obvious remains of an encampment along the west coast o f Beechey island.
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meshed perfectly with current public enthusiasm. In one plea for continued searches 
he wrote:
1 trust for the sake of the United States, for the sake of
the noble-hearted woman, who has been the animating soul of
all the Expedition, for the sake of this flag which has so
triumphantly borne the battle and the breeze, for the sake
of the humanity which makes us all kin, 1 trust that [thejsearch is not yet
ended, that the rescue o f Sir John Franklin is yet reserved to his nation and the
world.^
This statement is revealing. Kane made it based on little more than the spirit 
of adventure and the hint o f a tragic tale. Kane believed in the open polar sea theory 
and that Franklin might yet be alive.'^ His faith in the open polar sea theory gave him 
an edge in Arctic circles because wealthy patron Grinnell wwas willing to test it.
Kane supported the assertions of famous American oceanographer Matthew Fountain 
Maury, the leading proponent of the idea. Maury explained that the open polar sea 
theory was possible based on water temperatures, directions and rates of oceanic 
flow, sightings o f animal life moving further north at high latitudes, recordings of 
swimming birds like the eider duck around Baffin Island, whalers’ tales of narwhals, 
seals, and walruses moving north from the ice edge, evidence that polar bears 
travelled beyond the supposed ring of ice, and historical uncertainties regarding 
where exactly the ice became impenetrable.^
’ Mark Horst Sawin "Raising Kane: The Making o f  a Hero, the Marketing o f a Celebrity." M.A. 
Thesis. University of Texas at Austin, 1997. "The noble-hearted woman" is Lady Franklin.
 ^Sawin. "Raising Kane." 11-12.
* Silas Bent, An Address Delivered Before the St. Louis Mercantile Library Association, January 6''\ 
/(S'72, Upon the Thermal Paths to the Pole, the Currents o f  the Ocean, and the Influence o f  the Latter 
Upon the Climates o f  the World (Sx. Louis: The R.P. Studley Co., 1872). Bent presented his paper as a 
defense against recent attacks on his ideas. In the paper, he neatly summarized the arguments of M.F. 
Maury, upon whose ideas he drew for his own proposal o f a thermal route to the North Pole. Elisha 
Kent Kane, .Access to an Open Polar Sea in Connection with the Search .A fter Sir John Franklin and 
His Companions, read before the American Geographical and Statistical Society at its Regular 
Monthly Meeting. December 14, 1852, (New York: Baker, Godwin and Co., 1853),12-14.
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Kane was a serious student of Arctic history. He knew that ice was a problem 
between 72 and 77 N and that ships never made it further than 82 N under the best 
conditions. He firmly believed that the ice around 80 N was a ring encircling the 
Polynya, the Iceless Sea. He won public and scientific support by combining the 
search for Franklin with the debate over the open polar sea theory. In a special 
address before the American Geographical and Statistical Society (AGS) in 1853, as 
he finished his fundraising lecture tour, he offered Americans the chance to find 
answers to both questions. He said that "the question o f access to the Arctic pole- the 
penetration to this open sea-is noww brought again before us, not as in the days of 
Hudson and Scoresby and Parry, a curious problem for scientific inquiry, but as an 
object claiming philanthropic effort, and appealing thus to the sympathies of the 
whole civilized world-the rescue of Sir John Franklin and his followers."^’
The open polar sea theory was still the key to other questions about the Arctic, 
such as whether there was land beyond 80 N, how far Greenland extended northward, 
and how the currents ran north of the ice barrier. As long as explorers believed that 
there was a thermal water route across the entire arctic region they would try to 
explore it by ship. Kane's interest in both the open polar sea theory and the search for 
Franklin was a new twist to familiar Arctic problems. He never mentioned the 
Northwest Passage; instead, he focused on England's lost crew.
The combination of Kane's faith in Maury's theory and his access to 
Grinnell's money placed him in an ideal spot at a key moment for American science 
and exploration. Navy lieutenant Maury's overwhelming "evidence " for the open 
polar sea theory won him international fame and brought welcome attention to a new
' Kane. .‘ttrwA’. 16.
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field o f American science later known as oceanography. Maury, like England’s 
Hakluyt a generation before him, collected information from all sources; trained 
scientists, amateurs, whalers, and explorers, and his enthusiasm for all opinions 
turned early oceanography into an interdisciplinary science. Many o f his pet ideas, 
including the open polar sea theory, were later revised or corrected, but the sheer 
volume of his work moved him and his supporters into the scientific spotlight during 
the mid nineteenth century.^
Despite the relative flood of expeditions sent to look for Franklin, these 
crews' reports were only minor contributions to his calculations o f oceanic currents. 
His steadiest data collectors were whalers. Their observations about the types of 
whales found seasonally in particular oceans helped Maury publish innumerable maps 
and charts. In addition, his most significant book Physical Geography o f  the Sea 
(1855) became a necessary handbook for all sailors and explorers. Maury promoted 
the open polar sea theory because he believed that the planet’s water flowed through 
all of the oceans, and that the evidence of cold and warm water currents in different 
parts o f the world proved that harmonic balance drifted with them. The cold polar 
waters, he thought, sank and drifted to the equator, while the equator's warmer waters 
moved toward the poles. The presence of an open polar sea was the most obvious 
way to account for the currents'circulation.^ No explorer had yet sailed far enough 
north to disprove the idea.
Maury operated in an atmosphere in which the US Navy and scientists o f 
several fields were all professionalizing. As director of the US Hydrographic Office
’ William H. Goetzmann. New Lands. New Men: America and the Second Great Age o f  Discovery' 
(New York: Viking, 1986). 302-303.
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for sixteen years (1844-181), Maury devoted his attention to making sailing directions 
easier to read and follow. He initiated the scientific study of hydrography and sailing 
directions, and sailors reported easier and shorter oceanic voyages as a result.^ Maury 
benefitted from the navy's peacetime interests in this type of research. During the 
thirty years before the Civil War, the US Navy sometimes aided select commercial 
ventures. The US Coast Survey (1807) and the Depot of Charts and Instruments 
( 1830) both began as means o f protecting American merchants. The navy 
experimented early with using its crews on scientific enterprises. In 1836, Congress 
approved $300,000 for the US Exploring Expedition.'*^ Commander Charles C.
Wilkes oversaw a successful trip to map specific parts of the Pacific Ocean, but the 
cooperation between the navy men and the passenger "scientifics” was problematic. 
Wilkes (also working as expedition surveyor, astronomer, physicist, meteorologist, 
and historiographer) exerted strict control over the scientifics. assigning particular 
areas o f observation to each one. Some of the scientists were trained so generally that 
they did not know how to adapt their skills to the particular needs of the expedition. 
For example. Wilkes often decided which among them would study mammals, which 
ones birds." Wilkes' trip was successful, but the navy-science combination won little
" Goetzmann. New Lands. 327.
" Lance E. Davis. Robert E. Gallman. and Karin Gleiter. In Pursuit o f  Leviathan: Technoiog\\ 
Institutions. Productivity', and Profits in .American IPhaling. IS16-1906 {Chicago and London: 
University o f Chicago Press. 1997). 281.
Elizabeth Green Musseiman. “Science as a Landed Activity: Scientifics and Seamen Aboard the 
U.S. Exploring Expedition.” in Edward C. Carter II. ed.. Surveying the Record: North American 
Scientific Exploration to /930 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. 1999), 81-83. Wilkes 
led the expedition ( 1838-1842) with directions to chart the South Pacific for merchant traders, 
detennine if the Great Southern Continent existed, establish the United States as international scientific 
force, and observe British Hudson's Bay activity in the northwestern United States. It was a massive 
undertaking that eventually involved six ships, a naval squadron, and nine passenger scientists/artists. 
Wilkes returned with hundreds of charts for the navy and countless physical specimens for the 
Smithsonian institution.
"  Musseiman. "Science,” 86-91. The navy men and the scientifics also disagreed over how to
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support. Also, even though Maury made fast use of the maps and charts, the 
boatloads of specimens donated to the Smithsonian Institution sparked little public 
interest. Congress decided it had overspent on an unremarkable idea, and did nothing 
to further the collaboration.*^ In the future, civilian scientists would need to find 
other means of travel and money for their research.
With the navy and the nation’s professional scientists operating separately, the 
United States found itself on the verge o f a new methodology for scientific 
exploration. Maury successfully merged his naval career with his personal research 
interests, and his work brought new life to an old theory. The whalers and explorers 
upon whom he depended for information, however, operated within the worlds of 
commerce or philanthropy in order to secure their funding. Grinnell, Kane’s patron, 
responded to the Franklin mystery, but expected scientific validation and a search for 
the open polar sea from his expedition.
Kane was genuinely interested in both questions. Grinnell had already 
promised him the use of the Advance for his trip. He needed more money for 
supplies, however, and he knew that Grinnell's acquaintances in the American 
Geographical Society (AGS) were his best chance for the funds. Kane introduced his 
quest to the AGS: '"Gentlemen of the society:... the resources of those whose 
philanthropy has fitted out this expedition, must be scrupulously appropriated to the 
single object of search. But this search is not merely a voyage of rescue; it appeals to
appropriate shipboard space. The scientifics wanted space to organize and label their collections, and 
the naval crew resented the inconvenience and hazards. Also, the scientifics were disappointed that the 
ship did not stop more often for terrestrial collection and observation opportunities. Eventually, Wilkes 
developed the habit o f dropping off the scientifics at convenient locales, sailing further to make his 
own calculations, and returning to retrieve the passengers.
'■ Musseiman. "Science.” 100.
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the highest interests o f scientific inquiry; but to physical geography especially.” '^  
Everyone wanted to know if it were possible to sail all the way to the pole. Kane also 
announced that he would learn more about physical geography in his exploration of 
southern Greenland. He would benefit thermal science with his determination o f ‘‘the 
distribution of heat upon the surface o f the globe.” And he would help the field of 
terrestrial magnetism with special attention paid to the magnetic force near the pole. 
The Smithsonian Institution offered him an advance for some necessary instruments, 
and John P. Kennedy, Secretary of the Navy, gave him special leave to make the 
trip.''' Kane obtained his military leave, the ship, and the instruments all without 
revealing his proposed route. Arctic fundraisers paid attention to the route because 
most had theories about where Franklin might have travelled, wrecked, died, or 
awaited rescue. Kane withheld his plans until he stood before the AGS. where he 
announced that he would explore northern Greenland.'^
Kane left in 1853 for a one-year trip. He hoped to prove Maury's open polar 
sea theory, but he was a complete amateur regarding ship leadership and scientific 
observation. Ice trapped the Advance for two winters, one thousand miles further 
north than the spot where Englishman John Rae, in 1854, found the best evidence of 
the Franklin disaster. Kane had no way of knowing that he was in the wrong place.
Kane. “Access." 23.
Kane. "Access.” 23- 24.
Elisha Kent Kane. Arctic Explorations: The Second Grinnell Expedition in Search o f  Sir John 
Franklin. IS53, ‘54. ’3 5 {Philadelphia: Childs and Peterson, 1856), I: 17. Kane stated that he would 
use a land base, which was a new idea by itself. Previous explorers only left their ships if forced to by 
extreme emergency. Nobody knew where the northern boundary o f Greenland lay. Kane clung to the 
current belief that it was a peninsula, "nearer the Pole than any other known land.” He planned to use 
the Inuits for help and to depend upon local animal populations for food. He explained that after he 
found the northern tip o f Greenland, he could then easily travel east or west and search for Franklin 
without the usual geographical hindrances further south. He would proceed to the northern point of 
Baffin Bay by sledge and boat and explore the necessary coastlines for signs o f Franklin, pp. 17-18.
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so he maintained appearances and explored as much as possible. He kept a daily 
journal, used his scientific instruments, and let his feelings about the region flow into 
his observations. It was a completely unremarkable expedition, but it made him 
incredibly famous.
Upon his return to the United States, Kane and his publisher George W. 
Childs compromised on the content of Kane's forthcoming book about the Second 
Grinnell Expedition. His first book, an account o f his trip with DeHaven. came out in 
1854 during his absence, and was mildly popular. The second book, however, shot 
Kane into celebrity status. Kane insisted on the inclusion o f sixty pages o f scientific 
tables and charts to go along with his emotional narrative. The combination was a hit 
and the book became a bestseller.'* He purposely wrote the book “for the general 
reader" and avoided the usual lengthy discussions of scientific records and precise 
numerical data. He also filled the book with several hundred engravings and sketches 
o f the land, the Inuits, his men and the ships, the Inuits' tools and clothing, and 
images of routine activities the men performed to survive the almost unbearable 
conditions. Despite setbacks, he enjoyed the setting, as the following description 
indicates:
It was saddening to our poor fellows, when we were forced to leave the ice- 
belt and push out into the open field, to look ahead at the salt ice-marshes. as 
they called them, studded with black pools, with only a white lump rising here 
and there through the lead-colored surface, like tussocks of grass or rushes 
struggling through a swamp. The labor would have been too much for us, 
weary and broken as we were, but for the occasional assistance we derived 
from the Esquimaux. 1 remember once a sledge went so far under, carrying 
with it several of the party, that the boat floated loose. Just then seven of the 
natives came up to us, —five sturdy men, and two almost as sturdy women.
lb Sawin. "Raising Kane." 27. 30. Kane's first book was called The U.S. Grinnell Expédition in Search 
o f  Sir John Franklin: A Personal Narrative. New York: Harper and Brottiers. 1854. Kane's second 
book sold over 135.000 copies during its first two years o f publication.
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—and, without waiting to be called on, worked with us most efficiently for 
more than half a day, asking no reward.”
More important, Kane kept alive the idea of an open polar sea. He claimed 
that a member o f his expedition saw open water further north than Smith Sound. 
Scientists and the public alike latched onto this idea. Maury published his landmark 
oceanographic book The Physical Geography o f  the Sea a few months alter Kane's 
return, and he counted Kane's statements as further evidence that his ideas had merit. 
Armchair Arctic travellers debated what the news meant, and the New York Times 
printed editorials about the presence of an open polar sea and speculations about its 
form.'** Kane contributed little o f scientific or newsworthy merit, although he did 
amass a substantial collection of plants, which he donated to the Philadelphia 
Academy of Natural Science.'^ The open polar sea theory died within a few years of 
this trip when later explorers found better routes, travelled further north, and saw no 
hint of an open sea. Kane found no sign o f Franklin and set no Farthest North 
records. Yet when he died in 1857 thousands of people lined up to view his body as 
it travelled from Havana (where he died) to Philadelphia by steamboat and train, and 
every major newspaper and journal in the nation covered his death. England's 
prestigious RGS also mourned his passing and appreciated his search for their lost
17 Kane. Arctic Lvploralions, 1:5: 2:232-233.
"* Sawin, "Raising Kane." 29.
Berton. The Arctic Grail. 294. Kane's ship sailed further north than any previous ship. He explored a 
large water trail that today bears his naine-Kane Basin. These were significant events but hardly 
seminal moments in Arctic histoiy: Kane. Volume 2. Arctic Exploraiiorts. 442-467. Botanist Elias 
Durand studied and enumerated the plant specimens, trying to detennine more precisely the different 
Arctic climate zones. One o f the signs that the sub-Arctic region has turned into the Arctic region is a 
decrease of plant life. Botanists studied the plants to determine at which longitude certain plants 
ceased to exist, as well as how some lichens and moss survived on the Arctic tundra.
■" Sawin. "Raising Kane." 33.
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crew?' Kane made the Arctic popular and interesting in America, aside from the 
hysteria over the Franklin disaster.
The next significant American explorer of the Arctic had a few things in 
common with Kane. He was not a scientist and depended heavily upon Grinnell and 
the AGS. Initially, these desires created the same problems for him as they had for 
Kane. It was difficult to raise money, he operated almost completely alone even in 
the Arctic, and it still was not clear where to find Franklin or his men. Hall never 
achieved the level of fame of Kane, nor did he contribute longlasting ideas to the 
fields o f physical geography or oceanography. He went to the Arctic three times, 
twice in search of Franklin and once to find the North Pole. He failed each time. He 
meant a great deal to American Arctic exploration, however, because he wrote 
extensively about the Inuits of Greenland and described their climatic adaptations.
He intended these observations to be tools for his searches for Franklin or the pole, 
but instead they became his enduring legacies to Arctic travel. Hall started his 
northern exploits searching for Franklin but ended up looking for the pole. In doing 
so, he became the first American to explain reasons for going to the pole as a separate 
issue from the trips undertaken to find the Northwest Passage, the open polar sea. or 
Franklin.
In 1854. nine years after Franklin first left England. Englishman Dr. John Rae 
led a mapmaking expedition into the Arctic and accidentally found items from 
Franklin's ships that confirmed that the story ended in disaster. He encountered a
■' Roderick Impey Murchison. Royal Geographical Society Addresses (Lonàon\ Printed by William 
Clowes and Sons. 1857). 399. The RGS marveled at the American's extensive mourning rituals for 
Kane and expressed. The world's admiration for Kane's search for Franklin helped the RGS maintain 
its interest in the search.
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group of Inuits who told Rae they remembered Franklin’s group and that they had 
seen the men’s dead bodies. He brought back a few items from the Inuits that could 
only have come from the personal stores o f Franklin’s crew, such as specially 
engraved silverware. Francis Leopold McClintock had the grim task of discovering 
whether Rae’s story was true. Lady Franklin sent him in the Fox to King William 
Island in 1857. He confirmed that Franklin died early in the disaster, but many of his 
men survived long enough to haul sledges further south in hopes o f finding help. 
They died of starvation, exposure, and scurvy as they walked.'"
But as late as 1860 nobody had yet found the bodies o f the last group of men 
from Franklin’s original crew. McClintock found a cairn holding two notes, the first 
left in 1847 and the second a year later, indicating that the ship spent two consecutive 
winters frozen in near King William Island.. The second note said that Franklin had 
died on June 11,1847, which became the total amount known about Franklin's death. 
In September 1848, Francis Crozier led the last survivors south towards Back’s Fish 
River. McClintock followed the apparent trail o f the men as far as he could, finding 
skeletons and discarded items along the way. He never found Crozier and the 
unknown numbers who made it further south than the river. He returned to England 
with these few answers in 1857.'^ Hall went North in 1860 despite full knowledge of 
these conclusions.
Hall was a successful newspaperman and seal engraver in Cincinnati when he 
decided to become an Arctic explorer. Little is known about what finally prompted 
him to sell his paper and journey to the North, but in 1860 he undertook the first of
■■ Chauncey Loomis. Weird and Tragic Shores: The Stor\' o f  Charles Francis Hall. Explorer (New 
York: The Modem Library. 2000). 17. 19.
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three rigorous Arctic trips. Hail filled voluminous notebooks with information about 
Arctic current events, history, geography, and biography. He “believed that God had 
destined him to find Franklin survivors or at least to solve the mystery of the 
expedition’s fate.” '^*
When Hall decided in 1860 to pursue the Franklin mystery, he approached a 
particular group of people in the East. He insinuated himself within the small circle 
of American Arctic experts. Hall was unknown in the whaling and sailing industries, 
so it took him awhile to track down his best resources. He persuaded several 
important Ohio men. including Governor Salmon Chase, to sign a petition in support 
of his quest. He also published a circular to explain himself, which almost thirty 
influential Cincinnati citizens signed. He listed three goals: to find any Franklin 
survivors, to resolve lingering questions about the mens’ final fates, and “to promote 
and benefit the cause of Geography, Navigation, Natural History and Science.”'^ 
Science, again, had a place in Arctic work, but it served as a safety net. If the mision 
failed, he would o f course have some scientific observations to trumpet. He was not a 
scientist, nor did he have any volunteers or paid crew to offer as helpmates in these 
endeavors.
Grinnell was a pivotal character in Hall's decision to command Arctic 
expeditions. He introduced Hall to the insiders o f the private sailing industiy : ships' 
captains, financiers, and members of the AGS. Grinnell was the first president of the 
AGS when it organized in 1851. Geography was not yet a professionally organized
■’ Loomis. Weird anJ Tragic. 19. 
Loomis. Weird and Tragic. 4 1. 
Loomis. Weird and Tragic.
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field, so the name was a bit misleading. Most o f the members of the club were 
wealthy men like Grinnell with philanthropic interests and tastes for adventure. They 
liked to know and sponsor the men or groups who explored and mapped exotic places 
around the world. The scientific information gathered interested them, but few of 
them were actually geographers.
Grinnell arranged for Hall to attend a lecture before the organization members 
given by Isaac Hayes, another American heading into the Arctic that year. Hayes and 
Hall had many of the same parties interested in their northern dreams, but Hayes was 
already prepared. The American Arctic community was small and Grinnell was the 
most consistent financier. He helped both Hayes and Hall leave for the north in 
1860.-'^
Grinnell hired a ship and a few private donors supplied Hall with food and 
basic supplies. Hall attached himself to a larger whaling venture, which agreed to 
drop him off at a specified location while it continued on to whaling grounds, then 
retrieve him and his ship on its way back. Unfortunately, Hall's whaler the George 
Henry got stuck in ice in late September of 1860. Her companion ship, the Rescue. 
was smashed to pieces during a storm, as was Hall's small expedition ship."^ He 
could not look for Franklin without an independent craft, so he salvaged the trip by
Loomis. Weird and Tragic. 46-47. 52. Grinnell funded most of Hall’s trip, but also served as 
treasurer of Hayes’ expedition. Grinnell was a wealthy humanitarian shipping magnate who seemed to 
have no ulterior motives regarding the various commands he funded in the Arctic. Several 
geographical points bear his name as a result of the numbers of men he helped, and he certainly made 
no money in return for his aid. The American Geographical Society was officially the American 
Geographical and Statistical Society for its first years. Hall and Kane referred to it as the Geographical 
Society o f New York in their respective books.
Dennis Rawlins, Pear}' at the North Pole: Fact or Fiction? (Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1973), 
23-25. Hayes was the ship’s surgeon on Kane’s 1853-55 trip, so he was already a familiar name to 
Grinnell and the AGS. He left on the UnitedState.s in I860, hoping to reach the North Pole. Thick ice 
turned him back and he spent only one winter in the Arctic.
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switching his focus.
He spent the winter studying and getting to know the local Eskimos on Baffin 
Island. The whalers remained on the stranded George Henry, but Hall left the ship 
and lived with the Inuits. He became especially attached to an Inuit couple named 
Ebierbing (Joe) and Tookoolito (Hannah) who had spent several years in England 
during the 1850's. A whaling crew had taken them to England, where they learned to 
speak English and were guests of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. The Inuit couple 
intrigued Hall. He gave Hannah reading and writing lessons, presented her with a 
Bible, and dreamed that their civilized ways would someday spread throughout the 
Eskimo settlements o f Greenland. Hall hypothesized that in order to understand what 
became of Franklin he needed to reflect upon the Inuits’ lifestyles. He spent over one 
month away from the ship, living with the Inuits and depending completely upon 
them for his survival and tutelage.”*
Hall returned to New York to raise money as fast as possible. Grinnell 
arranged for him to present his results before the AGS. Hall was excited about some 
relics he had found from what he believed to be Martin Frobisher's 1576 Arctic 
expedition. The trophies that received the most attention, however, were Joe,
Hannah, and their baby son Tukerliktu (the Butterfly). Hall's ship captain Sidney O. 
Budington brought them to the AGS for Hall's talk, after which Hall arranged for the 
Inuits to spend a week on display at Bamum's Museum."‘^ He also allowed Boston's 
Cotting and Guay's Aquarial Gardens to showcase the family for two weeks, upon the
Loomis. Weird and Tragic. 79. 93.
Loomis. Weird and Tragic, 137. Audiences liked the Inuits so much that they stayed on with 
Bamum for an additional week.
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recommendation of famed scientist Louis Agassiz/*^ The Inuits were so popular that 
without them he might never have maintained patronage.
Nevertheless, Hall had a terrible time garnering finacial aid for his next trip. 
He started a lecture tour, but still lacked enough for the several thousand dollars it 
cost to rent a ship, hire a crew, and outfit an Arctic exploration team. All serious 
politicians were focused on the Civil War. and Hall faced a complete lack of 
government interest in the North Pole.^' He turned again to the AGS. which formed a 
joint committee with the New York Chamber of Commerce to raise the 
approximately fifteen thousand dollars necessary to outfit a ship.
Hall secured one ship, but circumstances forced him to sell it to support 
himself and his two Inuit charges. He refused to give up. though, and arranged for 
passage on a whaler, the Monticello. He had no crew, no money, and no means of 
independent transport aside from the whaler. The men who believed in him tried to 
enlist public enthusiasm for his continued quest to find Franklin. Grinnell. Brevoort. 
and a few others published a direct appeal in several New York newspapers. In it, 
they stated that "Our countrymen have won an honorable fame by their courage and 
endurance in Arctic research. It is, therefore, not fit that one who has already shown 
such perserverance. fortitude, and ingenuity in his previous voyage as Captain Hall
Loomis. Weird and Tragic. 137-39. Agassiz wrote a letter to Hall saying that the Boston showmen 
would take good care of their charges. Hall had a bad experience with Cotting and Guay's, who never 
paid him for the full expenses for transport of the Inuits. Hall also decided after this event that the 
shows were too hard on the Inuits. who often got overheated from appearing in full Arctic gear in close 
quarters indoors. They tended to return ill to their temporary home with the Budingtons. He refused to 
hire them out anymore, but did continue to take them with him on personal lecture tours.
Loomis. Weird and Tragic. 142-144. Richard Chappell, a wealthy whaling agent, believed in Hall 
and led him to believe that the government would help him. Chappell knew several important 
government figures, including the Secretary o f the Navy. Gideon Welles, and he wrote to them on 
Hall's behalf. Hall planned a trip to Washington to push his cause, but got so little positive response 
from war-weary politicians that he never went.
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has done, shall be permitted to leave our shores lacking anything which can further 
his laudable object.” They further asked that their “public-spiritied citizens” help him 
with the additional three thousand dollars he needed for a small ship and supplies.
The request worked. Hall received enough money to have a small expedition ship 
(the Sylvia) built and to buy supplies and food. He outfitted himself for a three-year 
voyage.^" Arctic fervor had changed since the days of Kane. The same small circle 
o f people looked forward to positive returns, but without the Franklin mystery as fuel 
it took greater efforts to get an American into the North.
Hall left in 1864 and spent five winters in the Arctic. Joe and Hannah 
returned with him. but besides these two and a German he hired from the whaling 
crew, he was alone. Once again he lived among the Inuits. adopting their style of 
dress, learning their language, observing their cultures and habits. He also secured 
the last details about what probably happened to Franklin's men. A group of Inuits 
pointed out the exact location where either the Erebus or the Terror sank and a spot 
near there where several of the men died in a big tent, surrounded by tools, clothing, 
weapons, and bedding. He met other Inuits who described seeing Crozier and the last 
few Franklin men. clearly starving, asking for help from the Inuits. The natives, also 
searching for food, did not stop to help the men and later found skeletons near this 
scene.^^ Thus, Hall confirmed that none of Franklin's men survived the sixteen-year- 
old ordeal. His interest in the Arctic remained strong, however, and as soon as he 
returned to the United States he began asking for money to try for the North Pole.
Hall's third trip had funds from both federal and private interests. He shifted
Loomis. WeirJ and Tragic, 156-57. 
Loomis, Weird and Tragic. 200-201.
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from a primary focus on Franklin to a desire to find the North Pole, which partially
explains the need to expand his financial base. The Civil War was over, so Hall
expected the national government to take an active role in polar exploration. Grinnell
and Brevoort again pledged money to Hall, but federal aid was not forthcoming.
Grinnell and Brevoort especially applauded Hall’s scientific interests, even though
these were vague and only broadly stated. In the end, a government institution
retained the rights to the scientific information. In a letter sent to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1870, Hall tried to explain his new plan:
For years 1 have had it in my mind that when I should complete the mission 
relative to Sir John Franklin’s expedition-that is. should recover some of 
Franklin’s companions, or should become satisfied that none existed-1 would 
return to my country and prepare for making a third voyage to the Arctic 
regions, especially for making geographical discoveries, even up to the north 
extremity of the axis of our globe. Neither glory nor money has caused me to 
devote my very life and soul to Arctic exploration.^^
Hall expected the federal government to support his switch from the Franklin
search to the discovery of the North Pole, an interesting belief given that his specific
goals still seemed unclear. In 1870. Hall asked for money based on the highpoints of
previous Franklin searching expeditions and the novelty of contact with the Inuits.
He had not yet formulated a strong reason for attempting to reach the North Pole. He
wanted the United States to be the first to the pole, but he downplayed the history of
the search for the Northwest Passage and other Arctic goals. The horrors of
Franklin's fate still resonated. Nobody had yet reached the North Pole and many of
the most famous stories of Arctic travel involved spectacular failures and horrific
C.H. Davis, ed., Narrafive o f  the North Polar Expedition. US Ship Polaris. Captain Charles Frattcis 
Hall Commanding (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 20. Letter dated March 29,
1870. The Committee on Foreign Relations was the Senate counterpart to the House o f Representatives 
Committee on Appropriations. Both committees determined the fate o f a resolution written to
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deaths.
Still, however, the combination o f slight geographical progress and the thrill 
of the unknown kept Hall’s dreams relevant. On one occasion in 1869, Hall accepted 
an invitation to speak at the Teachers’ Institute o f Hamilton County, Ohio, and in a 
letter to A.B. Johnson, president o f the college, he tried to explain why the North Pole 
mattered. Hall wrote that "there is a great sad blot upon the present age, which ought 
to be wiped out, and this is the blank on our maps and artificial globes, from about the 
parallel of 80 North up to the North Pole.. .Shortly, 1 expect to apply to our 
Government for its aid. feeling that the day has come when the great problem of ages 
on ages must be solved under the stars and stripes.” In another attempt to broaden his 
appeal. Hall insisted that the information would matter for three reasons: geographical 
discovery, science, and commerce. He planned to discover the North Pole, provide 
scientific observations to the National Academy of Sciences (a patron), and to report 
any whale sightings for the whaling industry.^'’
Hall's overblown attempts to appear relevant to the scientific community 
refiected an awkward moment in American science. Many fields of science 
(geography, geology, oceanography) still wrestled with the organization and 
management problems of early professionalization. The National Academy of 
Sciences and the AGS struggled to raise funds, as Hall discovered. More than that, 
however, the United States still lacked a central organizing influence for scientific 
explorations. The US Coast Survey (USCS). the organization ideally suited to help
guarantee funds for Arctic work.
Davis. Narnuive, 19. 39-40. In a letter to Judge Charles P. Daly on April 9. 1871. Hall wrote about a 
known though unseen bay (Admiralty Inlet) that he expected to find. The whalebone and whale oil 
industry generated $15 million for English and American whalers annually, so a positive identification
82
maritime explorers, was also so preoccupied with internal management issues that it 
could not assume a stronger role. Alexander Dallas Bache, director o f the USCS 
(1843-1867), worked “to set the most rigorous scientific standards to provide research 
opportunities for American scientists, and to influence or 'professionalize,’ if not 
control, other scientific institutions, including the American Association for the 
Advancement o f Science, the Smithsonian Institution, and the National Academy o f 
Sciences."’^  ^ In order to achieve these standards, Bache negotiated compromises 
between the army officers who operated the USCS and the civilian scientists who 
collected the data. He explained as delicately as possible why these highly trained 
scientists deserved positions over the ships' officers and militaiy crews. Also, he 
spent considerable time winning public support for the work of the USCS, and he 
looked for ways to popularize the results. By the end of his term, Bache oversaw a 
government-funded, centralized organization with regional programs in development 
across the country. The focus of the USCS. however, lay in projects of immediate, 
pragmatic import to the American public. Even though the USCS had the largest 
budget ($500.000/year) of any scientific institution in the United States by the 1850's. 
Arctic exploration offered too little return for serious consideration.^^ Bache's efforts 
benefitted scientists generally because he made marked distinctions between their 
training and expertise and the outdated methodologies of military crews. Senator
of this bay would be significant. Earlier sailors had reported that smooth back whales, narwhals, and 
seals were known to frequent the bay (located around 73 43’ N).
Hugh Richard Slotten. "The Dilemmas o f Science in the United States: Alexander Dallas Bache and 
the U.S. Coast Survey.” in Ronald L. Numbers and Charles E. Rosenberg, eds.. The Scientif'w 
Enterprise in America: Readings from Isis (Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press. 
1996), 38.
Loomis. Weird and Tragic, 151. 157. The US Coast Survey did give some instruments to Hall on his 
earlier expeditions. Also, the USCS. like the rest o f the country, was preoccupied with the Civil War 
during Hall’s early Arctic career.
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Thomas Hart Benton (Missouri) attacked Bache for his use of civilian scientists as the 
major force for survey expeditions. Benton wanted the Navy more heavily involved, 
believing that the USCS offered the perfect peacetime activity to keep the crews 
viable. Senators Jefferson Davis (Mississippi) and James Pearce (Maryland) defended 
Bache and explained that there was a big difference between the “nautical 
knowledge” of the sailors and the current, technical, mathematically based 
experiments of the scientists. The arguments smacked of elitism, but Bache and his 
supporters wanted clearly to define the difference between professional scientists and 
the outdated practices of data accumulation aboard navy ships. Still, however, it 
remained too risky and expensive to jeopardize the USCS reputation for Arctic work.
The Hydrographic Office, another possible federal accomplice for Arctic 
explorers, likewise turned its attention elsewhere. In 1866. Congress created this 
agency, part of the Bureau of Navigation, to handle the creation and maintenance of 
charts o f all non-American coasts. The Hydrographic Office operated essentially as 
"a maritime publishing company." and Maury continued his post-war cartographic 
pursuits in this organization. Until the 1880's, administrators of the Hydrographic 
Office favored charts of the Pacific Ocean, believing that the results would benefit 
American commerce with Asia. '^  ^ Both the USCS and the Hydrographic Office 
considered commercial interests the ultimate beneficiaries of their work. Arctic 
exploration promised adventure and scientific worth, but it could not guarantee 
financial gains worth sending surveying crews into the brutal climate. Thus, even
Slotten. "The Dilemmas.” 38.45. 51-57.
''' Thomas G. Manning. U.S. Coast Siin'L'y vs. Naval HyJrof’raphic Office: .4 I9^''-Cenliiry Rivalry in 
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though the federal government organized its scientists better than the private 
organizations. Hall had trouble attracting help. As a result, when he tried to look 
useful to the scientific community, he still addressed a disparate array of interests. 
Also, no single organization could afford to send a team of scientists with him.
In July 1870, after pressure from Half s most influential friends. Congress 
approved a resolution giving the president power to outfit a polar expedition. Hall 
received $50,000 and the guarantee o f a ship (the original bill asked for $100,000; 
Congress halved the amount in its final form).'*" Hall had lobbied hard for this 
command. Earlier in the year, he spoke privately to President Ulysses S. Grant upon 
request. Hall told the president about the Inuits and Arctic life, knowing that Grant 
was interested in further Arctic exploration. Several months later. Hall accepted an 
invitation from the vice-president, several cabinet members, senators, representatives, 
and a few influentual local citizens to speak in Lincoln Hall. President Grant also 
attended the lecture, entitled "Arctic Explorations. Past and Prospective." Hall knew 
what would best capture their attention. He spoke about Franklin and his men, as 
well as the Inuits. whom he spoke of as close friends from his previous two Arctic 
trips. He also brought three Inuits to the lecture so that the politicians could feel 
closer to the project.""
The US Navy, which oversaw Hall's trip and eventually bought his papers and 
letters from his widow, was specific about how he should conduct himself in the
Davis. Narrative, 27.28-29. The resolution passed July 12. 1870. The government paid to refit the 
steamer USS Periwinkle into the ship that became the Polaris. The ship was strengthened and refitted 
with heavier wood. The Polaris weighed 400 tons. 3 tons more than it had under its former frame.
Davis. Narrative. 26. Hall brought his Inuit interpreters. Ebierbing (Joe) and his wife Tookoolitoo 
(Hannah), and their child Punny (Sylvia). Hannah had given birth to a second child, named King 
William, soon after Hall returned to the Arctic in 1864. The infant died. Punny was the couple's third 
child and first daughter. Hall continued his practice of bringing this family to public lectures and they
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Arctic. George Robeson, Secretary o f the Navy, wrote a long letter to Hall in 1871 
explaining the Navy’s expectations o f the trip. First, he expected Hall to donate all of 
his records, as well as the journals o f his crew, to the Navy. The Smithsonian 
Institution, however, expected to receive the observations o f the Chief of Corps and 
head scientific officer, Emil Brussels (a surgeon). Robeson explained that the science 
department o f Hall’s expedition, under Brussels' leadership, operated under the 
guidelines of the National Academy of Sciences. Brussels was the main science 
officer, but it was permitted for any member of the crew to collect ' ‘objects of natural 
history, ethnology, etc."**"
It is significant that the US Navy allowed the Smithsonian to control Hall's 
scientific data. No serious American explorer ever again left for the Arctic without 
money, directives, or actual men from some sort o f scientific institution. The 
commanders' and/or scientists’ results, however, were never systematically organized 
by one institution or under one program of study. It became the explorers' or their 
scientific institutions’ decisions about how and where to place their collected 
information. Hall, dependent upon his federal assistance, had clear instructions that 
the Smithsonian owned all scientific property associated with this expedition."*^ In 
fact, the Smithsonian was responsible for choosing and organizing the scientific 
personnel for the expedition. The Navy focused on the prestige of funding and 
outfitting an expedition to the North Pole; subsidiary scientific observations paled in 
comparison.
continued to be crowd-pleasers.
Davis. Narrative. 32. 35. The Navy had the rights to Hall's records since the money came from the 
Federal government.
Davis. Narrative, 33.
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The emphasis on the expedition’s scientific goals caught the public’s 
attention. A New York Times article commented on the modernity o f the voyage:
A great deal of satisfaction is expressed by those interested in the 
expedition at the thorough manner in which all the preparations for the 
exploration have been made, which is due to the liberal appropriation of 
$100,000 made by Congress...This expedition starts under better auspices, on 
account o f more perfect equipment and advantages gained from past 
experience, than any expedition for Arctic exploration ever before fitted out, 
and Capt. Hall and his associates are most hopeful of achieving satisfactory 
results. Mr. Morton, who is third officer, and who is the only living explorer 
who ever saw the open Polar Sea. has the utmost confidence that the Polaris 
will find a route by which to enter it. Among the visitors to the vessel today 
was Senator Sumner, who appeared greatly interested in what he saw.'*'*
Judge Charles P. Daly, the new president of the AGS. presented Hall with a
flag of the organization that his predecessors DeHaven, Kane, and Hayes had also
carried north. Most AGS members were Arctic enthusiasts. Kane. Hall, and Hayes
had each spoken before the organization, received money from it, and benefitted from
its significance to philanthropist Grinnell. The early affiliation between the AGS and
Arctic explorers set important precedents. The ties mattered decades later when
professional scientists accompanied the expedition leaders and needed funding in
addition to the needs o f the commanders.
Hall believed that he was destined to find the North Pole. He imagined his
success; "'Suppose there is an island at the North Pole: around it the sea. 1 see a star
upon the horizon. If 1 were to remain a thousand years at the Pole, that star will
remain on the horizon without varying one iota in height...The phenomena displayed
there will be deeply interesting, provided there is land there, and 1 am satisfied that 1
will find land there. From what 1 have heard from the Eskimos. 1 am satisfied that 1
The New York Times. May 30. 1871.
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will find people living there, too.’”'’^
Unfortunately for the members of this first American expedition to the North 
Pole, Hall died on November 8, 1871, during the first winter o f a trip equipped for 
two and a half years. They reached 82 I UN in the Polaris, spent the winter in the 
Arctic, and returned in 1873.'*  ^ Hall’s death made it impossible for a run to the pole, 
though the crew diligently recorded all relevant geographical information and took 
careful observations of the Inuits who visited and traveled with them. Sailing master 
Budington took command upon Hall's death. It was an unsuccessful trip, yet there 
remained enough general interest in Hall's goal that the Navy purchased his records 
from his widow and published them as a narrative of this federally supported trip.
By 1872. American Arctic histoiy had a questionable record. Hall wrote 
about the landscape and the Inuits. ended all doubts about Franklin's crew, and 
achieved a Farthest North record. Kane accomplished almost nothing of lasting value 
but became a legend. Each of them tested the latest theories o f his day. but the sorts 
of information that they gathered could not match the previous excitement of 
searching for a Northwest Passage or a vanished expedition. The next American to 
leave a mark in the Arctic initiated a new role for the region. It seemed clear that 
men could survive and maneuver safely within certain areas of the Arctic and that 
much remained to be learned about these bounds.
The next phase was one characterized by "big science." in which many of the 
new wave of explorers worked for the federal government or large bureaus. John
Bruce Henderson. Fatal Stin’ival: Ach'entiire and Survival Aboard USS Polaris, the First U.S. 
Expedition to the North Pole (New York: American Library. 2001 ). 23.
The Polaris was frozen in for the winter by August. The expedition members were already prepared 
for the winter season when Hall died.
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Wesley Powell and his work for the US Geological Survey surveying the American 
West characterized this period. Individual men or leaders still brought fame and 
recognition, but large organizations masterminded the plans and worked mainly to 
inform themselves. The United States only organized one more large federally 
funded Arctic endeavor. More significantly for Arctic explorers, newly 
professionalized scientists strengthened or created new organizations with special 
emphases on data collection of all sorts. The National Geographic Society (NGS). for 
example, established in 1888, welcomed professional and amateur geographers, but 
also counted government men such as John Wesley Powell and Henry Gannett (U.S. 
Geological Survey topographer) as two of its founding members."*’ The NGS and the 
AGS both became so successful at promoting scientist-explorers all over the world 
that funding remained problematic for individual explorers. Neither group sponsored 
early Arctic expeditions independently, and the NGS celebrated its first debt-free year 
as late as 1905."*** Each organization tended to give smaller sums to numerous data 
collectors than large amounts to a few. Their financial contributions paled in 
significance to the prestige o f affiliation with them. By the late nineteenth century, 
these groups controlled American geographical achievement.
Before this happened, however, the United States government sponsored one 
more large Arctic expedition. The tremendous amounts of data collected by Arctic 
crews since the disappearance o f Franklin fascinated scientists across the world in 
meteorology, oceanography, geology, geography, hydrography, and astronomy. After
Goetzmann. New Lands. 3 9 9 .4 19-20.
48 C.D.B. Bryan. The National CJeaf^raphic Societ}-: 100 Years o f  Adventure and Discovery (New 
York: Many N. Abrams. Inc.. 1997). 94. The NGS boasted a surplus of $3500 in 1905. The society’s 
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89
Hall’s exploits, the United States lost interest in Arctic travel until Lieutenant Charles 
(Karl) Weyprecht of Austria offered Americans a place in an unusual international 
experiment. Weyprecht had explored parts of the Arctic and was frustrated by the 
competition, deaths, mistakes, and tragedies that accompanied each new quest. He 
saw greater potential in international scientific cooperation.**^ In 1875, Weyprecht 
and Count Wilczek suggested to the International Meteorological Congress that the 
Arctic should become a massive area for "continuous, cooperative, and simultaneous" 
field research. The idea led to the organization of the International Polar Conference 
in Hamburg on October 1,1879. Conference attendees offered the following plan: 
invited nations would simultaneously build scientific stations throughout the polar 
regions and collect all relevant data. In this manner, with the entire arctic and parts of 
the antarctic under study at the same time, scientists could answer enduring questions 
about the poles. Eventually, eleven nations joined and set up several dozen 
observatories.^"
America responded slowly to Weyprecht's plan. Shortly before the 
conference in Hamburg, Weyprecht wrote to General Albert J. Myer, the head of the 
Army Signal Corps (the meteorology specialty branch of the Army) and asked him to 
Join the international coalition. Myer declined to Join the conference, but in a 
separate exchange with Weyprecht he indicated interest in seeing the well-equipped 
United States involved. The other countries proceeded with their cooperative plans
Leonard F. Guttridge. Ghosts o f  Cape Sabine: The Harrowing True Stoiy o f  the Greely Expedition 
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 2000). 12.
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without the Americans. The involved nations held a Second International Polar 
Conference in Berne in 1880, having struggled during the first year to set up only 
seven stations. At this meeting, they named the twelve months between 1881 and 
1882 the International Polar Year and renewed their commitments to the enterprise.^' 
The United States kept abreast of this progress. Eventually, Congress approved the 
plan to join the international scientists, and the Army tapped Army Lieutenant 
Adolphus Washington Greely to command one of two American posts.
In 1881. Lieutenant P.A. Ray organized one station at Point Barrow, along the 
western Canadian Arctic, and Greely established the most northerly based locale, at 
Lady Franklin Bay, 81 44’ N. Much like the observers at the other international 
centers. Greely paid attention to "auroras, arctic ice. gravity, tides and other oceanic 
conditions. Collections were made relative to fauna, flora, geology, and 
ethnography.” The military and federal government supplied Greely with the 
necessary tools, and despite equipment failures Greely’s data proved useful. Nobody 
yet knew that Greenland was an island, but Greely's tidal data confirmed that the 
landmass ended within the latitude of 84 N.^‘ Greely also set a new Farthest North 
record. These positive notes were important in retrospect. In all other regards, the 
Lady Franklin Bay Expedition was a complete disaster that stained American Arctic 
history for years afterwards.
The expedition sailed under the control of the US Army Signal Corps. Greely 
took with him eighteen Army men. three civilians, two Inuit guides/hunters, and one 
doctor/naturalist. Only one of them knew anything about sailing. None o f the
Guttridge. Ghosts, 13. 
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military men had any Arctic experience. This lack o f preparation and knowledge 
might not have been a problem had not everything else gone wrong.
Greely set up his station at Fort Conger, in Discovery Bay, with the 
expectation that a relief ship would resupply him the following year. He and his men 
fought constantly, and most of his instruments were unusable. The men passed the 
first winter in unhappy conditions that worsened when an expected relief ship never 
appeared in 1882. John Lockwood. Greely’s second in command, took a small crew 
northward by foot and established a new Farthest North at 83 23’N. the first new one 
since 1876. Lockwood's record was the only bright spot in an increasingly desperate 
situation. They spent their second winter at Fort Conger, only to face another 
summer with no new supplies. Thick ice had formed further south than usual during 
these years, making passage of Kennedy Channel, and resupply, impossible. One of 
the two relief ships had been crushed, and her commander left two poorly marked 
caches with a fraction of the rescued goods and then turned home. '^
Greely moved his men further south in 1893. hoping to run into rescue, 
whalers, or a supply ship. They found nothing but ice. This scenario had been testing 
men’s nerves since the beginning o f Arctic exploration. Even when crews planned to 
winter in the Arctic, men often dreaded the situation. The sun disappeared for 
months, leaving crews in darkness, unrelenting cold, and cramped quarters, with little 
to do. The cold and darkness prohibited hunting, so unless the men camped within 
walking distance of an Inuit settlement the winter brought extreme solitude, 
monotony, and discomfort. Most crews learned to watch each other closely for signs
John Maxtone-Graham. Safe Return Doubtful: The Heroic Age o f  Polar Exploration (New York: 
Barnes and Noble Books. 1988). 89-95.
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of delirium. Men occasionally went mad under these conditions. To make matters 
worse, crews stuck on ice-trapped ships often endured the distressing sounds o f the 
wooden vessels popping, creaking, and grinding against the ice, knowing that if the 
ship splintered and rescue failed, they faced another winter without even a ship's 
shelter for comfort.
Stranded on an iceberg with only a hut and overturned boats as protection. 
Greely and his men awaited a third Arctic winter near Cape Sabine. Seventeen of 
them survived the winter. The suffering continued, however, as the men struggled 
through the spring and early summer until the ice melted enough for a relief ship to 
find them. They ate boiled clothes, lichens, sleeping bags, tea bags, and mouldy dog 
biscuits. The doctor. Octave Pavy. amputated the hands and feet of one man who 
contracted gangrene from severe frostbite. Greely had the rare support of his men 
when he ordered the execution of a man who stole food. Pavy committed suicide. A 
strong wind blew a tent pole over, pinning three men to the ground for days because 
none of them was strong enough to lift it. When help finally arrived, only Greely and 
six others were alive. The amputee died on the way home. The news of what 
happened to Greely and his men horrified the nation, especially when it became 
apparent that the sur\ ivors had resorted to cannibalism.^"* It was the worst story yet 
told by explorers of the Arctic. Two years after Greely's return. Peary visited 
Greenland and began a new phase o f exploration.
Peary dominated American Arctic exploration for twenty-six years, 
discovered the northern tip of Greenland, set new standards for overland sledge 
travel, turned polar dashes into a science o f preparation, and perhaps even discovered
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the North Pole. He travelled seven times to the Arctic. Nobody before or since has 
equalled the quantity of information that Peary and his crews collected. Yet he never 
came close to the celebrity of Kane. He had to work even harder than Hall did to find 
money, even at the end of his career when he had years o f success behind him. And 
he began his Arctic adventures in the shadow of the Greely disaster. Peary’s career 
has obvious roots in the legacies o f his predecessors. The insider struggles for money 
and acclaim were familiar, even if his arguments and goals differed.
Peary first saw Greenland in 1886, and his life changed forever. He spent 
only one summer in the Arctic during this initial trip, but he planned to return as soon 
as possible. He had to create this next opportunity, however. He was an engineer and 
a Naval officer and Arctic exploration remained tied to Greely’s expensive disaster.^^
Peary had begun a solid Navy career as an engineer when he decided to 
pursue his Arctic interests. He never left the Navy, but this federal connection had 
nothing to do with his exploratory career. He was the only child of Mary Webster 
Wiley and Charles Nutter Peary. Pneumonia killed his father in 1858 when Peary 
was only two years old, and his mother moved from Philadelphia to Maine upon her 
husband’s death, to be closer to family. Peary lived with his mother in various Maine 
towns during his childhood. He was so close to his mother that when he left for 
college, the two roomed together off campus. He did well academically at Bowdoin 
College (Brunswick, Maine), where he graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1877 as a civil 
engineer. After a brief period as a surveyor in Fryeburg. Maine, he moved to
Maxtone-Graham, Sqfu Return. 101-105.
U.S. Congress. House. Claim.s ofOwners and Crew.s o f  Certain American H'haling I'essels. H.R. 
10267. Congressional Record. 51-1. no. 9 (1889, 1890) : 2842. The US government spent $750,000 to 
rescue Greely.
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Washington, D C. to work for the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Office.'^^
Surveying work bored Peary, so on a whim he took and passed an exam that 
qualified him to enter the Navy’s Corps of Civil Engineers with the rank of 
lieutenant. The job went well, but his life changed direction in 1885 when he 
chanced upon a book about Greenland. He already knew about Kane’s exploits, and 
Greely’s disaster was still fresh news. He decided to see the Arctic, and he went for 
the first time in 1886.^  ^ Thereafter, he became as Kane and Hall before him, anxious 
to return and desperate for the money and means to do so.
It took Peary five years to return to the Arctic. The inadequacy of Greely’s 
trip and the horrors of the ordeal still filled newspapers. Greely had not even been a 
part o f the historical competitive "firsts” of the Arctic. He had led a peaceful, 
science-oriented trip and barely lived to tell about it. Peary had a more specific goal 
than Greely, however, and eventually he won support. He could not afford the trip on 
his own (he earned less than $3000/year), so it was necessary that he find other funds. 
Once again, the AGS played a part in the hopes o f a prospective young Arctic 
explorer. In 1890, the organization invited him to speak before its members, as did 
the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia. Peary outlined his plan to cross the 
northern tip of Greenland and explained that he only needed six thousand dollars (a 
very low estimate). The request was cheap by Arctic standards, though it still proved 
difficult to raise the money.'^ **
Robert M. Bryce, Cook and Pean-: The Polar Controversy. ( Mechanicsburg. PA:
Stackpole Books, 1997), 15-17.
Bryce. Cook and Peary. 19-21. Peary's mother loaned him the money for his first trip to the Arctic. 
He booked passage on a whaler, the Eaftle. in 1886, and spent the summer investigating a well-known 
part o f southern Greenland.
* Bryce, Cook and Peary. 23-24. Peary rushed to return to Greenland. He knew that Norway's Fridtjof 
Nansen had crossed Greenland from east to west in 1888. Nansen did not find the northern part of
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Peary eventually raised the money. No single contribution (from non-crew 
members) exceeded one thousand dollars, and he received no federal money, facts 
that Peary emphasized in his first book. Several of the men who funded Peary went 
with him to the Arctic. Professor Angelo Heilprin, F. W. Putnam, and John Verhoeff 
each gave money for the privilege of travelling with the explorer. Heilprin, curator of 
the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, was excited about the possibilities of 
retrieving Arctic artifacts, and several members of the Academy donated the 
remaining funds. Heilprin went along as a scientist, not as somebody interested in 
Peary’s personal goals. Putnam, also a professor, had similar intentions through his 
association with the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He 
hoped to use some of his finds as pieces "for an ethnological exhibit for the 
Columbian Exposition." Verhoeff, however, had read the press releases about Peary’s 
proposed trip and was one of many men who wrote Peary to ask that he be allowed to 
join the crew. Peary considered each request carefully. If chosen, each man paid 
three hundred dollars to outfit himself. Verhoeff was so eager to go that he offered 
Peary two thousand dollars. Peary also received money and support from the 
Portland Society of Natural History, the National Geographic Society, the AGS, the 
New York Stm. "various friends." and Bowdoin College. In addition, he put in 
several thousand of his own m o n e y . B y  1891. the contributions enabled Peary to
Greenland, but he was the first to attempt such an extensive overland exploration of the island's 
interior. It still was not clear where exactly Greenland ended, but Nansen's trip showed that another 
cartographic prize was about to fall. Peary proposed a similar overland crossing of the island, except he 
planned to travel west to east on a more northerly route.
■ ' Robert Peary. Northward Over the "Great Ice: " A Narrative o f  Life and Work Alonft the Shores and 
Upon the Interior Ice-Cap o f  Northern Greenland in the Years IH86 and 1891-1897,2 volumes (New 
York: Frederick A. Stokes Co.. 1898), I : xxxix. xli-xlii. Ivii. The National Geographic Society gave 
Peary a flag to plant at his "farthest north " Also. Commodore Farquhar. Chief o f the Bureau o f Yards 
and Docks, where Peary worked, supported the trip. The AGS gave Peary one thousand dollars, as did
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charter the Kite, an old whaling ship. A few years later, when Peary considered 
Greenland a supply stop, rather than his ultimate destination, both the Kite and the 
few thousand dollars he raised after one round of entreaties would be quite 
insufficient. In 1891, however, these conditions sufficed. Several contributors also 
helped Peary secure military leave for the trip. Peary asked for and received eighteen 
months’ leave after Daly (president of the A G S), Cyrus C. Adams (owner of the New 
York Sun) and Putnam each wTOte letters to Secretary Tracy on behalf of Peary, 
explaining the importance of his mission.^**
Peary sailed for the Arctic in 1891 with sixteen people, nine o f whom were 
members o f the large scientific party organized through the Academy of Natural 
Sciences. He split his expedition into two groups—the West Greenland Expedition 
and the North Greenland Expedition. Scientists comprised most o f the former group, 
and they wintered further south than Peary’s hand-picked seven-person crew. Peary’s 
smaller North Greenland Expedition wintered near Whale Sound in order to prepare 
for his s cross-island trek during early spring.^' The Kite deposited Peary’s group at 
McCormick Bay in late summer, before the ice froze. The members o f the West 
Greenland Expedition left with the ship and spent the winter observing and collecting 
what they needed near Cape Robertson. The following spring. Peary and Astrup
the Sun and Putnam. These were the largest donations, aside from that of Verhoeff. The Sun paid for 
first rights to any letters that Peary sent to correspondents in the US from Greenland.
Robert N. Keely. Jr. and Gwilyn George Davis In Arctic Seas: The f orage o f  the "Kite " with the 
Peary’ Expedition. Together with a Transcript of the Log o f  the “A.7/e" {Philadelphia: Rufus C. 
Hartranft. 1893. cl 892). 478. Verhoeff and Peary had a series of exchanges after Verhoeff read about 
Peary's trip in the Tacoma Weeltly News. Peary let Verhoeff join with the understanding that he would 
get no control and that Peary was the lone expedition leader.
Peary. Northward. I : xxxix.
Peary. Northward. 1: 44-45. 48. The North Greenland Expedition included Peary. Matthew Henson. 
Frederick A. Cook (surgeon). Langdon Gibson (ornithologist/hunter). Eivind Astrup, Verhoeff. and 
Peary's wife. Josephine Diebitsch Peary.
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together accomplished Peary's goal and walked across the interior o f Greenland, west 
to east, and confirmed that it was indeed an island. The only serious setback during 
the trip was the death of Verhoeff, who accidentally fell into a crevasse and died 
during the spring o f 1892.*“
When Peary returned to the United States, he planned another trip 
immediately. Already he had plans for exploration beyond Greenland, but he 
continued to explain the need to know the island better. He saw it as the ideal 
launching point for overland runs to the pole. He began to speak as if a purposeful 
gathering of Arctic information had multiple benefits. Like Hall, he emphasized 
scientific benefits along with the nationalistic incentives. Peary was tom between the 
rough allure of the region and the need to find a use for it. In his first book, he 
acknowledged that Arctic exploration "must, like anything else, be made a business 
and carried on from year to year, profitting by each added item of experience, taking 
advantage of every occurring opportunity." At the same time, however, he offered 
the following: "suppose we admit that Arctic exploration is only a matter of 
sentiment, with no money return; no increase of commerce; no fruit o f colonisation, 
no harvest of great good for many men. Let it stand as a sentiment; it has good 
company. Love and patriotism and religion are all matters of sentiment, and we ask 
no money return for them.”*^
Peary never successfully divorced money concerns from his Arctic career, 
however. In one strange twist, American commercial interests worked in Peary's
*’■ Bryce. Cook & Peary. 81-84. Peary. Northward. 1:414. Successful negotiation o f Arctic ice 
required careful maneuvering and constant attention. The ice often formed in jagged heaps, and 
temperature vacillations, severe winds, or slight glacial movements could open wide leads of open 
water, new ice peaks, or invisible crevasses. Nobody saw Verhoeff disappear, but equipment found
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favor. Operating briefly under Commander John Russell Bartlett (1883-1888), the 
Hydrographic Office switched its focus from the Pacific to the North Atlantic Ocean. 
One of the highpoints for 19th-century American science was the cooperative and 
tactical effort required to lay a submarine telegraph cable between the United States 
and England. Also, the increasingly heavy use of steamships increased commercial 
opportunities for the United States. Bartlett’s office rushed to supply ships’ captains 
with useful charts and maps of the North Atlantic. His men also republished an older 
circumpolar chart, as well as new maps created from information gathered during the 
Greely rescue. Peary requested copies of this material.^ As it had for the past 
several decades, the federal government preferred to use its own scientists and 
cartographers to aid commercial interests. Especially after Greely’s experience, there 
seemed little reason to target the Arctic.
Peary went on a whirlwind money-raising tour so that he could charter a ship 
quickly and return to the Arctic. He brought back the five dogs who survived the trek 
across Greenland (fifteen died) and took them with him on a lecture circuit. Once 
again, his friends wrote to the Navy on his behalf and he won three years' leave. By 
the time he returned from the Arctic in late 1892, he had six months to raise the 
money, obtain leave, find another crew, and organize in time to leave in early summer 
of 1893. He raised thirteen thousand dollars by delivering 168 lectures within that 
span. His wife Josephine, who accompanied him on the trip, published an account of 
her year in the Arctic and donated the book's proceeds to the next expedition. The 
AGS gave him another thousand dollars. The New York Sun made the same deal for
near a crevasse told the story. 
Peary. NorihwarJ, I: xxvi. Ixxix.
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first rights to his letters home and promised him two thousand dollars. Friends gave 
him another three thousand dollars. Even with twenty thousand dollars, however, he 
could not afford to charter a ship and order supplies for the scientists who again 
planned to accompany him. He earned the rest of the necessary money by putting his 
new ship, the Falcon, on display in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Portland.*'^
This time, Peary planned for two years in the Arctic. He took another crew of 
scientists as members o f the Auxiliar)' Expedition. His wife's brother, Emil 
Diebitsch, was part of this group, mostly because he donated money to Peary. 
Josephine stayed with Peary during the winter at Anniversary Lodge, as did Matthew 
Henson, Hugh Lee (volunteer crewman), six scientists, and several Inuits. Josephine 
became internationally famous because she gave birth to the couple’s first child,
Marie Ahnighito Peary (the “Snow Baby”) September 12, 1893.^^ She was bom 
further north than any known white person, and both mother and daughter were 
famous upon their return to the states in 1894.
When the ice broke in August, 1894, the Falcon took all expedition members 
back to the United States except Peary, Henson, Lee. and a few Inuits. Peary expected 
the Falcon to return in late summer 1895 to pick him up after he travelled to Melville 
Bay to look for the famous iron source first reported by Englishmen decades earlier. 
Peary spent the winter preparing to explore more of Greenland the next spring. He
Manning. U.S. C’oav/, 3 1-32. 36.
Peary. Northward, I : xiiii-xlv, 4. He had the five dogs and burros and carrier pigeons on board the 
ship (in preparation For the next trip) as added attractions.
Peary, Northward. 2: 69.
Peaiy . Northward, 2: 126. Extremely harsh weather and the deaths of most of his dogs ruined 
Peary's expedition across Greenland in 1894. Peary stayed in Greenland for another year in order to 
search for the tabled "Iron Mountain" that John Ross had reported over one hundred years earlier. He 
enlisted an Inuit guide and found the world’s three largest known meteorites. On May 27, 1894. Peary 
left a record at the meteorites' site indicating that he. Lee. and their Inuit guide had found them.
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did not know it, but the Falcon wrecked after depositing his wife safely in 
Philadelphia and she began a mad scramble to secure funds to send another ship to 
find him.
Josephine knew that her husband was not prepared for another year in the 
Arctic. He had enough supplies to last him until the spring of 1895, and all 
Americans knew from Greely’s tale what could happen to a crew expecting relief that 
never came. She had only a few months in which to raise enough money to find a 
replacement ship for the Falcon. She enlisted the aid of Peary’s familiar circle of 
friends and begged for help. She received pledges from the AGS. the American 
Museum of Natural History (AMNH). the Geographical Club of Philadelphia 
(Heilprin was president), and Daly (president o f the AGS). She was far short of the 
necessary amount, so the National Geographic Society asked her to give a public 
lecture and promised to give her the proceeds. She agreed and received four hundred 
dollars for her first public appearance. The ship still cost thousands more, so she 
wrote to Morris K. Jesup, president o f the AMNH, and convinced him to make up the 
necessary difference to charter a ship.^ **
The meeting between Jesup and Josephine was remarkable for two reasons. 
Their connection and mutual devotion to Peary evolved into the Peary Arctic Club 
(PAC) several years later. Also, Jesup had never before met her or Peary, but he 
admired Arctic work and realized that it was a desperate move on her part. Upon 
Daly's suggestion. Josephine boarded a train with her daughter and her “nurse." and 
traveled from Washington, D.C. to New York to seek funding, despite thinking that
Peaty, Northward. 2: xlvii. Jesup gave several thousand dollars to the cause, which was the one 
exception to Peary's declaration that nobody gave him more than one thousand dollars to send him to
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“every mile that the train progressed I wished were a mile in the other direction.” 
Jesup tried to ease her anxiety, and arranged before the meeting for his wife to be 
present so that Josephine would not be the only woman present. He initiated a 
lifelong friendship when he told her: “I believe that you are doing all you can to raise 
this money, and I don't want you to do any less, but if you do not succeed in raising it 
all, come back to me again. You must understand that while I am interested in the 
scientific aspects of your expedition, my chief interest is that 1 want you to get your 
husband back.” Despite the money from Daly and the promise from Jesup. Josephine 
needed seven thousand dollars. One scientist, a college professor, had died 
unexpectedly, and his host institution withdrew its funding. Josephine delivered two 
public lectures to make up some o f the difference, and Jesup delivered on his 
promise. She rented the familiar (and cheap) Kite for Peary.*‘^
Peary, meanwhile, found the meteorites and returned to Anniversary Lodge to 
await the Falcon. He received news about the fate of that ship, but claimed that he 
did not worry because he "knew the brave woman would send a ship for us.”’"
Peary probably spent more time dealing with ship rentals than any other 
preparatory task for the duration o f his career. For his last two trips, he commanded a 
special, huge icebreaker built especially for him. Every other expedition, however, 
hinged upon his ability to find a tough ship, negotiate a reasonable price, and then 
raise enough money (usually at least $20,000) to cover this one cost. The choice of
the Arctic.
’ William Adams Brown. Morris Ketchum .Jesup: .-I Ciuiracier Sketch (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons. 1911), 189-192. Josephine's "nurse” was a young Inuit girl named "Miss Bill." She went to New 
York with Josephine after the birth o f  Marie, and she stayed with the Peary family until Peary's next 
Arctic trip. Josephine. Maria, and "Miss Bill” lived in an apartment in DC on $75/month at the time.
Peary . Northward. 2: 535. Whalers. Inuits. and the large Danish settlements in southern Greenland 
ensured that news travelled well along the southwestern coast o f Greenland.
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available ships was discouraging. It was too costly to build ships especially for 
Arctic navigation, so ambitious explorers usually picked sturdy whalers, refitted them 
with extra wood/steel, and hoped that the northern ice did not crush their 
transportation. Therefore, American Arctic explorers often found their ship choices 
tied in unusual ways to the fate o f the whaling industry.
Until the 1850’s, most whaling companies converted older merchant vessels 
to their own uses. As a result, when Kane and Hall rented used whalers for the 
Arctic, they revived ships that probably originally had been designed for commerce. 
American shipbuilders of the mid-nineteenth century specialized in designs of the 
medium clipper ship. These ships were meant to have shallow drafts and to carry 
large amounts of cargo. They were sailing ships meant to be "light ' on the water, and 
speed was of little significance. When whaling companies refitted the clippers, they 
routinely added more weight to the vessels' hulls, so that the rougher conditions of 
the Northern Atlantic would not crush them too easily. Explorers, in turn, added 
more weight when they later used the same ships.^'
Ship construction changed during the 1870‘s, however, because America 
became the world's best whaling nation. The United States dominated this industry 
from 1820 to 1880 for several reasons. In 1840, whaling crews discovered 
Cumberland Inlet, a bay at the southeastern comer of Baffin Island, a previously 
unknown whale fishery. In addition. American sailors began wintering over in the 
Arctic after 1851. The familiarity established between the whaling crews and the 
Inuits created a successful fur trading network that added more money to the whaling 
industry. Also, a few whaling companies set up shore stations in the Canadian Arctic
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that provided supplies, support, and a home base for these crews. Another positive 
turn for American whalers was the discover}' in 1860 of one of the last great eastern 
Arctic whaling grounds in Roes Welcome Sound, near Hudson’s Bay.
In response to the sizable profits generated by the whaling industry, American 
shipbuilders began after 1870 to design specialized whaling vessels.’" The new 
whaling vessels were built much like the medium clippers, except they were shorter 
in length, bark-rigged, and had finer underwater lines, so that they might slip above 
quickly forming ice. Ice constricted and crushed tlat-bottomed ships more easily than 
these narrow-bottomed whalers. These alterations also made the ships faster and 
easier to maneuver, important considerations for crews trying to harpoon and haul 
aboard whales. During the 1870's, the American shipbuilding industry grew as a 
result of the demand for these specialized whaling ships.’^
Peary missed the peak o f the American whaling industry, however. The 
whaling fleet started outfitting its ships for steam during the 1880's, almost thirty 
years behind Britain. Steam power, o f course, made ships faster and more 
maneuverable, but the costs were prohibitive. A steam bark cost triple the amount of 
a wind vessel.’"* The steam-powered ships used in the eastern Arctic were not cost 
productive. Decades of intensive whaling had decreased the profits, and the high cost
Davis. Galiman. and Gleiter. hi Pursuit. 267-268.
Davis. Galiman. and Gleiter. In Pursuit. 38-39; Claimes o f  Owners and Crews o f  Certain American 
Wluilinf’ Vessels. Congressional Record. 51” Cong.. I” sess.. 1889. 1890. Between 1868 and 1888, the 
US whaling industry averaged two million dollars per year in revenue.
Davis. Galiman. and Gleiter. In Pursuit. 10.268. 270. A bark is a vessel with three masts, square- 
rigged on foremost and main mast, fore- and aft-rigged on the mizzen. meaning that this class o f vessel 
has more masts than smaller classes. The masts helped the barks sail faster, but also required many 
men to haul them up and down as needed. Whaling crews were usually fairly large, since different 
skills were required for each phase o f harpooning, hauling, cutting, and preserving the whales.
Davis. Galiman, and Gleiter. In Pursuit. 45. Coal was expensive, as were the salaries for the skilled 
mechanics who worked with the new technology. Also, not all steamers were "new." Some steam 
whalers were older sailing ships that had steam equipment attached.
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of the new ships made them unpopular choices. Many eastern whaling companies 
established West coast operations, however, and sent their steamers to freshly 
discovered hunting grounds in the Pacific Ocean. These same companies often 
reverted to smaller ships for their North Atlantic expeditions, which kept that part of 
the industry profitable.^^
During the 1890’s, just as Peary announced long-term plans for Arctic 
exploration, the American eastern whaling industry' fizzled, and the most local, 
accessible, active ships were smaller, technologically outdated ships. As a result, it 
was a crisis of some import when Peary’s wife realized that she had only a few 
months to find and rent a ship to retrieve him during the spring of 1895. It was 
difficult to find ships because most whaling companies pared their fleets to reduce 
costs. Also, not all of these smaller ships could not handle Arctic ice. even during the 
summer. Finally, ship rental was expensive, and possible refitting costs compounded 
the situation.
Josephine's scramble to rent an old whaler exemplified the core of Peary’s 
frustrations as an Arctic explorer. The United States was unprepared for his needs. 
Peary spent months looking all over the world for decent ships each time he planned a 
trip. He also remained desperate for money. He wanted the North Pole after 1898, 
which would be even more expensive (and difficult to explain) than his earlier quests. 
Arctic exploration still had the reputation of being an expensive undertaking with 
little to show in return. After 1893. Peary found one solution. He became adept at
Davis. Galiman. and Gleiter. In Pursuit. 46. Steamers made it possible for whaling crews to winter 
over in the Western Arctic, and profits stayed high. Also, by the I890’s. whaling companies all over 
the world realized that the Antarctic was probably the last large hunting ground, and steamers 
definitely made that trek possible. The North Atlantic whaling industry died slowly.
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honoring, gifting, and cajoling a select audience of scientific men and organizations 
into supporting him. He directly benefitted from the trails that Kane, Hall, and 
Greely blazed within the American Arctic community. As Peary became more 
focused on the North Pole, he got better at making these men and institutions 
dependent upon him, as they had not been with his predecessors. The complexities of 
these relationships deepened after 1898, though he set his patterns during these first 
trips. He returned home only long enough to rekindle the fires of support and to 
rejuvenate an increasingly well-informed, well-organized American Arctic 
community.
During the 19"’ century, the United States moved through several phases of 
scientific Arctic exploration. England dominated the region for two hundred years, 
but as its enthusiasm dwindled in response to Franklin's mysterious tragedy, the 
United States took greater notice of the region. Kane's dual interests in England's 
hero and the romance of so much uncharted, difficult terrain captured Americans' 
imagination. American scientists, equally as excited but poorly organized, could do 
little more than appreciate any new information retrieved by the explorers. The 
federal government alternately funded Arctic exploration and withdrew its support in 
favor of more practical commercial endeavors. Hall familiarized his countrymen with 
the idea of trying to reach the North Pole. He also began a tradition, later exploited by 
Peary, of observing and mimicking some of the Inuit adaptations to the foreign 
climate. He relied upon old methodologies, however, and never fully considered the 
radical organizational and leadership tactics required to reach 90 N. Greely. with the 
full force o f the US Navy behind him, had an opportunity to tie federal money to
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Arctic exploration and a large, organized scientific community. His spectacular 
failure convinced the government and most Americans that the Arctic posed too many 
hazards for its scientists and explorers. Peary committed himself to Arctic 
exploration, and he spent over two decades raising money, getting a select group of 
scientists professionally invested in his work, and turning his dream of finding the 
North Pole into a national obsession.
With his first two trips, Peary encountered several problems that he learned to 
handle as he became the nation’s top Arctic explorer. He knew that several scientific 
organizations wanted to help him because their members believed that they could 
direct the legacy o f an exploratory frontier. Out o f necessity, Peary paid attention to 
how the scientists organized themselves, and he learned how to help them find money 
for new kinds o f fieldwork. His motives were selfish, but his needs coincided with 
the creation o f a new assembly of professional, field-specific scientists, and it worked 
to his benefit. Through the researchers, he contacted wealthy philanthropists who 
enjoyed affiliation with modem scientific achievement. But that was yet to happen.
By 1895, he had learned only that scientists liked his work and that they had barely 
enough money within their various organizations to fund an uninspired exploration of 
Greenland. He also realized, though probably not deeply enough, that finding 
transportation to the Arctic was no easy task. This particular detail o f expedition 
planning too often got buried amid sweeping proclamations about the greater good of 
the trip. As his next large endeavor indicates, Peary learned the lesson but was forced 
to be selective in explanations about the goals and needs of Arctic exploration.
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Chapter 3
“A Common Carrier”: Scientists, Money, and Peary—1897
Robert E. Peary needed money to return to the Arctic in 1897. His engineer’s 
salary barely covered his family's living expenses, and he had no personal fortune. His 
employer, the US Navy, wished him luck and awarded him extended military leave, but 
gave him no extra consideration for Arctic exploration. The US Navy had never involved 
itself in the Arctic to the same degree as had England’s military a few decades earlier, 
especially after the Adolphus W. Greely disaster in 1884. England used the Arctic as a 
vast peacetime training area for its naval crews. Until Captain John Franklin 
disappeared, the British government supported its navy’s search for the Northwest 
Passage. America’s first Arctic explorers needed aid just as England withdrew its 
interest. Fully aware o f England's problems, the United States government never made 
Arctic exploration a national imperative. Also, given the relatively small size of the 
American navy, the government could not risk its ships or men on such a questionable 
quest. Peary’s only real option was private funding. Upon each post-expeditionary 
return to the United States, he embarked upon a serious financial campaign. He almost 
always had plans for the next trip ready before the previous one ended. He had several 
months, occasionally one full year, to raise several thousand dollars, make the necessary 
preparations for another large, extended venture, and leave again for the North.
The events of the summer of 1897 produced the same fervor as so many of 
Peary’s previous money-raising efforts. He had limited time and many expenses, and he 
needed to contact the people who could help him quickly. This campaign was slightly
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easier, however, because his name and his association with the Arctic were better known 
than in previous years. More important, he was familiar by that time with the work of 
many different scientists, so that when he began to formulate long-term goals he had 
knowledgeable audiences. He still petitioned scientists to join him, but already he 
envisioned a future in which he could ignore the scientific management o f his trips and 
focus exclusively on the best route to the pole. The summer of 1897 was a turning point, 
because afterward Peary did not need individual scientists to fund him. Thereafter, he 
was able to win the fmaneial support of powerful finaneiers.
No single institution, university, museum, office, organization, or individual 
financier oversaw Peary's plans or controlled his information and artifacts upon his 
stateside returns. The United States lacked a national plan, so when Peary drafted one he 
took Arctic exploration in a new direction. Until Peary explained his vision, national 
Arctic exploration changed dramatically with each individual explorer. Peary became 
America's most famous northern explorer long before he got within reach of the North 
Pole because he turned other men's scientific pursuits into his most powerful tools. The 
American Geographical Society (AGS) the National Geographic Society (NGS), and the 
American Museum of Natural History (AMNH), the largest scientific associations in the 
nation, donated money to Peary in exchange for Arctic artifacts, news, and descriptions.
Peary asked and even pressured individual professional scientists to accompany 
him on each of his early (pre-1898) trips. In return for paid passage, Peary transported 
them to safe spots in northwest Greenland where they conducted fieldwork. These 
scientists had the rare opportunity to make their observations in a remote locale. Their 
research added professional merit and prestige to Peary's trips and provided a public.
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reliable connection between his polar dreams and his institutional backers. Thus, Peary 
created a new sort of American Arctic exploration that bore only a passing resemblance 
to the methods of Elisha Kent Kane, Charles Francis Hall, and Greely. He did not use the 
Northwest Passage, the John Franklin mystery, or the open polar sea to recruit audiences. 
Instead, he focused on the North Pole, and in the process utilized the organization and 
finances of America’s leading scientists. Moreover, Peary's plan also differed 
significantly from the model o f the British, the world’s Arctic leader at the beginning of 
Peary’s career.
England dominated Arctic exploration until shortly before Peary’s first trip.
Britain gave more money to Arctic explorers than did any other nation. In addition, in 
England scientists had professional incentive to collect data about non-European peoples 
and places that might become domains for British subjugation. Victorian-era Britain 
experienced a wave o f imperialism and a flood o f scientific information during the most 
successful exploratory phase o f the nation’s history. Multiple scientific societies and 
clubs also contributed to the science of imperialism. During the nineteenth century, the 
Royal Geographic Society (RGS), became the most prestigious and well-respected group 
o f scientists in the world. The American copycats, the NGS and the AGS, imitated the 
RGS by combining explorers, cartographers, linguists, ethnographers, surveyors, 
instrument makers, engineers, diplomats, military officers, and politicians within one 
organization.' Roderick Murchison, a professional geologist and talented administrator, 
helped direct the early RGS, which sought to further the careers of explorer-scientists and 
simultaneously provide useful data to Britain’s government. This was the era of 
Livingston's travels to Africa, and a time when Britain sent teams of scientists to Latin
no
America, Australia, and Canada to secure a dominant colonial presence. ‘
Under Murchison's direction, the RGS became the world’s leading geographical 
organization. Within a few years, the “RGS gold medal emerged as one of the most 
coveted decorations in the world.”  ^ In 1854, Murchison created the Geographical Club, 
an exclusive dining group designed to allow explorers to mix with RGS officers. The 
private information shared between the scientists and politicians or elites often influenced 
public opinion. The RGS is one example o f the organizations that propelled Britain 
through its last uncontested phase of imperialistic exploration. It worked because "while 
the scientists won access to widening career options and new data, the imperial 
government gained accurate information for administering and developing its sprawling 
possessions.”  ^ Even more important, the RGS operated as a national repository for its 
scientists' collective observations and as a location for public discussions about overseas 
scientific expeditions.^
American Arctic explorers operated under much different circumstances than 
their English counterparts. English interest in Arctic exploration dwindled along with the 
fervor to find Franklin. Greely and Kane drew Americans into the setting, with modest 
success. Peary's need to find private backing limited his means and often delayed his 
plans. When he started making independent trips in 1891 (his first trip to Greenland in
' The RGS was founded in 1830. the AGS in 1852, and the NGS in 1888.
■ Robert A. Stafford. Scieniisi o f  Empire: Sir Roderick Murchison. Scientific Exploration, and I 'ictorian 
imperialLsm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 22.
’ Stafford, Scientist. 22.
■' Stafford. Scientist. 189. See also Edward P. Alexander, Mu.seum Masters: Their Museums and Their 
influence (Nashville, TN: The American Association for State and Local History. 1983), 134-136. The 
Kew Gardens, under attack from a bitter govememnt minister in the late nineteenth century, defended itself 
as a tool o f both science and government. The garden's director. William Jackson Hooker, and his 
colleagues stayed alloat by depending upon the many ways that the garden's herbarium aided British 
colonial advancement around the globe. Kew became famous for its close ties with the British empire.
'  Alexander, Mu.seum Masters. 22.
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1886 was under the direction o f the US Navy), the only reliable sources for money were 
scientists interested in Arctic fieldwork.
Peary slowly, carefully built a circle of professional scientists who depended upon 
him. He wrote to researchers at various universities, colleges, and institutions and listed 
the benefits o f travel with him. In return for paid passage on one of his trips, Peary left 
the scientists in Greenland with provisions to last several weeks or months and picked 
them up after he returned from regions further north.^ Pear)' consistently received money 
from the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH), the NGS, and the AGS, and it 
is doubtful that he could have won their continual and increasing support during his first 
years as an explorer without his success at getting individual, hand-picked scientists to 
accompany him. Peary himself was not a scientist, nor did he fully understand the data 
collected by his teams of specialists. The scientists' presence made it possible for Peary 
to showcase the Arctic as a vast expanse of fieldwork awaiting data collectors. The 
public regarded the quest for the North Pole as a national conquest, but the history of 
Arctic exploration proved that the cost in lives and money was often too much. The 
AMNH, the NGS, the AGS, the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, and the other 
relatively large groups that helped Peary did so out of more than interest in the race to the 
pole.
Peary often attracted scientists by emphasizing the publication opportunities that 
awaited them upon return from the Arctic. He pointed out how signing with him would 
work to the benefit of both individuals and their home institutions. Most scientists who
*’ Peary usually left the scientists near Melville Bay, along the northwest coast o f Greenland. He then took 
his smaller exploration crew further north, through Smith Sound and Kennedy Channel, before leaving the 
ship to set up a strategic winter camp. Depending upon the strength o f the ship and unforeseen weather 
conditions, he then sent the ship back towards Melville Bay. back to the US for supplies, or stuck in ice
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travelled with Peary eventually published their findings after withholding their data for a 
time so that Peary could publish first. Because Peary was not a trained scientist, there 
was little chance that he would trump a scientists’ results, but as the organizer of the 
party he demanded first rights to public access.
Peary was a remarkably successful explorer even though it took him twenty-six 
years to claim the pole. Yet he considered himself a personal failure because the pole 
eluded him until 1909. No other explorer, however, operated at such a high level of 
produetivity for such an extended length of time. Each trip yielded results: cartography, 
the world's largest known meteorites, live animals, bird and animal skins, a farthest north 
record, and in one bizarre case, actual Inuit "specimens.” The scientists who 
accompanied him never failed to reach their destination, and they had plenty of time for 
research, observation, or collection. Between 1891 and 1909. a staggering amount of 
Arctic information, artifacts, flora, and fauna entered the United States via Peary and his 
scientific associates.^ Most of it filtered through America’s scientists and museums and 
became public exhibits, articles, or lectures. For example, the AMNH expanded its floor 
space by over 100.000 square feet through a combination of funds from the city of New 
York ($75,000). the Endowment Fund ($65,000), and the Trustees ($8,000). A member 
o f the Peary Relief Party (of 1895) donated "numerous specimens... to the Department of 
Mammals and Birds.” The museum had enough material to open two new halls, and
near his camp until the tbiiowing spring.
' "The Opening of the East Wing of the American Museum o f Natural History." Science New Series. 4 
(1896). 849-853; "The American Museum o f Natural History," Science New Series. 17 (May 29. 1903), 
874-876. Peary maintained his affiliation with the AMNH. The museum received an unusually large 
number of mammals during the year 1902: "The gift from the Peary Arctic Club o f about one hundred 
mammals, collected by Commander Peary on his last arctic expedition, is especially noteworthy, and the 
museum is now doubtless by far the richest in the world in mammals from arctic America.” The museum 
also received many animals from the New York Zoological Society and the Central Park Menagerie. It is 
not clear if all o f these animals came from Peary, but he frequently left Eskimo dogs and other animals with
I I :
Peary had special influence upon one, the Ethnological Hall. The museum was especially 
proud of this section: “The importance o f  the Peary collection, a gift o f Mr. Morris K. 
Jesup, President of the Museum, lies in the fact that the tribe whose culture it represents 
has had very little contact with the whites, so that it is more primitive than most material 
that has recently found its way into museums. The costumes, industries and utensils of 
this tribe are represented exhaustively."^
However brief, Peary had a unique control over Arctic scientific research. Men 
like geologist Ralph Tarr. glacialist T. C. Chamberlin, and geologist George Barton 
traveled with Peary and published worthwhile articles. Peary controlled what people 
thought about the Arctic through the sheer volume of his personal Arctic collections and 
how he chose to use, sell, store, or donate the information to various organizations. By 
1909, the most famous and wealthiest organizations (like the AMNH) received most of 
his donations. These groups, in turn, depended upon Peary's inclusion of professional 
scientists as a proviso for their continued support o f his quest to reach the North Pole. In 
the end, Peary was a master at turning scientific information into professional currency.
Peary did not organize a polar expedition again until 1898, but after his 
disappointing 1893-1895 trip, he made two successive summer trips to Greenland. In 
1894, Peary saw the three huge meteorites first mentioned by England's John Ross in 
1818. Ross noticed the natives' use o f iron but could not discern their source. Peary 
convinced his Inuit guides to take him to the Iron Mountain, where he found three 
meteorites, known individually as "the dog (1/2 ton)," "the woman (3 tons).” and "the 
tent ( 100 tons)." Peary returned to Cape York in 1896 and took home the smaller two
the New York City Zoo. It is possible that some of them ended up at the AMNH. 
" "The American Museum.” 876.
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meteorites. He planned to return in 1897 to retrieve the largest one. He also briefly stated 
that the Inuits were delighted to watch him haul away their major source o f iron and 
expressed disappointment that he could not take all three aboard ship in 1896. He wrote 
that the Inuits received so many iron goods from whalers and explorers that they no 
longer depended upon the meteorites.'^
As Peary made plans for his last Cape York meteorite trip, he enjoyed short-lived 
financial security. During the early spring of 1897, he wrote to Evelyn Briggs Baldwin, a 
meteorologist at the Weather Bureau who had accompanied him on the 1894 expedition. 
Baldwin knew that Peary planned to return north that summer to retrieve the last of the 
three meteorites, and he offered to pay Peary for the privilege o f accompanying him. 
Peary informed Baldwin that he need not worry about payment, since the AGS had 
supplied sufficient money. Peary still wanted Baldwin to remain committed to the 
Arctic, however, and stressed that “your training and experience would add weight to 
your application." Peary hoped to force the scientists into competition, giving those 
who had been with him before an edge, but no guarantee. Baldwin did not join the trip of 
1897.
Peary also asked Baldwin to edit his report from the earlier trip so that it could be 
included it as part of his forthcoming Arctic volume, and he offered to send a copy of 
Baldwin's previous work back to him, with Peary's editorial suggestions. Peary wanted 
the style o f the book to be "uniform throughout," which required Baldwin to popularize
’ Robert E. Peary, "The Cape York Iron Stone, " Journal o f  the American Geofiraphical Society' o f  New 
York 26 ( 1894). 447-488. See also Robert E. Peary. Northward Ch’er the “Great Ice: " A Narrative o f  Life 
and Work along the Shores and upon the interior Ice-Cap o f  Northern Greenland in the Years IH86 and 
1891-1897. 2 volumes (New York: Frederick A. Stokes. 1898). 2: 561. 574.
Robert E. Peary to Evelyn Briggs Baldwin. March 29, 1897. Folder "B.” Box 6, Letters Sent. 1897-98. 
RG 401: National Archives Gift Collection o f Materials Relating to Polar Regions. (I)  RADM. Robert E. 
Peary Family Collection (A) Robert E. Peary Papers. Referred to hereafter by PFC and Specific Box and
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his scientific manuscript for a broad audience." Peary hinted, however, that a more 
complete revision o f Baldwin's work would appear later as part of the explorer’s planned 
second volume of Arctic travel, which would “contain the scientific results of my 
expeditions and in which shall be gathered together all the scientific papers originating 
from my various main and auxiliary expeditions.”’"
Peary’s soon faced disappointment. During the spring and early summer of 1897, 
he had to prepare for his last summer meteorite run and secure as many donors as 
possible for the trip to the North Pole he envisioned for 1898. However, Peary had 
assumed significant personal debt for the 1896 trip to retrieve the smaller two Cape York 
meteorites, and he refused to repeat the experience. Peary knew that the best way to 
secure reliable money was through the scientific community.
As usual, the most expensi\ e item was ship rental. It cost between twenty and 
thirty thousand dollars to rent and insure a whaler. This aspect o f Peary's stateside career 
was enormously time-consuming. He had one advantage, however. Throughout his 
campaign history, the captains of each of his ships all came from the same family—the 
Bartletts, a large Newfoundland-based sealing family with substantial Arctic expertise. 
Several different Bartletts took Peary and his passengers to the Arctic in old, refitted 
whalers, and they also scouted for suitable ships between trips. Harry Bartlett sailed 
north with Peary in 1891 and 1893 and brought Josephine and baby Marie back to the 
United States in 1894. Harry's brothers John and Samuel also served Pear)'. When
Folder.
" Peary. Northward. 2: 177-203. One chapter of the second volume is Baldwin's work, entitled 
"Meteorological and Auroral Notes. " The chapter is included in the form of reports from Baldwin to Peary 
listing meteorological data and tables, mixed with Baldwin's narrative descriptions o f the weather and the 
landscape. There is no indication from Peary if  this comprises all o f Baldwin's work or correspondences.
'■ Peary to Baldwin. March 29. 1897. Folder "B.” Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
' ’ Robert A. Bartlett. Tha Log o f  Boh Bartlett: The True Story o f Forty Years o f  Seafaring and Exploration
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Peary finally secured the Windward for his 1898 trip, John was captain and his nephew, 
Robert (“Bob”), sailed as a mate. John liked Peary, and suggested to Bob that he join the 
explorer. As Bob remembered, John told him that “if I could become attached to the staff 
of a man like Peary it would no doubt help me later on to land a ship o f my own.” '"* Bob 
watched and realized that Peary’s observations of ice and tidal conditions along his 
chosen route gave him a crucial advantage over later competition. Bartlett stated flatly 
that Pear> ’s later successes happened because “ ...he spent nearly twenty-five 
years...eliminating the obstacles that had prevented other explorers for four centuries 
from doing what he was trying to do. I think the main thing that made possible the 
discovery of the North Pole was the placing of a ship at the north end of Grant Land on 
the shores of the Polar Sea. In this way both dogs and men could set out early in the 
spring o f the year and travel directly across the polar ice, without any preliminary 
struggle.” On each trip, despite other failures, Peary studied the ice between Cape Sabine 
and Cape Sheridan, a distance o f several hundred miles, and learned better than anyone 
else how to navigate a ship further north through Kane Basin, a notoriously tricky path
(New York and London; G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1928). 57-59. 101-103. 141-143. Newfoundland enjoyed 
brief prosperity from the sealing industry. During the early nineteenth century, sealers often brought in 
over one million dollars each spring. By the early twentieth century, the entire Newfoundland fleet rarely 
earned more than S200.000. Years o f over-hunting decreased the seal population, and the introduction o f 
steam ended the older sailing sealers' runs. Declining profits made it too expensive to convert to steam.
The Newfoundland sealing leaders did not reinvest in newer markets like boot and shoe factories, real 
estate, or copper and steel operations, like New England whaling magnates did when the American whaling 
industry experienced the same problems at the end o f the nineteenth century. John Bartlett was one o f  the 
first Newfoundlanders to obtain the difficult British mariner's certificate. Bob Bartlett also became a master 
mariner several years later. The test required intensive study and expert knowledge o f astronomical 
instrumentation. Bartlett's skills may have been one reason why Peary did not take him on the final leg of 
his 1909 trip, on which Peary claimed to have reached the North Pole. None o f the other men with Peaiy at 
the pole knew how to take these measurements. Samuel's great-uncle Isaac captained the whaler that 
rescued Hall and his crew in 1872. Harry disappeared on his way home after returning Josephine and 
Marie in Philadelphia.
Bartlett. The Log. 145. His uncle was correct. Bob had a long, distinguished career as an Arctic captain 
long after Peary claimed to reach the North Pole in 1909.
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that occasionally froze over unexpectedly far s o u t h . ( S e e  Appendix, Figures 5-6)
Bob Bartlett appreciated Peary’s attention to detail, and the trip of 1898 marked 
the beginning of a twenty-year association with the explorer. During the fall and winter 
of 1897, however, Peary still relied mainly upon Bob’s uncle, John, for advice on ships. 
John returned to Labrador after making inquiries about several vessels, knowing that 
Burchell would help Peary find a suitable c r a f t . P e a r y  contacted H.J. Bull in Norway 
and asked him to assess the possibility o f renting “second hand Norwegian Whalers.” 
Peary wanted a list and description of available ships and what it would cost to insure 
them, in order to compare the cost of Norwegian and Newfoundland sealers.’  ^ The news 
from Burchell. however, was disappointing. The ship owners demanded high rates for 
the ships’ use alone, and the insurance costs would make them too expensive. Peary shot 
an angry letter to Burchell, asking him to remind the Newfoundland sealer companies 
that despite newspaper accounts that he had enough money for his trip, he did not have 
unlimited funds. He could spend no more than thirty thousand dollars for the ship and 
insurance. Twenty thousand would come from the scientists, and the rest from his own 
efforts. Peary made the problem clear to Burchell: “The expenses of this summer 1 shall 
have to meet entirely with money received from scientific expeditions which will take 
passage on the ship. Last summer 1 ran myself several thousand dollars in debt by the 
voyage, and am but now free o f my obligations after unremitting efforts....1 see my way 
clear to raise ... about Twelve thousand dollars; but anything beyond that is out of the 
question.” Peary hoped to profit from the sealing industry's disastrous 1896 spring
Bartlett, The Log, 146-147.
Peary to Herbert Bridgman. June 2. 1897. Folder "B." Box 6, Letters Sent 1897-98.PFC. Peary told 
Bridgman that Bartlett had sent a telegraph with this information.
Peary to H.J. Bull. March 31, 1897?Folder "B.“ Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC.
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season, expecting that ship owners would be grateful to rent him a craft for less money 
than usual. He directed Burchell to remind the sealers that the next sealing year looked 
no more promising, and that they should be happy with less.'*
Peary’s woes continued throughout the winter. Another shipbuilding company 
offered him three ships, the Diana, the Esquimaux, and the Terra Nova. Peary especially 
liked the Terra Nova, but considered the cost too high because he would have to refit the 
whaler to make it more manageable, which increased the expense. Peaty suggested that 
Bruce turn the ship into a commercial vessel, which might yield a faster profit, "even in 
spite of her unquestioned fitness for Arctic work."'*^ Peary’s inability to find suitable 
transportation only heightened his anxieties about fund-raising.
He became increasingly direct in his pleas for money, and the sheer remoteness 
o f the Arctic helped Peary. He exercised undisputed control over placement o f the 
researchers who accompanied him, imposing strict rules about where he would leave 
them to do their work. Peary dropped them in a safe region that also promised easy 
delivery and pick-up with his ships, although he knew that the most dedicated scientists 
would value access to lesser-known areas. As a result. Peaiy occasionally offered to take 
an observer further north than other expedition members. As he prepared to leave in 
1897. he tried to lure Chamberlin o f the University of Chicago into accepting his 
invitation by pledging that "the restriction in regard to passage north o f Melville would 
be omitted and 1 should be very glad to have you make the entire round trip with the
Peary to H. Burchell. June 8. 1897. Folder "B, ' Box 6. Letters Sent, 1897-98. PFC. Burchell also looked 
for a whaler for Peary to rent for the 1898 trip. Even if Peary got $20,000 from the scientists, enough 
possibly for a ship, he still had to cover crew salaries, supplies, dog expenses, and trading goods for the 
Inuits. The ship costs determined all else. For example, the owners o f the Hope wanted $8,000 before 
insurance. Insurance costs ran $20,000-30.000. At that price. Peary could afford the ship but nothing else. 
' " Peary to David Bruce. December 16. 1897. Folder "B." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC. Peary 
eventually rented the Diana as a supply steamer.
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ship.” *^^ It was a bit of a bribe, meant to win Chamberlin’s assent for a return northward. 
Chamberlin was the rare scientist given the opportunity to stay with Peary and not be 
dropped off in Greenland.
Peary was proud of Chamberlin’s attachment to his 1894 expedition. In his two- 
volume work about his first five Arctic trips, Peary singled out Chamberlin, and 
concurrently applauded himself for the positive effect he had made on the glacialist’s 
work."' Partially as a result of his Arctic work, Chamberlin became the first person to 
identify the different periods o f American glacial movement.""
Peary made more deals like the one he offered Chamberlin as his desperation 
grew. Two days after he wrote to Chamberlin, Peary contacted Henry W. Cannon, 
president of Chase National Bank and a personal friend, and asked for an extension on his 
debt to the bank. He enclosed partial payment, but explained that the rest would be 
delayed until he received money from the scientists who would accompany his next 
voyage."’^ Cannon was Peary ’s banker; and Peary wisely kept Cannon apprised of his 
successes. As soon as Peary had the last meteorite aboard his ship he cabled Cannon 
with the news. He also reassured Cannon that "My Eskimos eager for next summer," 
implying that Peary 's favorite group o f Inuits expected and welcomed his next return."'* 
This was not random information. Peary already had planned his next trip and he also 
knew that a select few of his wealthiest benefactors. Cannon among them, were
■" Peary to T.C. Chamberlin, May 30, 1897, Folder "C." Box 6, Letters Sent 1897-98, PFC.
■' Peary, Northward. I; Ixviii.
■■ In addition, he wrote a famous paper that put him at the forefront o f geology. "The Method of Multiple 
Working Hypotheses," published in both Sciemx' ( 1890) and the Journal ofCieolog}' ( 1897) argued that 
scientists should develop several leading hypotheses so that the researcher would not be predisposed to 
believe or disbelieve only one main idea.
■ ’ Peary to Henry Cannon. June 1. 1897, Folder "C," Box 6, Letters Sent 1897-98, PFC.
Peary to Cannon, Telegram. 1897, Folder "C." Box 6, Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC.
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considering increasing their aid."^
Peary’s mention of the Inuits struck at another favorite theme of the explorer. He 
often emphasized his importance to the Cape York Inuits. During his career, Peary 
experimented with different winter headquarters from which to launch his spring polar 
efforts, but each year he saw the same group of Inuits. He came to rely upon them for 
food, lodging, clothing, dogs, information, companionship, transportation, and guidance. 
He mentioned to Cannon that the Inuits were looking forward to his return, which was a 
calculated phrasing. Peary always acknowledged the many ways he benefitted from the 
Inuits’ help, but he also played upon the Inuits’ interest in him.
Peary believed that America's Arctic exploration benefitted the Inuits. He argued 
that his frequent trips raised their standard o f living. In his view, the trade goods that he 
brought made the hunters better providers and helped them support more dogs (the major 
transportation source of the region). The hunters’ greater success helped groups endure 
the climate better nourished, and so the birth rates rose and death rates dropped -  all 
apparently due to Peary’s presence.'^ He offered no evidence and never took an 
anthropologist with him to study these trends, but it was one of his pet defenses of Arctic 
work. Peary believed that he had raised "those children of the North... to a condition of 
affluence" through his gifts of knives, kayaks, needles, guns. wood, harpoons, awls, and 
sledges.'^ Peary's note to Cannon about "my Eskimos" insinuated the familiarity that he 
bragged about and also reminded Cannon that the North Pole awaited Peary's next big 
trip. He did not want Cannon to focus on momentary financial lapses.
Peary leaned heavily upon his circle of scientific acquaintances as time grew short
The PAC officially organized in 1898. 
■*’ Peary. Northward, I : Ix.
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for his quick metorite run. He wanted to plan the trip of 1898 but first had to secure the 
ironstone. He did what he felt was necessary in order to entice the scientists. He told 
Professor George Barton of Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (MIT), for example, 
that Professor Chamberlain of Colby College had already committed to him and that "the 
character and extent of the interest evinced in this summer voyage has surprised even 
me.’'"  ^Peary obviously saw no harm in creating some competition for the few open spots 
on his voyages.
Other times, as in the case of Alfred Burton. Peary used personal connections to 
advantage. He offered Burton free round-trip passage, but asked Burton to keep the deal 
a secret from the other passengers. Peary followed this gift with a plea: "1 am going to 
ask your assistance in the matter of getting up a party. Can't you raise another one in 
Boston as you did last year? The terms this year 1 shall be obliged to make $450 per head 
or $2500 for a party of six.”‘‘^
Peary became adept at stroking the scientists' egos. The secret deal he struck 
with Burton was one o f several similar bargains he negotiated. Barton o f MIT received a 
letter much like the ones sent to Burton and Chamberlin. Peary went one step further, 
however, and presented Barton with a chance to do specialized fieldwork. Peaiy was 
direct:
It has not been my intention to take anyone north o f Melville Bay this summer 
and 1 would not take a stranger under any circumstances, but knowing you 1 have 
this proposition to make; if you will raise a party o f five or six persons (outside 
of yourself) to be landed somewhere in Greenland and pay $2500 for their 
transportation, 1 should be glad to have you remain on the ship with me as my
Peary. Northward. 1 : lix.
Peary to George Barton. May 24. 1897. Folder " 8 .” Box 6. Letters Sent, 1897-98, PFC.
Peary to Alfred Burton. May 24. 1897, Folder "B." Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC. Peary needed 
thousands o f  dollars for the trip, but in this letter he enclosed one dollar he owed Burton from the previous 
year.
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guest and make the round trip without expense, with this clear understanding as to 
the regions and that portion of the voyage north o f Melville Bay, namely, that 
while the geographical and mineralogical features o f the country should be 
entirely at your disposal and you have the utmost freedom to write concerning 
them yet that you shall confine yourself strictly to these and not touch upon the 
scenery, the people and the products o f the country or the movements of the ship 
or party
Barton had a solid national reputation that he used to Peary’s advantage. He had 
been with Peary in Greenland in 1896 when Peary loaded the smaller two meteorites, and 
upon his return. Barton published his research in American Geologist.^' He did not return 
in 1897. despite Peary’s special offer, but wrote a letter to Science in 1897 that reminded 
the magazine’s readers that Peary would soon be leaving again for the Arctic, creating a 
tremendous opportunity for anyone interested in glacial phenomena. He suggested that 
American scientists should appreciate the chance because the Danish government (which 
had a dominant colonial presence in Greenland) supported research on glaciers, and 
comparative American science trailed the Danes.
According to Barton, an interested party would have four uninterrupted weeks of 
research. He especially emphasized Peary’s favorite point, that it might be possible for 
scientists to make annual returns. Peary had already been to Greenland six times and had 
plans for more trips, making such a scenario highly likely.^" Barton knew that Peary- 
preferred to take teams of scientists and that a note in Science magazine might reach the 
ideal target audience.
Peary to Barton. May 24. 1897. Folder "B.” Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC. Peaiy 's  correspondence 
with Baldwin suggests that Peary did not remain completely removed from the scientists' work, however. 
He did not want to be forced to include information o f limited appeal to the general public.
' George Barton in American Geologist, 18 (1896). 379-384.
’■ George Barton, "Discussion and Correspondence. Lieutenant Peaiy 's  Expedition." Science 5 (1897). 
308-310. Peary often asked his selected scientists to organize teams o f five or six that included different 
professions. Barton suggested a team composed o f a glacialist. zoologist, botanist, meteorologist, 
ethnologist, and a physician (who could also be trained as one o f  the above). Peary did not seem 
particularly to care which fields o f science were represented, but the team concept eliminated the need for
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With the letter to Barton, Peary laid bare several ideas. He knew that any 
dedicated scientist would be anxious to work new territory. The explorer stated as clearly 
as possible the topics Barton could cover in publication. Peary left the science to the 
experts (his directions to Baldwin notwithstanding), but insisted that he should cover 
anything of general interest, such as descriptions o f the native peoples or their 
environment, in his own work. Peary never allowed his passengers or crew to keep 
navigational or publish technical accounts of their specific geographic locations. Peary 
could not afford to let others discuss these aspects o f his trips. He knew by then that 
narratives o f Arctic exploration needed information beyond grandiose nationalistic 
declarations in order to see publication. The general, non-scientific areas that he asked 
Barton and others to avoid were ones that he could include as part of his chronological 
accounts o f each trip. Even as he wrote to Barton, he had already sent his first 
manuscript to several publishers and was awaiting word on its acceptance.^^
Some o f the people that Peary enlisted had only the loosest connections to 
academic institutions. This hardly mattered to Peary, however, so long as the large 
groups that monitored and sponsored him took sufficient interest to provide funds. Peary 
began to sell the Arctic. He informed J.D. Figgins, an interested taxidermist, that for five 
hundred dollars he would allow Figgins to collect as many birds or bird skins as possible 
during the brief summer voyage. Peary knew the price might be too steep, so he offered 
to "give...passage aboard the ship, pay all your expenses, and give...as your commission 
thirty-three and one-third percent of the sum obtained by the sale o f such specimens, viz.
further organization on his part and also gave him a large, dependable sum o f  money from one source.
”  From Charles Scribner's Sons to Peaiy. June 23. 1897. Folder "S. " Box 17. Letters Received 1897. PFC. 
Charles Scribner's Sons rejected his book one month later, explaining that "the great expense connected 
with such a work would be hardly justified by its probable demand." Frederick Stokes, however, did
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bird skins, walrus skins and skins of narwhal, bear skins, sealskins, Eskimo costumes, 
kayaks, tents, etc.... as you can obtain orders for from various museums and private 
parties between now and the time of departure... providing that the total amount of such 
orders that you may obtain will not be less than one thousand dollars.” The offer must not 
have been too unusual, because Peary offered to send Figgins a list of specimens with 
prices attached.
The explorer also solicited at colleges and universities. For example, in May 
1897. Peary wrote Professor Hill of Colby College (Waterville. Maine) that he planned to 
visit Colby soon to help Hill promote an Arctic trip among the students. An expert 
lecturer. Peary assured Hill that it would be a good one, punctuated by the use of "over 
one hundred views [slides], many of them beautifully colored.”^^  Ever the salesman. 
Peary encouraged Hill to organize a scientific party for the summer endeavor. The 
results o f taking one student group to the Arctic, he noted, had "already been recognized 
as an extremely effective and thoroughly legitimate means o f advertising a college and 
bringing it prominently to public notice as a progressive, up to date institution.”^^  He 
promised also that the Maine and New England papers would cover the event before and 
during the group's absence. Peary suggested that media attention would increase the 
school 's candidates for admission to Colby and that members o f the party would continue 
the exposure with their inevitable fall and winter publications. Peary reassured Hill that
publish the two-volume work in 1898.
Pear>’ to J.D. Figgins. April 22. 1897. Folder “F." Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
’’ Peary to Hill. May 24. 1897. Folder "H." Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC. Peary was proud of his 
dozens o f lantern slides o f the Arctic. He relied on them to remain at the top o f the lecture circuit. He was. 
however, constantly in debt to the company that manufactured the slides for him. William H. Rau of the 
Bromide, Enlargements. Lantern Slides. Half-Time Engraving. Platinotype Company wrote to Peary 
several times during early 1897 asking tor payment o f  his overdue bills; Folder "Rau.” Letters Received. 
1897 (R-V). PFC. "
Peary to Hill. May 24. 1897. Folder "H.” Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
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his (Peary’s) control over the group’s research would be minimal. He noted that “the 
party would be entirely independent as to the methods and character of its work and the 
party’s results and scientific material would be entirely its own without reservation: 1 
simply act as a common c a r r i e r . . . P e a r y ,  a well-respected and successful explorer, 
shifted readily into the rhetoric o f deference regarding potential passengers' work In 
closing, he mentioned that newspapers often bought stories from Arctic travelers for 
$100-$ 150 and that lectures secured $250-$500, “depending entirely upon the man,” *^.
Peary knew how profitable the lecture circuit could be, having spent virtually all 
of his spare time since 1892 lecturing around the country. In 1897, he wrote to his tour 
manager. Major James B. Pond, and demanded several key changes. He wanted no less 
than $500 per week and all expenses paid. For this amount, he agreed to deliver six 
evening lectures and one “matinee.” In those cases where Peary could not secure 
booking for an entire week, he offered to lecture once a week for $100, stating flatly to 
Pond that “you know as well as 1 do that if 1 wish to I can do this.”  ^^  The letter was stem 
and indicated that Peary realized this would put him at the high end of the payscale on the 
lecture circuit. As a result, he would have fewer opportunities. Peary, however, refused 
to keep the grueling schedule of the past and his reputation was strong enough that he 
could place the demand.
The lecture circuit helped Peaiy . but it was not an option for low-profile 
academics. Some of the scientists who wanted to accompany Peary had trouble raising 
passage money. Robert Stein of the US Geological Survey, for example, begged Peary to
Peary to Hill. May 24, 1897, Folder "H.” Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
Peary to Hill. May 24. 1897. Folder "H." Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
Peary to James Pond. April 17. 1897. Folder "P." Box 6. Letters Sent. 1897-98. PFC.
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take him in 1897.'*° Stein had no money, however, and eventually Peary agreed to let 
Stein pay for part o f the trip upon his return. Stein’s appeal reflects some of the problems 
encountered by the scientists poorly connected to larger patronage networks. He initially 
planned to raise $1000 to secure passage for himself and a Swedish accomplice."*' He 
outlined his research agenda, indicating where he wished to travel and that he intended at 
all times to be safe and not push too far beyond Peary’s usual boundaries, lest he upset 
Peary’s time constraints. He wanted so badly to go that he asked Peary to "please let no 
one know of this proposal, for fear somebody might cut me out.”"*" Stein pleaded, 
believing that if he could not go he would lose several years’ worth of research. Of 
course, he also promised to keep secret any assurances of post-trip payment. Knowing 
that Peary expected some guarantee of financial return. Stein listed several possible ways 
to get the money. He thought he might receive some money from the New York Tribune 
in exchange for a report of his work, and he suggested that he might sell a recently 
acquired house for another $300."*^
Stein eventually had to forego his Swedish aide, though he did expect to "have 
some Eskimos with me to handle the boat among the islands.”"*"* By June, Stein still did 
not have enough money to secure passage. He concocted a list of thirty people he 
thought might have the money to sponsor him. Two weeks later, after almost thirty
■*" Robert M. Bryce, Cook and Peary: The Polar Controversy. /îcio/vet/tMechanicsburg. PA: Stackpole 
Books. 1997). 112. Stein had led an expedition to Ellesmere Land in 1894 and was anxious to continue his 
research.
■” Robert Stein to Peary. May 19. 1897, Folder "Robert Stein,” Box 17. Letters Received, 1897 (R-Y), PFC, 
Robert Stein to Peary, May 19, 1897, Folder "Robert Stein," Box 17, Letters Received, 1897 ( R-Y), PFC. 
Stein wanted to explore Jones Sound and slightly westward.
Robert Stein to Peary, May 11. May 30, 1897, Folder "Robert Stein,” Box 17, Letters Received, 1897 (R- 
Y), PFC.
Robert Stein to Peary, May 13. 1897, Folder “Robert Stein,” Box 17, Letters Received, 1897 (R-Y), PFC. 
Stein knew that Peary often promised passengers that he would secure Inuit boats and/or guides for them, 
to make transportation and residence in Greenland easier during their research lenn.
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rejections, Stein dusted off another plan. The Smithsonian Institution had agreed to pay 
for '‘the collection of Eskimo remains.”^’ Peary eventually accepted Stein, though he still 
owed Peary for the balance of the cost in late November, several months after their return 
from Greenland.'*^
Peary spent months in exchanges with people like Stein, Burton, Barton, 
Chamberlin, as well as zoos, the Smithsonian, the AMNH, and his rich friends. He 
realized that part of his problem lay in the fact that nobody had taken charge o f the 
information and artifacts gathered each year, and the scientists were not in close 
communication with each other. The meetings and publications o f the NGS and the AGS 
were the primary means for these people to meet and talk to each other.'*’ Peary dreamed 
of overseeing a grand scientific enterprise. Not surprisingly, his model looked much like 
the RGS in London. Peary admired the RGS and knew how much the organization 
helped its national explorers. He confided to Barton that he planned to present a idea 
before the American Geological Congress in late 1897 that involved formation of a 
permanent committee to coordinate collection of all northern scientific work. Ideally, 
each year the committee would take over the time-consuming task o f finding scientists 
interested in Arctic field research. He envisioned that the committee might "present the 
matter each year to four or five leading Colleges with a view to their sending out parties
Robert Stein to Peary. June 17. 1897, Folder “Robert Stein." Box 17. Letters Received. 1897 (R-Y). PFC.
Robert Stein to Peary, November 24, 1897, Folder "Robert Stein," Box 17. Letters Received, 1897 (R- 
V). PFC.
Philip J. Pauly. "The World and All That is In It: The National Geographic Society. 1888-1918." 
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to cover some particular region o f those northern coasts.” *^
The committee was part of a long-term plan. Peary expected to go north “every 
summer for the next five years,” and his vision hinged on the scientists' belief in his 
personal involvement in the Arctic. Under Peary’s plan, each scientific group would 
operate independently of the others, but after five years, with good organization and 
communication, they would have “a systematic, scientific, accurate ‘ubersicht’ of the 
entire American Arctic coasts from the Straits of Belle Isle to Cape Sabine and Littleton 
Islands and perhaps even farther north.”"*'^
Confident that his plan would generate enthusiasm for his polar quest. Peary hit 
the lecture circuit again. Peary had greater control over his own schedule; he could pick 
well-informed and potentially lucrative audiences, rather than grub for money. In public 
discussions of the Arctic he emphasized two things, first that Arctic exploration was safe 
and had a glorious payoff- the United States flag planted first at the pole -and. second, 
that many fields of science directly benefitted from his work. The information gathered 
under his direction led to deeper understanding of the earth, its weather, movement, and 
formation. These topics deserved long-term commitment. Pear) argued, and his sterling 
leadership record proved that he could continue to help the nation pioneer them. He 
wanted Americans to believe that it would be a resounding loss for the nation if his work 
ended.
One of Peary's best explanations of his work appeared in 1897 when he received 
the Cullum Medal. The AGS chose Peary as the award's first recipient, a shining 
example of someone who had proven himself “by geographical discoveries, or in the
■"* Peary to Barton, May 24. 1897. Folder ”8 ."  Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC. 
Peary to Barton, May 24. 1897. Folder “B." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98, PFC.
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advancement of geographical science.” Peary was a unanimous choice for the award,
“with one exception, and that exception was -  Mrs. Peary.” His discovery that
Greenland was in fact an island, and his successful charting of the previously unknown
coast of Inglefield Gulf, changed perceptions o f the Arctic. The unknown, and therefore
dangerous, parts o f the Arctic were fast disappearing due to Peary’s consistent efforts. It
now seemed possible to reach the North Pole. Peary’s explorations of Greenland killed
one of the last mjlhs of serious pole seekers, that Greenland extended northward over the
pole. Daly summarized Peary’s work as he presented the medal:
Dr. Petermann. the founder, proprietor, and editor of the great German 
geographical journal that bears his name, maintained for years...that Greenland 
was a large continent extending over and beyond the pole. 1 never believed in this 
theory... for the reason that three-fourths of the polar circle as then known was an 
archipelago of islands and if. in the absence of knowledge, we were to indulge in 
conjecture it was more reasonable to suppose that the remaining fourth would 
prove to be the same; and this...you have established to be the fact.’ '
The acceptance of the award put Peary in a prime position to unveil his
cooperative plan. Peary pointed out that he alone, of four recent international figures
endeavoring to find the North Pole, had returned with legitimate hopes for future success.
Frederick Jackson of England, America’s Walter Wellman, and Norway’s Fridtjof
Nansen had explored different parts of the Arctic. Jackson and Nansen demonstrated that
two relatively well-traveled areas were probably poor for serious polar launches.^" Peary
Bulletin o f  the American Geographical Society' 29 ( 1897). 116. The mention of Josephine Peary reflected 
their appreciation for her work on Peary's behalf in 1894. One of the first people she approached for 
financial aid in her relief effort was Judge Charles P. Daly, president of the AGS.
■' Bulletin of the American Geographical. 116.
Pierre Berton. The .Arctic Grail: The Quest for the North H'est Passage and the North Pole. 18IS-1909 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1988). 496-498: Bryce. 268; Bulletin o f  the .American Geographical Society 
29 ( 1897). 118. Jackson tried for the North Pole from Franz Josef Land and failed. On his way home, he 
rescued Nansen's expedition by chance, which had reached a new Farthest North at 86 13' in the Siberian 
Arctic but had a rough return and was near starvation and death when Jackson found them. Wellman was 
still in the Arctic, trying to reach the pole from Spitzbergen. but there was news from him (passed along by 
whalers) indicating that he would not make it.
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had already identified the best way to reach the North Pole: moving northward through 
Smith Sound and Kane Basin, hugging the northwest coast of Greenland/^ The ice pack 
was further north along this edge o f the Arctic Ocean. The large number o f small islands, 
bays, and channels wreaked havoc on ships, but Peary learned early to travel overland 
rather than look for open waters.
Peary’s willingness to explore Greenland on foot gave him advantages. His base 
camp could be located further north than any ship could travel. It forced him to consider 
Inuit adaptations seriously and to make intercultural communication a necessary part of 
polar work. And while other explorers stayed on their ships or set up poorly situated 
camps, Peary used his spare time to investigate as much land as possible. Thus, his 
familiarity with the Arctic’s people and conditions was unrivaled, and his determination 
inspired loyalty. Bob Bartlett, for example, who admitted that he had no taste for 
exploration, stayed with Peary even after the terrible ordeals of the 1898-1902 trip.
When Bob's father told him that he would never make money guiding an explorer. Bob 
replied: "But 1 don’t want my own expedition,...as long as 1 can go with Peary." He 
explained the decision simply, as "That was the grip the man's personality got on me.”'’’*
Peary used the AGS award as a platform for his plans. He told the audience that 
" The conquest of the North Pole, the complete delimitation of the Greenland 
Archipelago, the last of the circumpolar island groups, and the elimination from our maps 
of the unknown area between the 84'’’ parallel and the Pole, are important geographical 
desiderata. The work can be accomplished without risk of life or health. It can be done 
at a comparatively small cost. The time for this work is favorable, the probabilities of
'  ’ Bulletin o f  the American Geographical Society 29 ( 1897). 118. 
Bartlett. The Log. 159.
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success flattering, the requisite experience and inclination to undertake it available. The 
one element lacking is the necessary funds. My plan in fewest words is to raise a fund 
sufficient to insure the continuation o f the work of exploration for ten years, if necessary, 
say $150,000....””
Peary then laid out his most ambitious dream. He wanted to buy a ship, an 
important consideration that took another eight years to be realized. Bob Bartlett, Peary's 
devoted ship captain, realized that Peary's insistence on wintering as far north as possible 
made all the difference in trying for the pole. He resented time spent fund-raising and 
looking for whalers to rent, and wanted to focus on the details o f exploration instead.
The rest o f Peary's long explanation of his plans to the AGS delved into the details of 
preparation and how he would spend his time in the Arctic. Moreover. Peary, unlike his 
contemporaries, had public, long-term goals regarding Arctic work. No one else made 
such grand commitments to the region.
Peary understood the value of entertainment. He knew that the public wanted to 
be able to see. touch, feel, and somehow experience the Arctic without leaving home. 
Peary used the lure of exotic Arctic animals to his advantage when he returned from 
Greenland in 1897. inviting the biggest national zoos and the Ringling Brothers to buy 
some of his best finds, including a pair of polar bear cubs. The Smithsonian Institution 
Zoological Park kept the cubs in the meantime. Eventually, after several exchanges, the 
Ringling Brothers Circus agreed to buy the cubs for five hundred dollars. The circus saw 
more than exotic animals; it enjoyed the idea of a public association with Peary. In a 
letter to him, the circus representative stated that "we would appreciate the fact greatly if 
you would cause the Associated Press to publish that you had disposed of the Polar Bears
Bartlett. The Log. 119.
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captured last October and shipped them to Ringling Bros. World’s Greatest Show. 
Coming from one so prominently noticed as yourself in the leading papers might be 
highly beneficial to us and we assume you would be highly appreciated.”^^
Even the unique animals o f the Arctic took time and persistence for Peary to 
place, however. The Cincinnati Zoo and the Smithsonian Zoo each expressed mild 
interest in the cubs, but were unwilling to pay Peary’s asking price.^^ Peary used 
whatever means he could to currj' favor with the public-friendly zoos. He sent an Eskimo 
dog to the Smithsonian’s zoo in early 1897. though the dog died of distemper soon after 
arrival. The Smithsonian was not dismayed, however. Frank Baker, superintendent of 
the zoo, offered Peary use of a set o f steel traps for the capture of more cubs when Peary 
returned north. Meanwhile, Baker decided, the zoo should focus on buying buffaloes, 
which were fast disappearing. The purchase of polar bears would have to wait.^*
The Eskimo dogs that Peary relied upon so heavily in the Arctic also served him 
well in the United States. The dogs were easier to transport than animals like polar bears, 
walruses, or musk ox, all of which he donated to different institutions during his career.
In one instance, he sold several Eskimo dogs to the Bronx Zoo. The director accepted 
them due to their association with Peary, going against his usual rule against accepting 
domestic animals. In fact, the zoo eventually ended up with so many of Peary's dogs that
Ringling Brothers Circus to Peary. February 16. 1897. Folder "R," Box 17. Letters Received. 1897 (R- 
Y). PFC.
Cincinnati Zoo to Peary, Janueary 27. 1897. Folder "C,” Box 17, Letters Received. 1897 (R-Y). PFC; 
Smithsonian Institution to Peary. June 11, 1897 Folder "S." Box 17. Letters Received. 1897 (R-Y). PFC.
Frank Baker to Peary, June 5. 1897; Folder "S," Box 17. Letters Received. 1897 (R-Y), PFC; Annual 
Report o f  the Board o f  Regents o f the Smithsonian Institution. Showing the Operations. Expenditures, and 
Condition o f  the Institution to.July. Ifi97 (Washington; Government Printing Office. 1898). 22-23. The zoo 
had little money and only temporary lodging for its animals, and its directors wanted to collect specimens 
of Great Plains bison.
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they refused to accept any more and sold them cheaply to anyone who would take them/^ 
Peary also employed a dog show manager, who travelled with the animals and put them 
on display for paying audiences. Peary shuffled some dogs between the dog show and 
the Smithsonian zoo, as needed.
Peary took only a small number of scientists with him to the Arctic. He knew, 
however, that there was a larger network of people interested in the region who did not 
have the opportunity, means, or desire to accompany him. They were not forgotten.
Upon each return. Peary worked hard finding appropriate scientific “homes” for his 
various Arctic artifacts, much as he did for the cubs and the dogs. During the spring and 
summer of 1897. he contacted scientists to give away or sell his best specimens from the 
year before. He wrote to the Carnegie Museum in Pennsylvania, for example, agreeing to 
sell them three walrus skins for $250. The walrus bodies had been shipped directly to the 
AMNH and Peary invited the Carnegie Museum to send its own expert to inspect the 
skins. Peary's connection with the AMNH was strong enough that he asked it to hold 
Arctic specimens while he searched for the best means to use them.^'
Peary used the Inuits much as he did Arctic flora and fauna -  as object of
William Bridges. Gathering o f Animals: An Unconventional History’ o f  the New York Zoological Society 
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Peary to Carnegie Museum. April 7. 1897. Folder "C." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC.
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scientific study. As stated previously, he considered himself a civilized benefactor and 
father figure to the Cape York Inuits. His attitude and his connection with the AMNH 
combined to give him a strange idea. Anthropologist Franz Boas worked at the AMNH 
when Peary knew him in the 1890’s. Boas had spent a winter studying the Inuits of 
Baffin Island in 1883 and eventually published the results in the Bulletin o f  the American 
Geographical Society. He built his reputation on the study o f various native groups in 
North America, particularly along the Pacific Northwest coast. By the time Peary was an 
accomplished polar traveler. Boas was an influential researcher at the AMNH. Boas was 
Peary’s ally and he gave him as much information as possible. In 1896, Peary began 
using his Inuit aides as subjects for the anthropologist. He convinced two young Inuits, 
ages twelve and eight, to allow Albert Operti, a passenger artist, to create "full-length 
casts’" o f them, and he sent photos of the work to Boas. Operti enticed several Cape York 
Inuits to model for him when they were not making fur clothing for the crew. The ship's 
motion through the ice floes tended to break the casts, so only a few survived the process. 
Peary helped Operti convince the Inuits to disrobe and be bathed before the plaster 
applications. Operti asked the models to lie perfectly still as he cast their faces, hands, 
feet, and occasionally a full figure. It was difficult work because the heated plaster often 
blistered the Inuits" skin as it dried, and it was a lengthy process. In one case, working 
outdoors in order to create a rare full-length standing cast, Operti covered his Inuit model 
in clay, vaseline, and plaster. After the cast dried, it took the artist almost two hours to 
chip the mold off the man. For his troubles, “the chattering Eskimo was promised a gun
Franz Boas. "A Year Among the Eskimo," Bulletin o f  the American (Jeographical Society 19(1887). 
383-402.
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to stand this dose.”^^
Peary caught Boas in the midst of a rushed study of native peoples o f the United 
States and Canada. Boas, like most anthropologists of the late nineteenth century, 
believed that native civilizations hovered on the edge of extinction and that focused 
research was necessary before they disappeared forever. '^* These ideas helped Peary 
regarding the Inuits, but had previously been a problem. The Smithsonian passed on 
purchase o f his polar bear cubs in order to buy buffalo, believing that the buffalo, like the 
Plains Indians, were on the verge o f extinction. The polar bear cubs were exotic, but not 
yet rare.
Peary's Arctic artifacts attracted attention for only slightly different reasons. 
Anthropology's fascination with disappearing peoples and cultures also fed a curiosity 
about the differences between savagery and civilization. The AMNH celebrated Peary's 
collections in its new wing because they showcased the "'primitive'' lifestyles o f the 
Inuits. The curators arranged the new Ethnological Hall displays in geographical order, 
with each collection operating as a unit. In each case, the displays showcased: "physical 
types of the people, the relations o f man to nature: manufactures and industries; 
househould furnishings; dress and ornament; travel; methods of obtaining food supply by 
hunting, fishing, stock raising or agriculture; warfare; trade and barter; games[;] music; 
plastic art; social organization; religion."*’"’ Peary's donations from the remote Inuits fit 
perfectly.
The museum's curators operated within a scientific culture that demanded
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attention to the difference between civilized and subjugated peoples. Many curators 
learned how to display, arrange, and talk about native peoples and/or cultures at the 
world’s fairs o f the late nineteenth century. Boas was a major force behind the 
anthropological displays at the Chicago world’s fair in 1893. As fair operators prepared 
for the world’s fair of Omaha in 1898, a primary concern was the context for various 
American Indian attractions. The Bureau of Indian Affairs sent word to agents across the 
country explaining that the upcoming display should be “’as thoroughly aboriginal in 
every respect as practicable, and that the primitive traits and characteristics o f the several 
tribes should be distinctly set forth.’"’*’^  The Omaha fair boasted a popular sham battle 
between "hostile” Indians and a collection of cowboys and “friendly” Indians that ended 
with the defeated “hostiles” being led away to a reservation, a mock Ghost Dance, and 
footraces meant to showcase Indian stamina. James Mooney, ethnologist for the Bureau 
o f American Ethnology, praised the scientific value of such events and the benefits for 
anthropology. The scientists believed they had moved past a mere Wild West show into 
“’a serious ethnological exhibit.’” One writer summed up the lesson behind the fair's 
presentation of the American Indians: “’The object lesson of the Congress o f American 
Indians in connection with the Trans-Mississippi Exposition is that of p r o g r e s s . T h e  
anthropologists considered the Indians a dying race, and the fair offered a fleeting chance 
for scientists and the public alike to remark upon the dramatic differences between the 
Indians’ cultures and their own. The world’s fair set the standards for display of native 
cultures throughout the country. Peary’s timely deposit o f several Inuits at the AMNH
University Press of Kansas. 1982). 232-233.
"Opening o f the East Wing." 850.
Robert W. Rydell. AH the World’s a Fair: Visions o f Empire at American Inlernalional Expositions. 
!876-19!6 (Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press. 1984). 64. 113.
137
gave the museum an ideal opportunity to explore the latest ethnological trends.
The AMNH was a relatively young institution but the ideas behind its 
organization created an ideal situation for Boas and, indirectly, Peary. Several wealthy 
anthropologists created the AMNH in 1869. Many of them, Morris K. Jesup, William E. 
Dodge, J. Pierpont Morgan, and Isaac N. Phelps counted the museum as merely one of 
several ways to distribute wealth for general social benefit. Jesup, for example, later a 
founder of the Peary Arctic Club, was an early organizer of the YMCA and also founded 
both the Society for the Suppression of Vice and the Society for the Relief o f Half 
Orphan and Destitute Children. The organizers had few clear goals for the AMNH; it 
functioned to please the public. The museum bought and created huge collections of 
plants and animals, but had no direction or organizing principle. As a result, it "was a 
testament to the wonders o f creation,’' and little else. The trustees, several o f whom were 
avid private collectors of art or other rarities, valued the collecting process itself.^*
The museum foundered under lack of direction until 1881, when Jesup became 
president. Jesup hired two skilled, veteran curators, Joel Asaph Alden and Frank M. 
Chapman, who systematically organized, labelled, and showcased the museum's vast 
holdings. The AMNH then entered a new phase of popularity. Not only did the 
institution have outstanding exhibits, but Allen and Chapman pushed it to embrace 
scientific research as the basis for its existence. Allen, especially, vocalized the need for 
money for research, appropriate facilities, and study collections for students and
Rydell. .4////»e World s. 117-118.
Ron Rainger, .4w Agenda fo r  Antiquity': Henry Fairfield Oshorn & Vertebrate Paleontology at the 
American Museum o f  Natural Histor\-. IH90-I935 (Tuscaloosa: The University o f Alabama Press, 1991), 
56-57.
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scientists.^^ Jesup, not a man o f science, appreciated Allen’s interests mostly for the final 
result o f improved exhibits.
Jesup’s attention to such details explains why the AMNH claimed as much 
scientific prestige as older American museums and academies. He began immediately to 
make the AMNH a center for both advanced education as well as useful public scientific 
information. Earlier attempts at ethnological collection and organization had damaged 
the reputation of American science. For example, Charles Wilson Peale. curator and 
founder of the Philadelphia Museum, designed his early nineteenth-century displays to 
impress, rather than inform, visitors. In one instance, "the museum included a bloody 
exhibition o f a wolf devouring the head o f a mule deer. The deer’s skin had arrived in 
such poor condition that only the head could be used -  as a snack for the wolf. ’ Peale 
emphasized nationalistic lessons, showcasing minerals donated by Thomas Jefferson 
from Lewis and Clark’s trek, as well as a mastodon bone found in the United States. He 
used the bone to disparage the theory that all New World animals were "degenerate forms 
of European animals.” Peale received international condemnation. One Englishman 
sneered that "it has remained for our American cousins to drag the term Museum down to 
a very low level. On the other side o f the Atlantic no good-sized town would be 
considered complete without its ‘Dime Museum." where every description of 
monstrosity, natural and otherwise— usually otherwise—can be seen for a modest 
fivepence."™
Peale"s displays discouraged academics, but his attempt to use his curatorship to 
gain respect among scientists was not unusual. It was "a ladder for ambitious scientists to
’ Rainger. An Agenda, 58.
’ Carla Yanni. Nature's Museums: I'ictorian Science the Architecture o f  Display' (Baltimore: Johns
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climb: these men wanted attention for collecting the best and biggest specimens, and such 
self-aggrandizement necessarily conflicted with their claim for creating typical displays.” 
The showmanship of Peale's collection later caught the attention o f P.T. Bamum, who 
bought it in 1850 for his circus.^'
Peale’s odd collection fascinated spectators, yet failed to keep pace with changes 
within American science. The next generation o f American scientists looked for deeper 
value in their studies o f animals and expeditionary finds. William Maclure, president of 
the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences ( 1817-1840). witnessed a new era of 
American science. Early in his presidency, Maclure determined to maintain the amateur 
appeal of his institution. The Academy refused to ally itself with other scientific groups, 
the government, or its host city. For example, in 1819 the group's members refused to 
reply to the government's request for advice on the proposed western exploratory trip of 
Major Stephen Long. However, the Academy struggled with its decision to support "the 
diffusion of knowledge rather than its advancement.” Member scientists squabbled over 
the increasing split between trained professionals and the devoted amateurs whose 
interests had founded the Academy. Then, in 1836, the organization responded to the US 
Navy's request for nominations for a naturalist to accompany Charles Wilkes on his 
Antarctic exploring expedition (1838-42). Eventually, three Academy members sailed 
south with Wilkes, and others recommended scientific guidelines for specimen collection. 
And in 1846. when Congress announced plans to publish only one hundred copies o f 
Wilkes' results, the Academy joined the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 
formal complaints about the need for more copies if the trip were to be of lasting
Hopkins Press, 1999). 28-29. 
Yanni. Nature's Museums. 30.
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scientific value/" Eventually the Academy, like the Smithsonian and later the AMNH, 
drew distinct lines between the professional scientists who collected and studied its 
material, and the larger untrained and amateur public.
In 1834, Joseph Henry visited Peale’s Philadelphia Museum and watched a man 
float over an excited crowd in a hot air balloon. He told a friend that “the whole 
exhibition was to me one of the most exciting 1 have ever witnessed.”^^  Twelve years 
later, as the first secrctar>' of the Smithsonian Institution. Henr>' focused on collecting 
over informing, but for different reasons than Peale. Henry believed that “’the increase 
o f knowledge is much more difficult, and in reference to the bearing of this institution on 
the character of our country and the welfare o f mankind, much more important than the 
diffusion of knowledge. Henry supported original scientific fieldwork, and he viewed 
the Smithsonian as an ideal repository for collectors who placed academic value on their 
finds.
Henry and his assistant secretary of Natural History. Spencer Fullerton Baird, 
identified several research areas that needed particular attention. Arctic and sub-Arctic 
collection had occurred haphazardly since the 1840’s. Hudson's Bay factors occasionally 
sent artifacts to opportunistic institutions, as did a few individual explorers, but England's 
long dominance of Arctic exploration benefited the RGS more than any US collector. 
Henry created specific instructions for the expeditionary teams that he sent north, and for 
the first decade of his management, he depended heavily upon the US government and
Patsy A. Gerstner. "The Academy of Natural Sciences o f  Philadelphia. 1812-1850," in The Pursuit o f  
Knowledge in the Early American Republic: American Scientific and Learned Societies from Colonial 
Times to the Civil War. Alexandra Oleson and Sanborn C. Brown, eds., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), 183, 185, 187-89.
”  Albert E. Moyer, .Joseph Henrv: The Rise o f an American Scientist (Washington: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1997), 188.
Moyer, Joseph Henry'. 249.
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the military for funding and personnel. As a result, “the majority o f the specimens 
deposited at the Smithsonian Institution during the 1850s were collected by employees of 
the War Department, the Department o f the Interior, the army, the navy, the 
Topographical Bureau, and various state surveys.” Henry, however, wanted collections 
that represented more than the mid-western and southwestern parts of the country, where 
the military sent most of its men (to handle American Indians affairs). He designed a 
more comprehensive exploration program that relied upon volunteers and trained 
scientific fieldworkers. When the Civil War began and the military withdrew its services, 
Henry initiated his plan and never again sought military manpower.
The Smithsonian's accessions more than doubled under the civilian program. In 
particular, the organization's sub-Arctic collection became world-class, largely through 
the work o f naturalist Robert Kennicott. He managed an area of the Hudson's Bay 
Company (around Mackenzie River), skillfully organizing local traders and trappers, 
explaining the Smithsonian's needs, and using the local native population as collectors. 
Within six years, Kennicott oversaw the collection o f one o f the Smithsonian's largest 
nineteenth-century exhibitions— its sub-Arctic material.
The Smithsonian, therefore, was the first large, well-funded American 
organization interested in international fieldwork. The Hudson's Bay Company was a 
cooperative partner in Henry and Baird’s collection o f northern specimens, giving them
Debra Lindsay. Science in the Subarctic: Trappers. Traders, and the Smitksonian institution 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press. 1993). 6-7. 9. 88. Before the Civil War. the Smithsonian had 
55, 389 accessions. By 1866. it had over 119.000 accessions. During his six years. Kennicott and his team 
sent over 1.700 specimens per year to Washington. DC. Kennicott paid close attention to his fieldworkers' 
organization skills as well, making sure that they abided by the guideline standards "being developed by a 
scientific community that was as concerned with rigor and replicability as it was with rarities.” The most 
dedicated traders and trappers in this collection system worked with specific directives and clear 
instructions about the value o f their work for anthropologists and other scientists. As a result, these 
northern collectors "fell midway between those of the professional anthropologists and those of the pre-
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an impressive assortment of artifacts from the peoples and land in the eastern Canadian 
sub-Arctic around 60 N. Substantial Arctic collections from areas further north where 
only whalers, explorers, and small groups o f Inuits visited took longer to develop. By the 
time Americans were seriously interested in the area, the Smithsonian had competition.
Its fieldworkers set a standard that other institutions followed, however. Jesup's 
management of the AMNH built on the directives begun by researchers at the 
Smithsonian. Peary's obvious favoritism toward the AMNH was based more on his 
friendship with Jesup than anything else. Jesup's careful selection of his departmental 
curators, therefore, affected the manner in which Peary's donations became both public 
information and anthropological specimens.
Jesup, like Maclure of the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, was a 
businessman. He was interested in his scientists' work because he believed in their 
potential to discover the world's secrets, pinpoint future resources, and bring fame and 
glory to everyone connected to the museum. He saw special value in a connection with 
Peary, because no American institution boasted a significant Arctic exhibition.^^ He 
explained Peary's value to the AMNH in a letter he wrote to the Navy on Peary's behalf 
in 1897 to explain how detrimental it would be if the Navy continued its plan to transfer 
Peary to California. Jesup wrote that the move would
detract from the educational value of the collections so far as it relates to 
the public, but it would result in the loss o f many data, valuable alike to the 
scientist and the country. 1 will cite but one instance of the many in mind. It is 
proposed to set up a winter and summer representation of the Eskimo camp, with 
life-size groups and complete accessories; those groups will possess extreme 
interest for every visitor to the building. Without the advice and the knowledge of 
Mr. Peary, we would be very much hampered in its preparation. Beyond this.
ethnographers who collected data only sporadically for reasons quite irrelevant to anthropological studies.” 
Douglas J. Preston. Dinosaurs in the Attic: An Excursion into the American Museum o f  Natural History’ 
(New York: St. Martin's Press. 1986). 24. 35.
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there is the valuable information he has acquired, which is needed in the 
formation of labels for the objects. I feel convinced that you will appreciate the 
position I take in the matter, without going into more detail, and you will pardon 
me, 1 hope, in conclusion, for earnestly urging upon you the wish of my associate 
trustees (whose names are attached) that if a change is contemplated for Mr. 
Peary, you will consider favorably our appeal to retain him at least for the present 
in the assignment to duty in Brooklyn. I believe that the Navy Department is 
deeply interested in everything that pertains to science, or that which will conduce 
to the public good, and 1 beg to assure you that your kindly aid and co-operation 
in our present needs will be gratefully appreciated.^^
In 1891, Jesup oversaw the placement o f Henry Fairfield Osbom as curator o f vertebrate
paleontology at the AMNH. The museum was in solid financial shape and had a fine
reputation. Osbom, however, helped usher in another phase of the AMNH that had
special bearing on Boas and Peary. Osbom saw the potential to fund scientific
expeditions through the AMNH.^**
It took time (and a wealthy benefactor, Morgan) to establish a committed network
of fieldworkers, but within a few years the AMNH became a routine financier of all sorts
of scientific/collection expeditions. Jesup's willingness to let his curators tum the
museum in new directions created a marvelous situation for Peary. Boas served as
director of the anthropology department during these key changes at the AMNH. Peary,
still anxious for positive press, did all that he could to give Boas specimens o f interest.
The casts of the two young Inuits were only the beginning.
Peary not only brought back polar bear cubs, walrus skins, and meteorites in
1897. He also delivered six Inuit people, four adults and two children, to the care of Boas
at the AMNH. Explorers had removed native peoples from their homelands for tours and
royal exhibitions for generations. Peary delivered his group to an anthropologist at a
William Adams Brown. Morris Ketclwm Jesup: J  Character Sketch (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons. 1911). 195.
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famous museum, however, and clearly meant them for further study. The explorer left 
them there and had no further contact with them until the following year, when he took 
one o f them back to the Arctic. Peary had not warned Boas o f their arrival, so the 
museum was ill-prepared to care for them. The small group lived in the museum’s 
basement and was taken out daily for public display where Matthew Henson, Peary’s 
African-American assistant, translated for the crowds.^^ Four o f them died of pneumonia 
or tuberculosis within a few months. Boas wrote to Pear}', explaining the illnesses and 
the steps he took to save them, but Peary was busy preparing for his next journey and did 
not visit his charges.***^  The Inuits were eventually moved into a private residence, 
although they continued to be of use to Boas. One of his students. Alfred Kroeber. who 
later became famous for his work with Ishi. last o f the Yahi tribe, visited the Inuits and 
studied their mourning rituals as individual members of the group sickened and died.**' 
Boas and his superiors at the AMNH realized that the Inuits were suffering in 
New York, but they were helpless to return the group home again until Pear}' went north 
in 1898. No other ships were known to be going far enough north until that time. By the
Kenn Harper. Give Me My Father's Body: The Life ofMinik. the New York Eskimo (South Royalton. 
Vermont: Steerforth Press. 2000) 27-28. Boas had earlier written to Peary and asked him to bring an Inuit 
for the museum's use For one year. Peary apparently never formally agreed, and certainly did not mention 
that he would bring back more than one person.
Boas to Peary, February 24, 1898; March 2, 1898. Folder "A." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC. 
Boas expressed surprise that the Inuits fell ill. He wrote to Peary that "I am exceedingly sorry that the poor 
Eskimos are suffering so much; but o f course nobody could foresee such events. So many Eskimos have 
been brought to this country by whalers and have safely returned, that it was Justifiable to presume that 
with due precautions they would spend the winter here without serious effects." In March. Boas wrote 
again to Peary, who was lecturing in North Dakota, to tell him that the female Inuit would be dead before 
Boas mailed the letter, and that the others were near death. He wanted Peary to know that "We have hired 
in tum various doctors, given these people every care; had them at the hospital...and settled them in a 
cottage," all to no avail.
Harper. Give Me, 37-38. See also Shari M. Huhndorf, "Nanook and his Contemporaries; Imagining 
Eskimos in American Culture. 1897-1922." Critical Inquiry 21 (Autumn 2000), 122-148. Huhndorf sees 
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time Peary attempted to reach the North Pole in 1898, only two o f the six remained alive. 
He took Uisaakassak with him aboard the Windward and returned him safely home. 
Minik, a young boy whose father had died earlier in the year, stayed in New York and 
was adopted into the home of William Wallace, a director o f the AMNH.*^ Minik caused 
a publicity problem for Peary a few years later, when he demanded to see his father’s 
bones and museum directors told him that they could not find them amongst their 
substantial skeleton collection.
This was a tragic incident to conclude Peary’s otherwise successful year. 
Strangely, the Inuits" problems had minimal effect on Peary. He received credit for 
delivering another interesting display for the museum, and the truth about what happened 
to these people never hurt Peary's career. The explorer spent the winter o f 1897-98 
planning a large, multi-year expedition to the North Pole, and the successes o f 1897 made 
this job remarkably easier.
Peary was at the top o f his form in 1897. He had found the elusive link between 
professional field researchers and the larger insitutions who depended upon their labor.
He realized that the two groups often had trouble locating each other and that he could 
benefit from their mutual interests. Peaiy won the attention of larger, well-endowed (or 
at least well organized) groups who appreciated the scientists’ work. These museums, 
organizations, and zoos rewarded his efforts financially, when possible, ensuring that
had no present or future in modem .America.
*■ Harper. Give Me. 40-42. Harper argues that Peary brought the Inuits to the AMNH to please Jesup and 
thus guarantee a closer affiliation with the man's wealth. Harper is forced to admit, however, that Jesup 
had no prior knowledge o f Peary's plans. Peary by this point had a long-established habit o f using 
museums to gamer positive press and scientific credit, knowing that the museums also wanted his Arctic 
goods. The Inuits fit within this pattem. Peary only used the results as needed, however. Harper points out 
that in the appendix to Northward Over the "Great ice". Peary wrote about these Inuits as if  they were still 
alive and played up his personal acquaintances with him, even though he knew as he wrote the book that 
two o f them had already died and the rest were seriously ill.
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Peary could maintain plans to reach the North Pole.
In the years between 1891 and 1897, Peary established the reputation upon which 
the rest o f his career rested. The PAC, an organization of millionaires, made sure after 
1898 that Peary had enough funds to return to the Arctic each time he developed a new 
plan. The most influential members of this group, however, were men who had 
contributed to his trips for years, or who had in some way benefitted from an alliance 
with him. In most cases, the connection could be traced to membership in the AGS or the 
NOS or to avid interest in the AMNH. These institutions had remained committed to 
Peary during his early years because he included scientists and ensured that they had a 
willing audience for their results. The quest for the North Pole became more of a 
business for Peary after 1897. This change had as much to do with the increasing costs of 
Peary’s trips and the refinement o f his goals as with these scientific organizations' subtle 
shift away from the promotion o f active field research. The next chapter will explain the 
roots of the new trend in Peary ’s career.
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Chapter Four
“In a Permanent and Lasting Manner:” The FAC, Peary, and the Pole, 1898-1902
Peary’s decision to seek the North Pole in 1897 outmoded his old methods of 
Arctic exploration. He had proven himself to be a resilient explorer and a savvy collector 
of Arctic souvenirs, but the North Pole posed new challenges. He spent the winter and 
spring o f 1898 organizing a four-year expedition to the Arctic. For his new endeavor, he 
built on the interest of the philanthropic businessmen who had supported his earlier 
ventures, expanded this network, and began to plan Arctic work that bypassed his former 
reliance on the research funding and companionship o f scientists. Before 1897. Peary 
approached college professors, museum personnel, and independent researchers, 
explained their collection opportunities, and required pre-payment from willing groups 
and individuals. The bargain worked because Peary received enough money to rent a 
ship and organize each expedition, and the ambitious scientists earned professional 
prestige and benefits for themselves and their home institutions.
With the businessmen's money, all this changed. The philanthropists wanted the 
pole, as Peary did. and were satisfied with his promise to donate most items of scientific 
or cultural intrigue to the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH). Peary's 
favorite collector. No longer was scientific study the first priority. The new source of 
patronage caused new problems, however. The men most interested in funding Peary had 
their own businesses to run and could not devote full attention to his cause. It took 
months to contact enough people to raise the kind of money that Peaiy needed.' At the 
same time. Peary feared losing the pole to legitimate, strong competition from both home
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and abroad. Norwegian and other American explorers crowded into Peary’s Arctic 
dreams.
Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen had stunned the world with his risky plan for finding 
the North Pole in 1893. Arctic explorers knew that the polar ice pack drifted in a 
generally northwesterly direction. Nansen proposed to ram a ship into the ice in Siberia 
and drift across the North Pole. Nansen and his “drift theory” enjoyed the full support of 
the Norwegian government. The federal government and the King of Norway pledged 
two-thirds of his money. Within six months, he raised the rest o f the funds from private 
subscription." Nansen built a remarkable, strong ship, the Flrrm. jammed her into the ice 
north o f Norway, and spent eighteen months drifting slowly towards the pole. (See 
Appendix. Figure 2) In 1895 he knew he would never reach the pole aboard ship; the ice 
was too thick. He and a companion. Hjalmar Johansen, tried and failed to ski to the North 
Pole. They achieved a new Farthest North at 86 14’. though, and Nansen suddenly had as 
much Arctic prestige as Pear> .^  Nansen operated under different circumstances, 
however. He had plenty of money, and he never once allied himself with science. He 
wanted only the North Pole, and grew terse with reporters who tried to give his quest a 
more pragmatic scope. Nansen had scientific training, and the soundings he took above 
Siberia proved that the Arctic was indeed an ocean, not a shallow sea. It therefore 
seemed unlikely that anyone would discover any landmasses further north; only frozen 
ocean lay ahead. Despite this realization. Nansen never made the observations an 
integral part of his goal. Norwegians embraced their new hero, w ho tried for the pole for
' Each trip cost at least $30 000.
■ Fridtjof Nansen. Farthest North. Edited by Jon Krakauer (New York: The Modem Library. 1999). 25. 
’ Peter Stark, ed.. Ring o f  Ice: True Tales o f  Adventure. E.xploration. and Arctic Life. (New York: The 
Lyons Press. 2000). 185-191.
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the adventure of i t /
The North Pole seemed destined to be seen after hundreds of years o f effort, yet 
for Peary it continued to take massive effort simply to come within walking distance. 
Peary’s multi-year effort required more managerial attention, but the details or 
organization remained of secondary importance. An even larger project unfolded 
simultaneously. A group of men interested in seeing Peary win the pole formed an 
organization dedicated to that one goal. Peary’s old friend Herbert Bridgman started the 
campaign and asked other wealthy men to donate at least one thousand dollars per year 
for four years to the cause. One year earlier, at an award ceremony at the AGS, Peary 
had spoken of a long-range plan that required significant funding, and he immediately 
attracted a small corps o f donors. Bridgman and Morris K. Jesup of the AMNH each 
pledged money for several years, hoping to underwrite Peary’s most recent scheme.
Jesup hosted the first meeting o f the PAC in his New York office.^ In 1898. nobody 
imagined that it would take another eleven years for Peary to claim success.
By early spring, the Peary Arctic Club (PAC) had a clear agenda and several 
thousand dollars at its command. There were problems, however. Americans anticipated 
war with Spain over Cuba during the spring of 1898. which made businessmen edgy 
about promising long-term money to a risky North Pole venture. In addition, the national 
economy remained unpredictable after an extended depression.^ The PAC petitioned
■* Nansen. Farthest North, xvii-xviii.
 ^William Adams Brown, Morris Ketchiim Jestip: A Character Sketch (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
1911). 195.
David Traxel. 1898: The Birth o f  the American Century- (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1998). 13. The 
United States plunged into a serious financial collapse in 1893. The depression spared no sector o f  the 
economy -  banking, business, and agriculture all suffered tremendous losses. Millions o f people faced 
unemployment. A brief respite ensued with the Klondike gold strike in Alaska in 1898. which helped 
bankers especially. Credit increased, but the rest of the nation realized slower recovery.
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men they knew, most of whom lived in New York City, Washington, D C., and 
Philadelphia, areas hit hard by the continuing effects o f the depression. The PAC faced a 
difficult task: to raise thousands o f dollars from businessmen facing uncertain recovery 
and the threat o f war, so that the United States could claim the North Pole. The Spanish- 
American War began even before Peary left, in the midst o f his preparatory campaign.
Charles A. Moore, president o f Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Railway and 
Machinists’ Tools and Supplies, pledged himself to the PAC but also recognized 
problems. Both Henry Cannon of Chase National Bank and Jesup had contacted him 
about the PAC. During the organization’s early stages, the men had problems deciding 
how to divide the work o f contacting other philanthropists, promoting Peary, and 
structuring the club. As they recruited more members, they also had to handle increasing 
correspondence with men who lived all over the country, many of whom did not know 
any other members aside from the one who initially contacted them. The PAC operated 
via mail; the men met together only as chance permitted (until 1899) and relied upon 
newspaper reports for most of their Arctic news. Moore recognized the huge time 
commitment involved in such an endeavor and politely removed himself from handling 
such details. He told Peary that "whoever assumes the laboring oar in this matter of 
getting the organization together and interesting them must be a gentleman of 
comparative leisure who is willing to throw himself into the work earnestly and 
constantly until the organization is perfected. You know that the demands upon my time 
in my business will not permit this on my part. While my interest in your success is 
earnest and constant, yet 1 cannot tie myself to undertake a work that 1 could not feel
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certain of being able to carry out successfully.”^
Moore gave money, if not time. His membership was a significant coup for the 
young organization, and Peary took full advantage. When a man named Hoppins offered 
Peary a sailboat for his upcoming trip, Peary recognized a golden opportunity. He 
thanked Hoppins for the offer, explained why he could not use the gift, and suggested 
that Hoppins examine an alternative way of helping him reach the North Pole. He named 
the most prominent contributors, Moore among them, emphasizing the glory involved. 
The explorer noted that joining the PAC would be a way to "identity yourself with my 
work in a permanent and lasting manner, a way in which the future will give you the 
pleasurable pride of knowing that you helped directly in securing for the stars and stripes 
the last great geographical prize which the world has to offer.” Peary explained that the 
"present war” had made his original fund-raising campaign difficult. As a result, an 
"exclusive club” organized as the Peary Club, "to be composed o f twenty-five gentlemen 
who will pledge themselves to contribute one thousand dollars per year for not to exceed 
four years. In other words the maximum cost of the work will not be over $100,000. If 1 
have good luck it may be less than $50. 000 or less than $2,000 a piece (sic).” 
Furthermore. wTOte Peary. "It is not proposed that the Club shall be dissolved upon the 
completion of my work but continue in existence ready to extend courtesies to any 
distinguished scientists or geographer who may visit this country.” Peary informed 
Hoppins that he would turn over all relevant materials to the AMNH. "where they will 
remain as an enduring monument to the Club.” All money would go directly towards 
expedition preparations because the club's officers received no salaries. Jesup had given
 ^Peary to Charles Moore. January 18. 1898. Folder "M." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. RG 401: National 
Archives Gift Collection of Materials Relating to Polar Regions. ( 1) RADM Robert E. Peary Family
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ten thousand dollars to start the organization. Peary implied that Hoppins should rush to 
join, promising that “by the time this reaches you it is probable that a dozen or more 
prominent men .. .will also be enrolled.”* Peary’s traditional arguments for persuading 
scientists to join him needed merely slight adjustments to fit his new needs. He 
continued to emphasize the ever-lasting glory associated with his Arctic work.
As the twentieth century approached, Peary and the men dedicated to his quest 
used the landmark to draw attention to Arctic exploration. The poles topped most lists o f 
remote places still unseen by humans. The arrival of a new century created an 
opportunity to list past exploration achievements and to point out the few significant 
remaining ones. Peary was actually in the Arctic aiming for the pole when the next 
century arrived. It fell to his closest stateside supporters to recognize the significance of 
the year and to capitalize on it.
The nation's dominant collection institutions and geographical societies seized the 
chance to recognize the progress of exploring Earth. Gilbert H. Grosvenor. president of 
the National Geographic Society (NGS) wrote an article for the Smithsonian Institution's 
annual report that emphasized the past century's exploratory highs. Equally significant, 
he wrote about the few blank spaces left on world maps.^ In 1800, wrote Grosvenor, 
"about one-lifth o f the earth's land surface was known.” One hundred years later, 
however, "much less than one-eleventh remains unknown, for the unknown area is so 
distributed in both hemispheres that nowhere except at the North and South poles are
Collection (A) Robert E. Peaiy Papers. Referred to hereafter by PFC and specific Box and Folder.
“ From Peary to Hoppins, May 21, 1898, Folder "H." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC.
' Annual Report o f  the Board o f  Regents o f  the Smithsonian institution. Showing the Operations. 
ExpeJitures. and Condition o f  the Institution (Washington; Government Printing Office. 1900): 416.
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there remaining large unexplored tracts.” Grosvenor also summarized the history of 
Arctic and Antarctic exploration, revealing that the Arctic had lost much o f its mystery. 
The years between the search for Franklin and Nansen’s remarkable “drift theory” 
expedition had seen large sections o f the Arctic mapped." The world awaited description 
o f the North Pole itself to complete the picture.
Peary was in the Arctic trying to do just that when Grosvenor’s report saw 
publication. He had left again in 1898, planning to winter over for three or four years and 
to make a run for the pole each spring, if necessary. If he could afford to stay that long, 
he could avoid the annual hassle of raising funds for a single trip. Also, preparing in 
advance for more than one trip made it possible to relocate winter encampments if the 
ship could not take him as far north as desirable the first year. Peary still believed that 
his best chance for success depended upon his winter headquarters. He pushed himself 
and his men to build northern encampments on Greenland, removed from the safety of 
the ship. His commitment to overland travel to the North Pole and his relentless study of 
his chosen route made him unique among Arctic explorers.'* Peary received annual
"'Annua/ Report. 1900,417; Alan Gumey, Beiow the Convergence: Voyages Toward Antarctica. 1699- 
1839 (New York: Penguin Books. 1997). 272-281. Antarctica had slowly become a point o f interest for 
explorers. Even until the mid-1800's the most usual visitors to the area were sealers and whalers. Soon the 
area was recognized as a continent, requiring different methods o f attack than the Arctic. Explorers 
approached it with increasing regularity as the nineteenth century ended, wanting to claim the South Pole 
conquest. James Cook initiated England's interest with his travels near Antarctica in 1774. American 
Charles Wilkes made a run for the southern pole in 1838. It did not have the same long, competitive history 
as the Arctic did, however, because there was no corollary for the Northwest Passage in the Antarctic. The 
English, French, Norwegians, and Americans were most interested in the Antarctic by the end of the 
nineteenth century. John Maxtone-Graham, Safe Return Doubtful: The Heroic Age o f  Polar Exploration 
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1999). 228-229. Roald A.mundsen led a Norwegian expedition to Antarctica 
in 1897-1899 on the Belgica and won fame for being on the first ship to winter over in Antarctica. 
American Frederick Cook. Peary's former surgeon and eventual nemesis, accompanied Amundsen. Cook 
had a brief moment o f  fame in America for reports o f  his idea to have the crew eat seal meat in order to 
stave off scurvy.
'■ Nansen's "drift theory" experiment was daring, but he never planned to leave the relative security o f the 
ship, despite the outcome. Peary intended always to reach the North Pole on foot and to rely on his ship for 
re-supply contact only.
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communications and supplies from his relief ship, the Windward, a gift in late 1897 from 
wealthy British backer Alfred G. Harmsworth. Peary disliked the ship's small size, but 
appreciated its strength and thanked Harmsworth, promising to return the vessel, if it 
survived. The gift saved him several thousand dollars because he did not have to rent a 
whaler.’^
Peary’s friends at the American Geographical Society (AGS) of New York made 
his plans public as he prepared to leave. A brief note in the society’s Journal explained 
that “he hopes to reach the northernmost extremity of Greenland in the early summer of 
1899. Then with a band of seasoned companions and trained dogs from which to select 
the fittest, he will equip a small compact party and start...for the Pole, hoping to reach 
that point and return to the land before winter begins again...If the summer of 1899 
should prove to be unfavorable, either in weather or in ice-conditions, Peary will 
establish his Eskimo colony at the northern end of Greenland and, if necessary, wait for 
the summer of 1900 or 1901..., In the meantime, the Windward will go as far north as 
possible each summer, and leave fresh supplies at certain pre-determined points.’"'"*
The structure and organization o f this trip was unlike Peary's previous attempts. 
His crew management, ship and supply preparation, and intended reliance on Inuit help 
remained the same. This time, however, he had no intention of taking large numbers of 
scientists with him or allowing wealthy travellers to accompany him. He pared his 
passengers to the minimum needed to reach the pole. The context of the trip was also 
different.
' ’ Peary to Alfred Harmswworth. December 16. 1897. Folder "H,” Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC 
Harmsworth published the London Daily Mai! newspaper.
"Departure of the Windward." in American Geographical Society o f  New York Journal 30 ( 1898): 262- 
263.
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Despite his growing financial support, Peary was actually working in increasing 
solitude. The only person who shared his exact experiences in the Arctic was Matthew 
Henson. Peary easily overshadowed Henson, an African-American, as a public figure. 
Henson rarely joined Peary in his funding campaigns or lecture circuits, and Peary did 
not consult with him regarding expedition arrangements. Henson was an able shipman 
who. like Bob Bartlett the captain, admired Peary and respected the quest. Peary and 
Henson seemed to share a formal camaraderie that made shipboard communication easy, 
but did not extend into stateside life.'^ Henson's race was occasionally acknowledged, 
but rarely discussed, in Peary's communications with PAC members. The social distance 
between the two men follows the pattem Peary set with most of his comrades. And 
Peary's references to Henson as “my body-servant" or “my negro assistant" likely 
undercut any patron's concerns about Henson being too powerful a leader. In early 1898, 
as Peary worried about the slow formation of the PAC, he received a tentative letter from 
Henson. Henson still aided the remaining Inuits left at the AMNH after Peary's 
meteorite retrieval in 1897. He learned about Peary's plan to winter in the Arctic and 
asked the explorer if he might accompany him.'^ Henson had previously asked Peary for 
jobs or money upon return to the United States. Peary still had his engineer's salary to 
cover finances while he planned the next trip, but Henson's detachment from Arctic 
correspondence and plans forced him to find other jobs. In 1895, Henson wrote twice to
Matthew A. Henson. .-1 Black Explorer at the North /’«/e (Lincoln and London: University o f  Nebraska 
Press, 1989), xxvii-xxviii. Reprint o f Henson's A Negro Explorer at the North Pole (New York: Frederick 
Stokes. 1912). Henson started sailing on merchant vessels as a teenager. Peary wrote the foreword to 
Henson's 1912 book. He praised Henson's hard work, but also consistently emphasized Henson's race. 
Peary wrote o f his companion: "Henson proved his fitness by long and thorough apprenticeship, and his 
participation in the final victory which planted the Stars and Stripes at the North Pole, and won for this 
country the international prize o f nearly four centuries, is a distinct credit and leather in the cap o f his 
race.''
Matthew Henson to Peary. January 22. 1898. Folder "Henson. " Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
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Peary asking for help. In October he said bluntly that “1 would like you to let me have 
some money as soon as.. .possible.” One month later, his situation worse, Henson 
explained that the AMNH had no more work for him and that he wanted to meet with 
Peary because “the winter is near and 1 would like very much indeed to have something 
to do.” ’’
Henson was Peary’s companion for more years than anyone else who sailed north 
with them. Aside from Bob Bartlett, ship captain after 1902. the rest of the crew changed 
on each expedition. Bartlett, an outgoing personality who became a popular guest at 
social clubs and the homes of wealthy benefactors after 1909, tried once to help Peary 
raise money by visiting William Rockefeller. His courage failed, and he missed the 
meeting. Instead, he met with Jesup. whom he knew personally. Jesup assured him that 
he would make sure Peary had the necessary finances to reach the pole. Bartlett hated the 
entire experience, and smugly decided that despite Jesup’s generosity, “ ...1 do not feel 
that he or any of the other big men had worries any greater than a fishing Captain can 
have. ” ' * Bartlett preferred Newfoundland between trips.
Neither Peary nor the PAC officers maintained steady communication with 
Henson and Bartlett upon return from the Arctic, nor did they rely upon them to promote 
expeditions. Also. Peaiy sustained contact with a smaller group of dependable 
fundraisers. Never a socialite, his entire focus lay on securing command of a reliable, 
physically rugged team of men and dogs that could reach the North Pole.
Peary's strategy provided an exploratory safety net. The four-year plan ensured
Henson to Peary. October 5. 1895; November I. 1895. Folder "Henson." Box 12. Letters Received 
1895, PFC.
'** Robert A. Bartlett. The Log o f  Boh Bartlelt: The True Stoiy o f  Forty Years o f  Seafaring and Exploration 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 1928). 27-29.
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plenty o f opportunity to observe the Inuits and make scientific collections during the 
accumulated weeks and months between attempts at the pole. Moreover, his relief ship 
would keep communication open between him and his network o f millionaires and 
scientists if he had anything exciting to report. McClure’s magazine contacted him 
several times in 1898 and promised to pay for two different stories. The publishers first 
asked for an article explaining his plans and strategy for the upcoming trip. They also 
wanted a piece describing the Inuits’ lifestyles, clothing, and preparations for him. The 
Spanish-American War had completely upset their publication schedule, but they wanted 
the two articles.'^ The Arctic still had mass appeal.
The publishers at Centurv. excited over positive press about the recently released 
Northward Over the Great Ice (Peary's first book), begged Peary to consider them for 
management o f his next volume. Like Peary, they expected its subject to be the 
attainment of the North Pole. They understood Peary 's unwillingness to commit to them 
before departure but made it clear that they were ready to issue a contract for the new 
book upon his return."^ Rival publishers made grander overtures. Charles C. Haskell & 
Son emphasized that Peary would not have to pay any pre-publication costs, promised 
him one-half the gross sales, continuous reports of the profits, and a beautiful book, 
complete with illustrations. They insisted that their offer was “the most liberal one that 
has ever been made to an author." In addition, they asked Peary to send them 
photographs so that they could have plates prepared during his trip in anticipation of 
immediate publication upon his capture of the pole."' Haskell was persistent. When 
Peary refused to sign a pre-trip contract, the publisher haughtily informed him that he
' McClure's to Peary. April 27. 1898. Folder "M." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC. 
' Century to Peaiy. Januaiy 13. 1898. Folder "C." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
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was making a terrible mistake. ‘‘Americans are a rushing people and when the fever is on 
they will all buy the books, but when they get cooled down it is hard to make sales,” he 
wrote. He urged Peary to reconsider and sign a contract before departure so that he could 
pounce on the public’s excitement when Peary won the pole." McClure’s magazine, 
which had paid for several Peary articles before 1898, cabled him as the ship pulled away 
and promised that “ ...we stand ready when you return to pay more than anybody else for 
a magazine article about your achievement and addition to knowledge of polar regions. 
Good bye and good luck.”"^
Similarly, companies that had risked association with him before now hoped for 
financial rewards. Officers of the Cleveland Baking Powder Company reminded Peary 
that he had used their product on his first expedition. Concerned about (erroneous) 
reports that he had instead used Royal baking powder, the company asked Peary to 
remember their support. They asked him “... to give us a statement to that effect, that is, 
that you have used Cleveland’s baking powder in your expedition and found it stood the 
test thoroughly. If you can. and are willing, to make some such statement to offset the 
claim made by competitors, we will consider it a special favor.”'"* The odd requests piled 
up. Peary's lecture tour manager. James B. Pond, asked him to send "any old Eskimo 
clothes or curios" to Lincoln. Nebraska, so that shopowners could create window 
displays. Peary planned to lecture in Lincoln and Pond thought the gesture might "help 
the lecture and it would also be a good way of booming your forthcoming book.”"'
Peary ’s dream had become a marketing tool, despite his many setbacks.
■' Charles C. Haskell & Son to Peary. January 23. 1898, Folder "H.". Box 18. Letters Received 1898, PFC. 
■■ Charles C. Haskell & Son to Peary. June 17. 1898. Folder "H .'. Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC. 
McClure'.y to Peary. July 7. 1898. Folder'"M." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
McClure’ .V  to Peary. February 9. 1898. Folder "M." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
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Pear)' slowed his previously frenetic money-raising pace, which worried Pond. 
Pond seems not to have been contacted by the PAC. and Peary made a few moves that 
upset their old relationship. The explorer refused to set lecture appointments that post­
dated his return. Peary certainly planned to negotiate for top-dollar commitments upon 
his return from the pole, and he did not want to lock himself into pre-determined 
contracts. Like the publishers. Pond ached for a pre-departure commitment that would tie 
him to Peary 's certain fame. Peary was only one of his "stars." however, and Pond took 
the unusual step o f arranging several highly lucrative lectures for Nansen in early 1898.“*’ 
Nansen was a hit and Pond admitted that "It was the first snap 1 have had in years where 1 
have made a little money." Apparently. Nansen had spoken extremely well o f Peary in 
his lectures and Mrs. Peary had personally attended the two Washington D.C. talks. Pond 
chided Peary for using a different manager the previous fall for arrangement of a couple 
o f Boston lectures: " ...if  on your return from the North you are successful, which 1 
believe you will be. I can make as much money for you as anybody in the world and do it 
legitimately and everybody be happy.
James Pond to Peary. January 10, 1898. Folder "P." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
■'’James Pond to Peary. January 10. 1898. Folder "P." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC; J. Scott Keltic. 
“The Great Unmapped Areas on the Earth's Surface Awaiting the Explorer and the Geographer." National 
Geographic Magazine 8 ( 1897): 263-264. Keltic, also Secretar) of the Royal Geographical Society and 
Editor of the GeographicalJournal. published his presidential address delivered before the Geographical 
section of the British Association for the Advancement o f  Science, in Toronto. August 19. 1897. His 
sentiments about Nansen reveal the deep appreciation felt for his achievements by geographers the world 
over. Nansen had just returned from the Fram ordeal and Peary was one month in the field when he spoke. 
"Nansen may be said to have almost solved the North Pole problem—so far, at least, as the Old World side 
o f the Pole is concerned. That some one will reach the Pole at no distant date is certain; Nansen has shown 
the way, and the legitimate curiosity of humanity will not rest satisfied till the goal be reached....Nansen 
and other Arctic authorities maintain that the next thing to be done is to complete exploration on the 
American side—to do for that half of the North Polar region what Nansen has done for the other half....it is 
important, in the interests of science, that this section o f the polar area be examined; that as high a latitude 
as possible be attained; that soundings be made to discover whether the deep ocean extends all round the 
Pole." Keltic also mentioned the recent goals o f "the gallant Lieutenant Peary" and wished him well. But 
as a devoted geographer, he deferred to the higher ideals o f Nansen. Peary and the PAC were suspicious 
and Jealous o f Nansen, and certainly did not have such well-rounded goals in mind any longer.
■ Pond to Peary, February 10, 1898. Folder "P." Box 18. Letters Received 1898, PFC.
160
Peary understood the professional cost if  he failed to reach the North Pole. The 
pole was such a public fixation by 1898 that previously spectacular achievements lost 
their luster. But even as he sought one o f the most acclaimed spots on earth, he took the 
time to defend his past deeds, lest others steal his prize. In early 1897, Peary wrote to 
George C. Hurlbut o f the AGS and complained about the society's choice for their 
prestigious geographic gold medal, American Arctic explorer Adolphus W. Greely.
Peary worried that the medal would give Greely credit for Peary’s accomplishment o f 
crossing Greenland and determining that it was an island. Greely, a high-profile member 
of both the NGS and the AGS, had recently claimed to have discovered the insularity of 
Greenland."*
Much o f Peary’s fame rested on his treks across the tip of Greenland in 1894 and 
again in 1895. (See Appendix, Figures 5-6) He had been the first to proclaim Greenland 
an island and he did not want the credit stolen. In his letter to Hurlbut. he claimed this 
discovery and referred to the most recent map of Greenland as further evidence that his 
theories about the islands' northernmost extension were accepted by modem 
cartographers as well as the U.S. Hydrographic Office. Peary meant to sway the AGS 
privately and avoid a public fight. He admitted, "1 have no wish... to influence any 
conservative altitude of the Society, and ... can make no suggestion as to the wording of 
the inscription on its medal.”"‘^ Greely was granted the award, despite Peary's fears. As 
Peary intensified his efforts for the pole, he rarely missed an opportunity to defend his 
reputation via stories, Arctic artifacts, and advance press announcements sent to favored
Adolphus W. Greely. The Greely Arctic Expedition (Philadelphia: Barclay and Co.. 1894). In 1894. when 
Greely published his book. Peary was in the Arctic and nobody yet knew whether Greenland was an island, 
or if it extended northward over the pole to another piece of land. The detennination o f the insularity of 
Greenland— whether it was an island and. if  so. where its northern boundary lay—was a topic of intense
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reporters and editors/^ His media contacts kept his name at the fore o f Arctic news. At
the same time, Peary pounced on negative press. He picked his fights carefully and did
not respond publicly to his detractors. If necessary, he enlisted his friends among
geographers to proclaim public indignation.
Arctic fans knew afer Peary's speech before the AGS in January 1897 that he
planned to seek the pole in 1898-99. He explained his proposed route and his dreams for
organized financial donations. He grew furious later that year when a Norwegian
competitor, Otto Sverdrup (formerly captain of the Fram under Nansen), announced
alarmingly similar plans. Peary finally wrote to Sverdrup and demanded an explanation.
"My dear Captain," wrote Peary,
Paragraphs and articles are appearing in the papers here to the effect that you 
intend going North with a party in the Fram next year, provisioned for several 
years ... with the intention of exploring the northwest coast o f Greenland and 
attempting to reach the Pole... as my preparations for carrying out that project are 
already well advanced, these articles have created a distinctly disagreeable 
impression over here, and have caused and are causing such unpleasant reflections 
upon you that 1 am constraining to take this liberty of writing you and asking you 
to give me authority to deny the statements.^'
The competition to reach the pole began long before the explorers crossed the Arctic
circle. Peary's concerns were well-founded. Peary knew that his choice o f the
“American" route, through Smith Sound, gave him advantages over others still searching
for ways to sail directly to the pole. Sverdrup's interest in the same route put them on
geographical speculation.
Peary to George Hurlbut. January 6. 1897. Folder "H. ' Box 6. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
Charles Skinner to Peary. June 20. 1898. Folder "B." Box 18. Letters Received. 1898. PFC. For 
example. Peary sent a copy o f his recent book. Northward Over the Great Ice. to reporter Charles M. 
Skinner at the Brooklyn Daily Eagle for review. Skinner did not have time for a lengthy review, but hoped 
that his article would "help to create increased interest and a lively sale."
Peary to Otto Sverdrup. November 4. 1897. Folder "S." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC; Robert M. 
Bryce. Cook and Peaty: The Polar Controversy, /Je.vo/vt'c/(Mechanicsburg. PA: Stackpole Press. 1997). 
210. Hurlbut responded in the Bulletin o f  the American Geographical Society that it did not matter if  
Sverdrup chose to trump Peary. If he did so. "men will remember him as the one Arctic voyager whom they
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equal footing. Peary reacted as if  he had proprietary rights to the pole, an attitude he kept 
until his death. He obsessed over his goal, and it startled him to face competition. To 
Peary, Sverdrup's sudden plan was more than a discourtesy; it was a slap in the face.
Peary worried more about the timing of his trips than the physical difficulties. To 
confidantes, Peary emphasized the significance o f preparation, a dependable ship, and 
public recognition. His friends and geographical societies were outraged by Sverdrup's 
announcement. The Geographical Society of Philadelphia wanted to use the media to 
attack the apparent glory-snatching. The members proposed that "our protest would take 
the shape o f a resolution passed at one o f our meetings, to be subsequently published in 
our next Bulletin.” "^ The AGS also took a shot at Nansen. An anonymous reviewer of 
the Journal of the AGS wrote about International Geography, a book in which Nansen 
was one o f seventy contributing authors. The reviewer singled out Nansen for taking 
credit for discovering the northern limit o f Greenland and noted that Nansen had been too 
long out of touch with recent Arctic events. He supposed that Nansen had " ...not found 
time since his return to Norway to make himself acquainted with the work o f other 
explorers. He has youth on his side, however, and may hope, with diligence and the 
cultivation o f a right spirit, to arrive at a knowledge of several things which are now dark 
to him."^^ The digs at Nansen continued after his return to Norway, while Peary 
remained in the Arctic within shot o f the pole. Peary's allies never failed to point out the 
shady tendencies of his competitors.
Peary, meanwhile, downplayed his anger at Sverdrup. A few days before he
would gladly forget."
■ Henry S. Bryant to Peary. February 10, 1898. Folder "Henry S. Bryant.” Box 18. Letters Received 1898. 
RFC.
Journal of the American Geographical Society o f  New York 31(1899); 511.
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wrote to Sverdrup. Peary sent one o f his frequent notes to Theodore Roosevelt, then the 
Assistant Secretary o f the Navy, expressing various concerns over the Navy’s Corps of 
Engineers, an organization of much value to Peary. Peary paid close attention to the 
promotions and corporate mechanics o f the Corps o f Engineers. He still worked for the 
Navy, despite his repeated leaves o f absence. A friendship grew out of the professional 
communications between the lieutenant and the assistant secretary. Peary rarely 
addressed even long-time acquaintances (aside from his wife and mother) with more than 
necessary salutations, but his letters to Roosevelt were remarkably warm and 
appreciative. The letter in question was a reply to Roosevelt’s thanks for an Arctic 
souvenir. Roosevelt had also expressed discouragement over Nansen’s public dismissal 
o f Pearl ’s meteorite retrievals. Peary assured his friend that *T have had sufficient 
experience before this with reporters to know how unreliable and misleading they may 
be, even with the best o f intentions. I make it a point to pay no attention to newspaper 
comments or criticism or misstatements.” "^* Despite this dismissal. Peary also included 
with the letter a clipping from the New York Sim that announced Sverdrup’s polar 
attempt.
Peary also admitted to Roosevelt that authorities in Greenland had told him that 
they were already planning to have dogs ready for Sverdrup the following summer. The 
dogs were an important issue. In his attempts to organize. Peary had started breeding 
sled dogs in the United States to take with him to the Arctic.*'^ Of the dozens of dogs that
Peary to Theodore Roosevelt. October 29. 1897. Folder "R." Letters Sent 1897-98, PRC.
H.T. Foote to Peary, April 28. 1898. Folder "F." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC. Peary left his dogs 
in various places. Zoos kept a few when he did not need them, boarders and veterinarians managed others. 
His arrangements were not always successful, though. Dr. H.T. Foote of Brookside Farm in New Rochelle. 
New York demanded that Peary retrieve the two bitches Peary left with him. He found the dogs impossible 
to domesticate and wanted them returned to the Arctic.
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began each trip, only a handful usually survived.^^ The Greenland Inuits could not keep
up with the numbers of dogs needed by explorers. An entire trip could be thrown into
jeopardy for lack of dogs.
Nansen and Sverdrup were internationally famous, but nobody went to the Arctic
as often as Peary did. Peary referred to Sverdrup’s plans in his letter to Roosevelt as “an
extreme of discourtesy which borders on something else” and disclosed that he refused to
believe friends who insisted that Nansen was secretly involved. Despite his calm tone,
Peary was anxious about his competition. He still knew how to make the Arctic work for
him, though, and told his sportsman friend that he hoped "1 might sometime have the
privilege and pleasure of taking such a splendid lover of big game as yourself where you
could draw a bead upon a huge tusked walrus, 'the elephant o f the north. Either he
wanted special favor from his well-placed comrade or he simply knew how to please
another sizable ego.
Roosevelt was one of a small group with which Peary corresponded about non-
Arctic concerns. A few months before he sent Roosevelt his private concerns about
Sverdrup, Peary asked the assistant secretary to reconsider his decision to go to Cuba.
Newspaper reports told of Roosevelt’s plans "to take the field in Cuba." and Peary feared
for the assistant secretary's life. He asked Roosevelt to consider that
there are so many men who have the pure physical courage for the work of 
fighting in the field, while there are so few who have in addition, the moral 
courage and executive ability which you possess in such a pronounced degree. 1 
believe you are needed where you are now. more than anywhere else and 1 feel 
that you are risking too much in a struggle which I cannot feel will be worthy of 
you and your abilities....
Most succumbed to exhaustion or pibblokto. the Arctic madness that overcame them in the extreme 
conditions of the far North. Dead dogs were used as food for the rest o f the pack.
Peary to Roosevelt. October 29. 1897. Folder "R." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC.
’* Peary to Roosevelt. June I897[?]. Folder "R." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98, PFC. His letter to Roosevelt
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Peary thought that the situation in Cuba was unimportant, which proved to be a damaging 
miscalculation. The Spanish-American War seriously affected the wealth and the 
membership of the PAG in the midst o f his first polar effort.
When Peary left in 1898 for a planned four-year trip, he had no idea how much 
his finances would suffer during the war. He organized himself as well as possible before 
departure, and kept in touch with Henry Cannon. PAC treasurer. Even as he sailed 
North, he wrote to Cannon and reminded him about upcoming bills and payments. Peary 
explained how much and when to pay the crew of the Windward, depending upon her 
ability to return home as scheduled. He also told Carmon that he had promised both the 
crew and the captain special bonuses if  they landed him at his chosen spot and managed 
to return the Windward safely home in the same season.^'^ Peary did not expect expenses 
for sending the Windward north again to exceed $4000. If she got stuck in ice. however, 
and the PAC had to send the Hope in 1899, it would cost $7500.
With this in mind. Peary informed Cannon that "It will be very desirable to swell 
the membership to 25 or 30 as soon as possible."^" A PAC membership o f 25-30 would 
cover the necessary costs for the next two years and enable repair of the Windward, with 
money to spare. His costs included improving the Windward"s condition; it needed a 
new engine, a boiler, and a propeller. Even with the PAC's support. Peary could not 
relax. Despite the luxury of a gift ship. Peary believed that "the Windward's machinery
shows the esteem he accorded the future president. In 1905. Peary named his specially built ice-breaker 
ship the Roosevelt.
’ ' Peary to Cannon. [ 1898]. Folder "C." Box 6, Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC. He promised the crew a bonus 
o f $1000. a significant sum considering the PAC's limited finances and untested ability to recruit new 
members to cover unforeseen costs. He promised the ship's captain the same bonus, though its 
disbursement could wait till the following summer, if necessary. The first PAC members pledged 
S1000/year, so the bonuses alone ate up considerable income.
Peary to Cannon. [ 1898]. Folder "C." Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC
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is in critical condition and causes me a great deal of anxiety.”'*' Peary believed that use of 
a solid ship that could get him through Kane Basin was vital to his success. Relying upon 
the Windward in order to save money must have worried him as he organized his trip.
The ship would prove unworthy o f the job. despite Peary’s careful planning and the 
PAC’s excitement. Peary had successfully recruited scientists in years past, but 
persuading businessmen to make a long-term commitment was more difficult.
Peary paid all but two bills before his departure. He enclosed one draft and asked 
Cannon to cover it and explained about the second in more detail. His wife had charged 
several things for the expedition at a local store. By mistake, the bill was credited to her 
account rather than to the PAC, and he asked Cannon to recompense her."*^  The bill was 
less than fifty dollars, yet Peary took the time to explain the cost. Clearly, despite the 
thousands o f dollars under control of the PAC. every dollar counted.
Peary had every reason to be concerned about Cannon's ability to increase PAC 
membership to cover future costs. John H. Winser. Secretary and Assistant Treasurer of 
the AMNH wrote to Peary on behalf of the new president o f the organization and turned 
down his request for financial aid. Winser wrote that the president ’’feels great doub t... 
that success will attend any efforts in raising a large sum of money at this time; capital as 
you know is timid in the face o f war. and as you doubtless will concede, the conditions 
have undergone a radical change. He would feel very loth [sic] under the existing
■" Peary to Cannon. [ 1898]. Folder C. ” Box 6. Letters Sent 1897-98. PFC Harold Norwood. Barlieti: The 
Great Exp/orer (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited. 1989), 50. The Windward old. small, and had a 
weak engine. Peary could not afford to pass up the gift o f a free ship, but the Windward wovAd never have 
been his first choice. It took the ship 56 days to sail across the Atlantic to the United States, one o f the 
longest journeys ever recorded by a ship that did not get stuck in ice. The vessel was a converted sailer, 
equipped with a small coal engine. The boiler required constant maintenance, too. When John Bartlett tried 
take the ship out o f  harbor and head to Greenland, the tidal force was too strong for the engine and he had 
to wait for a strong wind to push the ship into the ocean.
Norwood. Barlieti. 50.
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outlook to address letters to his friends, confident that it would almost court failure, and 
would certainly embarrass him deeply
Other potential benefactors waited to see who else joined the PAC before 
committing themselves. Amzi Lorenzo Barber, New York asphalt entrepeneur, did not 
blame the war. but simply saw no need to contribute. Peary petitioned him at least twice 
to join the PAC. The first time. Barber replied that his money was directed elsewhere. 
However, his interest in Peary was apparent: "With regard to your Club, you need no 
assurance of my interest and good-will. If these alone were to be considered. 1 would 
join it instantly, but 1 am already under obligations to several other enterprises..."^^ One 
month later, after Peary asked again. Barber told him that "1 must not hold out to you any 
expectation that 1 will join it. but you may be sure of my sympathy, and it is possible that 
1 can see my way to come in later.'"^^
It was a difficult time for even the wealthiest men to rally behind Peary's cause.
In addition to the obvious competition, most of the nation still suffered from the 
depression of 1893. which hindered philanthropy. Cannon, president of Chase National 
Bank, felt the impact in the hub of the New York financial district. Cannon personally 
tried to get men to join the PAC. but had limited success. He informed Peary on one 
occasion that he had "...faithfully labored with at least a half a dozen capitalists and 
regret that my efforts to obtain subscribers for the fund have been o f no avail. 1 shall try 
again
The economy began to recover in 1898, but the first upturns were in agriculture
John H. Windsor to Peary. April 26. 1898. Folder •’A." Box 18. Box 18. Letters Received. 1898. PFC. 
Amzi Lorenzo Barber to Peary. May 27. 1898. Folder "Barber.” Box 18. Letters Received. 1898. PFC. 
Amzi Lorenzo Barber to Peaiy . June 30. 1898. Folder "Barber.” Box 18. Letters Received. 1898. PFC. 
Cannon to Peary. June 25. 1898. Folder "C.” Box 18, Letters Received. 1898. PFC.
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and transportation, which did not immediately assist Peary/^ The impending war with 
Spain diverted attention from the five-year depression, but did not make the PAC's job 
any easier. Only a few men could make a long-term financial commitment. Herbert L. 
Bridgman, owner of the Brooklyn Standard Union and secretary of the PAC, had 
founded the group and knew what it would take to increase membership. After Peary left 
in the Windward, he asked Peary to add more names to an enclosed list of people to 
whom Bridgman might send, "from time to time, such copies o f The Standard Union as 
may have any matters of Arctic or Antarctic and other Polar interest."'** Peary depended 
upon such men who appreciated the sales potential of the Arctic.
Peary spent most of his time handling correspondence about the PAC. media 
reports, and the support of well-wishers or businessmen. He relied upon Bridgman to 
bring in more money and upon Henson to prepare the Windward for departure. Peary 
arranged by mail for most of the supplies and their delivery. Henson actually ran the ship 
for the last few weeks before Peary arrived for the formal send-off. His second-in- 
command wrote to Peary from the Windward (harbored in New York City) in June of 
1898 asking for money to buy water for himself and one o f the two surviving Inuits."*** 
Peary intended to return the Inuit man to the Arctic. The other remaining Inuit. a young 
boy called Minik. had joined the household of an AMNH administrator. The adult Inuit 
moved from the AMNH to the ship with Henson, and remained in Henson's care on the 
Windward. Henson's letter to Peary indicates that they remained a low priority for the
Gerald T. White. The United States and the Prohlem of Recover}’ after 1893 (Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press. 1952). 2-5.
Herbert L. Bridgman to Peary, Julv 8. 1898. Folder ”H.L. Bridgman." Box 18. Letters Received 1898, 
PFC.
Matthew Henson to Peary. June 14 (?). 1898. Folder "Henson." Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC. 
Four o f the six Inuits let) at the AMNH in 1897 had died.
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explorer, however.
The explorer emphasized the necessity o f a timely departure. In 1898 especially, 
he could not afford delay. Sverdrup was only one polar contendor. Swedish daredevil 
Salomon August Andree had convinced the Swedish Academy of Sciences to support his 
plan to fly over the North Pole in a hydrogen-tilled balloon. Alfred Nobel, dynamite 
inventor, loved the idea and paid half the costs. Andree tried first in 1896, but weather 
conditions prevented take-off. He launched successfully during the summer of 1897. and 
the NGS and AGS avidly reported news of his adventure. A sealer found one of 
Andree s carrier pigeons a tew days after his departure, but he was never heard from 
again.
Peary had lots o f competition besides Andree and Sverdrup. Wallter Wellman, a 
wealthy American and former owner of the Cincinnati Evening Post, left for an attempt 
on the pole in early 1898 in the Fridtjof. His first Arctic adventure had ended badly in 
1891 when ice crushed his steamer. This second trip boasted a mixed American and 
Norwegian crew, and the geographical societies followed his progress with much interest. 
Peary's fans knew, however, that Wellman had chosen a difficult route through the Arctic 
and would most likely fail.^' Henry Bryant, president of the American Geographical 
Society of Philadelphia and leader of the scientific portion of Peary 's  1894 expedition, 
encouraged the explorer: "1 cannot understand Wellman's persisting in this means of 
attacking the Pole, after its impracticability has been proven by Jackson and Nansen ... 1 
feel sure that you will restore the pre-eminence o f the Stars and Stripes in the battle for
Maxtone-Graham. Safe Return.]68-\&3. One ofAndree's polar buoys was found in 1899 on 
Spitsbergen. Experts agreed that Andree was dead and that the balloon had foundered.
National (Jeographic Magazine 10 (July 1899): 280. Greely explained that Wellman's route around 
Franz Josef Land posed enough problems that he should not be a threat to Peary or Sverdrup. It left him
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Supremacy in the North. You will start out under the best aupices and with your great 
experience and fine equipment should win. If there is any one piece of advice which I 
can summon assurance enough to give you, it is this:- when you have done your best, 
even should you not reach the goal of the Centuries, have the moral courage to turn 
back.”"'’ The advice was surely lost on Pear) , who turned back only under extreme 
duress. Wellman was a relative unknown, having made only one previous foray into the 
Arctic, but everyone believed that any well-organized attempt could reach 90 N. Many 
men realized the notoriety associated with the pole. For Peary and a new batch of 
competition, it seemed as though only random bad fortune or weather could prevent 
success.
The threat o f losing to another explorer remained serious during Peary's first year 
away. Peary wanted above all to stay in the Arctic until he reached the pole. Samuel and 
John Bartlett helped Peary handle the problem of renting a decent resupply ship. The 
Windward was too weak to return to New York, so the expedition needed another ship. 
John Bartlett suggested several options for securing a spring resupply ship, knowing that 
price remained the decisive factor. Operating out of Newfoundland, he cabled and wrote 
to Bridgman, comparing the prices and necessary refitting work of several ships. The 
Hope and the Diana were the best choices, but the Diana's owners still demanded a high 
price. Bartlett favored the Hope, though he knew that the ship would "give them all they 
can do to have her ready by 27‘*’ June."^^ When Peary reached Etah and started his winter 
encampments, he sent the Hope home. The Windward was frozen in. The Hope was
too far from the pole to be within reasonable reach within one season.
Henry Bryant to Peary, May 23. 1898. Folder "Henry S. Bryant." Box 18. Letters Received 1898 PFC. 
John Bartlett to Peary. May 16. May 28. May 29. 1898. Folder "John Bartlett." Box 18. Letters Received 
1898. PFC. The cabin needed retlooring. and also the boat smelled bad. Refitted whalers often smelled
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unfit for further travel, so the PAC had another ship emergency. Peary needed a relief 
ship, either for food for another winter, or to bring him home victorious. Samuel Bartlett 
maintained correspondence with Bridgman during the winter of 1898-99. Bartlett 
worried that ice would crush the Windward, and that Peary would be so desperate for 
help the following spring that he would have to rent a steamer hurriedly, likely paying 
$3000/month. Samuel expected to captain the relief ship and pushed Bridgman to find 
him one. He favored an English ship, the Discovery, but the English Admiralty refused 
to let the ship loose for the Peary Relief Expedition without a replacement vessel.
Bartlett knew from Peary's experience with ship rental that Bridgman had to make it a 
priority. He reminded Bridgman and the PAC that ‘‘the Fram is in competition and 1 for 
one would not like to see the lieutenant defeated, and I am sure you would not like to see 
or hear of the Norwegian flag flying at the Pole when the lieutenant arrived there, for 1 
am sure that he will accomplish it if evervthing goes While Pear}' settled in for
another long winter in the Arctic, the PAC scrambled to find a ship to send to him when 
the ice broke in 1899.
The club successfully met its first spontaneous challenge and rented the expensive 
Diana for the spring relief expedition.'"’ Things looked promising for Peary as he 
prepared for the first polar run. Feeling certain of victory, the PAC continued to gloat 
privately over the damage done to Nansen's reputation. Bridgman obviously delighted in 
such news. Bridgman had sent a copy o ï Northward Over the Great Ice to Eivind Astrup. 
the young Norwegian who had accompanied Peary to Greenland in 1891. Astrup 
thanked Bridgman, but also complained at the American press's treatment o f Nansen and
terrible from the whale oil and carcasses previously stored onboard.
^■'Bartlett to Bridaman. December 24. 1898. Folder “H.L. Bridgman. Box 18. Letters Received 1898. PFC.
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Sverdrup and insisted that neither man intended to compete with Peary. He hoped that 
any chance meeting of Sverdrup with Peary in Greenland over the winter would “be to 
their mutual comfort and satisfaction.” Bridgman, who stayed in close touch with 
Josephine, transcribed this long complaint in a letter to her and asked that “of course you 
will regard this as quite confidential, as it is not my custom, as you know, to "give away' 
personal letters.” *^’
Meanwhile, the same volume of the AGS journal that attacked Nansen's book 
contribution contained a glowing review of Northward Over the Great Ice. It also 
included a brief note about Peary's first impressions of his latest trip. Members noted 
that Peary expected to reach his desired winter headquarters in northwest Greenland, but 
that heavy ice had formed and that the Windward would probably not escape it.^  ^ The 
news item assured readers that Peary had plenty of dogs and Inuit volunteers and that 
"the death of their four tribesmen in New York made no difference in his relations with 
the Arctic Highlanders."^** This was one of the rare public acknowledgements of the 
ordeal of the six Inuits left at the AMNH the previous year. With Sverdrup in Greenland, 
however, it was necessary to assure his backers that he had plenty of dogs and local 
support. Peary seemed assured of the pole.
The situation changed remarkably quickly. Peary spent a horrific winter in the 
Arctic. He forced his small party of himself. Henson. Thomas S. Dedrick (a surgeon).
"  The Hope, the cheaper of the two. cost $5000 (before insurance).
Bridgman to Josephine Peary. December 23. 1898. Folder "H.L. Bridgman." Box 18. Letters Received 
1898. PFC.
”  Norwood. Bartleil. 54. The IF/;/</H«n/actually got iced in almost three hundred miles further south than 
Peaty planned. Peary's familiar problem spot. Kane Basin, was ice-blocked in 1898. and the Windward 
had no strength to push through it. As a result. Peary and his men spent the entire winter hauling supplies 
northward to Fort Conger so that he could attempt the pole in the spring of 1899. He was much too far 
south for a realistic try. but with Sverdrup in the area he could not wait.
Journal o f  the American Geographical Society o f  New Yorii. 31(1898): 355.
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several Inuits and sixty dogs to move to Fort Conger in March of 1899, tearing that if he 
waited until later in the spring to advance that Sverdrup would beat him. Peary's feet 
froze and upon arrival at the small cabins, as he stripped his shoes away, several toes 
popped off. Eventually, he lost pieces o f seven toes from the forced march. At least half 
of the dogs died en route as well. Henson managed to hunt enough meat for the group 
huddled at Fort Conger while Peary lay incapacitated. At one point Peary wrote a note to 
himself in Latin for which he later became famous: "Find a way or make one.” It 
eventually became a PAC motto. The group returned to the iced-in Windward so that 
Peary could receive further attention from Dedrick. The first year had been a bust, and 
Peary still worried about his competition. Peary and Sverdrup knew o f each other's 
positions, and even had two brief, cordial encounters in 1897, since both of them had 
docked near Smith Sound."^ Despite this rough start, things actually worsened.
Peary spent the summer o f 1899 in preparation for another winter in the Arctic. 
With the arrival of the Diana, he had two ships at his disposal, making walrus hunting 
and storage even easier. He also planned to spend the second winter further south at 
Etah, rather than Fort Conger, which made travel to and from the marooned ships easier. 
He still needed to recuperate from the surgical removal of most of his toes, and the loss of 
so many dogs made it impossible to cache or carry supplies. Sverdrup, meanwhile, 
moved further westward and made it obvious that he was no longer in contention for the 
North Pole. '^" Pear) tried in earnest for the North Pole in May 1900, but was turned back 
when the ice pack proved too difficult. He was already on the northeastern edge of
Wal ly Herbert. The Noose o f  Laurels: The Discovery of the North Pole ( London: Graft on Books. 1991). 
112-116. Herbert's book is an intense psychological biography o f Peary. He surmises that these long 
winters in the Arctic, during which Peary had fully expected to reach the pole, effectively broke his spirit. 
When Peary eventually wrote about this trip, he barely mentioned Sverdrup. After so much anxiety, he still
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Greenland, so in his retreat to Fort Conger he had an excellent opportunity at last to 
observe the very edge o f the island. When he eventually returned home to the United 
States, the maps of this venture were his greatest contribution to Arctic lore.
In 1900, after Peary had already failed once to reach the North Pole, another 
competitor made headlines. Italian Prince Luigi Amadeo, known as the Duke o f Abruzzi, 
achieved a new Farthest North at 86 33’, eclipsing Nansen's recent record. Italy spent 
almost five hundred thousand dollars outfitting the Stella Polare for the trip, and the 
investment was a good one. Inspired by this success, the Italian planned to team with 
Nansen for a future attack on the North Pole.^' Peary, of course, did not know about his 
newest challenge. The PAC did. however.
In late summer of 1900, Peary returned again to Fort Conger with Henson and 
several Inuit hunters and prepared for winter. It put him into excellent position for a 
spring 1901 nab of the pole.^" But in April when he. Henson, and their Inuit guides tried 
to reach the North Pole, they lasted little more than a week in the effort. The men were in 
poor shape and the effort was beyond them. They returned defeated to the ship.^’^  Peary 
made a last try for the North Pole in April 1902 after a winter at Cape Sabine, but 
encountered a wide lane of open water and could go no farther than 84 17". a new 
American record.'’"* Pearl 's grand plans had resulted in three tortuous winters, four tailed 
attempts at the North Pole, and few positive results for his weary benefactors.
Peary had not only pushed his personal limits: he tested the loyalty o f the two
refused to make public his fears.
"" Herbert. The Noose. 123.
National Geographic Magazine 11 (October 1900): 411,413.
Herbert. The Noose. 122-125.
Herbert. The Noose. 128-129.
Henson. 4 Black Explorer. 11-12. It was a famous stretch o f difficult terrain, known as "The Big Lead” 
to all who saw it. Henson explained that it was generally believed to mark the continental shelf o f northern
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people closest to him. In 1899, Bridgman rode Peary’s first relief ship the Diana to
check on Peary, whom he found in Greenland struggling to recover from his recent
frostbite ordeal, determined to try again the following spring. Bridgman returned
stateside and conferred with Josephine, and in 1900 she decided to assess Peary’s
condition herself. She took their daughter Marie, now seven years old, and returned to
the Arctic on the Windward. In 1901, therefore, Bridgman and the rest of the PAC faced
uncertainty in their investments. They knew that Peaiy was in poor shape physically but
refused to quit, and that they needed also to send another relief ship with supplies and to
arrange for his wife and daughter to return home.^^
The PAC members' annual fees of one thousand dollars (pledged for four years)
were designed to cover the costs of the main enterprise as well as the re-supply
expeditions. They had not expected to rent more than one ship, but by 1901 the PAC had
two ships in the Arctic, with no idea of their condition or whether a third rental might be
necessary; funds were low. Bridgman, therefore, offered a special tourist package for
PAC members: five hundred dollars for passage on the Erik's summer relief cruise.
Bridgman appealed privately to the PAC with the following concerns;
The summer of 1901 is likely to mark the culmination o f the work of the Peary 
Club, though its members, confident as they have been from the outset in Mr. 
Peary’s success, are pledged to stand by him unfalteringly to the end. Three years 
have elapsed since Mr. Peary left America, and two full season" work is to be 
learned upon the return of the Erik. More interesting, in a personal and dramatic 
way. that the geographic work of Mr. Peary, is the fate o f his wife and daughter 
and of the steamer Windward from which nothing has been heard since her 
departure from Godhaven. Greenland, August 20. 1900.'^^
A handful of men accepted Bridgman’s offer. Dr. Frederick Cook, later Peary’s
hemisphere landmasses.
Kim Fairly Giliis and Silas Hibbard Ayer III. eds.. Boreal Ties: Photographs and Two Diaries of the 
1901 Peaty Relief Expedition (Albuquerque: University o f  New Mexico Press. 2002). 4.
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bitter rival, traveled as ship surgeon, a position he had also held on Peary’s first 
independent Arctic trip in 1891. Everyone expected that Peary would require surgical 
care for his feet. Cook also served as second in command under Bridgman. Two more 
Bartlett men worked the ship. Moses as First Officer and Will as Second Officer (the 
captain was John Blakeney). The rest o f the passengers, however, paid for the privilege 
o f seeing the Arctic. Clarence Wyckoff, PAC member, millionaire inheritor of his 
father's Remington Typewriter money and a successful businessman, joined the group 
after convincing two friends to join him. Louis Bement, who sold hats for the Henry H. 
Angell Company, and Alfred Church, grandson o f Gail Borden of the Borden Milk 
Company, boarded the Erik, too, upon W yckoff s request. Herbert Berri, Polytechnic 
Institute student and son of the man who owned the Brooklyn Standard Union, and 
Limond Stone, a professor at Polytechnic Institute [New York], completed the passenger 
list.^^
Peary’s ship frustrations extended beyond his own endeavors to affect his relief 
efforts. Before departure, the PAC assured its inexperienced passengers that the Erik was 
a trustworthy vessel. Seriously stretching the truth, the PAC described the little steamer 
as being " in the best condition and well adapted for her Arctic work. " Over three 
decades later, Wyckoff still remembered the sorry state of the ship. He recalled that "'at 
the time they [the engines] were built, 1 imagine they were rather modem, but the ship 
had seen much hard usage in the Hudson Bay trade and the engines were only useful in a 
fair wind. With a fair wind and no sails spread, we could make about 6 or 7 miles an
Giliis and Ayer, Boreal Ties. 6. 
Giliis and Ayer. Boreal Ties. 8.
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hour. When the wind or tide was against us, we anchored or tied up to a cake of ice.’”** 
Eventually, the Erik found the Windward, and the people on both ships toured the 
Greenland coastline for a few weeks before the Erik took both relief parties home again. 
Cook, Wyckoff. and Bement took hundreds o f photographs o f the other passengers, the 
landscape, the Peary family, and the Inuits. Wyckoff and Bement also kept personal 
journals, in which they recorded the one bizarre event of the summer. Surgeon Dedrick, 
who was already with Peary in the Arctic in 1901. became agitated about some decisions 
Peary made and resigned his post as surgeon, but refused to return to America on the 
Erik. Bridgman and Cook tried to alleviate the interpersonal tension and to plead with 
Dedrick to return stateside, to no avail. Wyckoff and Bement disliked Peary’s handling 
of the problem. Peary refused to speak to Dedrick, forcing the intermediary action, and 
when Dedrick convinced the crews to leave him behind with the Inuits, Peary resented 
Wyckoff agreeing to give Dedrick a rifle for hunting food. Peary claimed that he and 
Josephine feared that Dedrick might try to kill him. Bridgman (editor of the Brooklyn 
Standard Union) told Bement that he "'was not going to mention it in any of his 
dispatches or his paper so the public would not be any the wiser.'" Bridgman also said 
that when Dedrick finally made it home in a year or two that, " by that time it would be 
an old worn out story and 1 guess nobody will pay any attention to it."'*'^
Wyckoff had one further cause for resentment against Peary. As the Erik pulled 
away from shore, Wyckoff tossed a gun over the railing for Dedrick. The following year.
Giliis and Ayer, Bon-ai Ties. 10.
Giliis and Ayer, Boreal Ties. 34-35. 169, 172. It was not entirely clear why Dedrick broke with Peary. In 
1902. when the story broke in the press. Peary's media machine spread stories that Dedrick was insane or 
had resigned over leadership rankings. Another version is that Dedrick was distressed over an epidemic that 
struck the Inuits that summer. Dedrick believed that the American exploration crew had infected the Inuits, 
and Dedrick wanted to help them medically. Regarding the gun. Peary not only feared Dedrick might shoot 
him. he also believed that Dedrick might use it to win favor with the Inuits during the winter, and possibly
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he learned that Peary had somehow come into possession of the gun and had donated it to 
the AMNH in his own name. Enraged, Wyckoff demanded the rifle be returned to him. 
Peary responded that he had asked an Inuit to inlay the rifle stock with walrus ivory to 
make it more interesting to Wyckoff. and that if he wanted it back Peary would arrange 
its retrieval from the museum. Wyckoff eventually received the gun. but the damage was 
done; he resigned from the PAC.^® Peary was exceptionally tough in the face of Arctic 
cold and ice, but his obsession could be overbearing.
Bridgman was wrong about both the timing and the media frenzy o f the Dedrick 
story, though the fault was his. The story broke to the American press in October 1901. 
before Dedrick returned to the United States. Upon reaching port in New York.
Bridgman announced to a reporter that he thought Dedrick was “practically insane.” as 
explanation for the doctors extended stay in the Arctic. The following winter, when 
Dedrick returned, he put his own version into circulation. In November 1902. The New 
York ITbr/c/printed a story in Dedrick" s name in which he accused Peary of extremely 
cruel and unjust treatment. Dedrick claimed: “'The animosity exhibited in the endeavor 
to brand me and bring me into disrepute, the refusing my unpaid salary on such technical 
grounds. Mr. Peary's disregard for the lives of his native helpers and almost inhuman 
treatment of me without provocation during the last year, and his threat to maroon me for 
a fifth year on the side of the channel uninhabited by Esquimaux at the expedition's 
vessel taking final leave...make reasons for my resignation unnecessary."'^’
Dedrick also contacted a few members o f the PAC seeking redress. Cannon
launch his own polar attempt the next year.
" Giliis and Ayer. Boreal Ties. 2 15-216.
”  Herbert. The Noose, 148. Letter from Barnes & Johnson. November 12. 1902. Folder “B," Box 19. 
Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC. Bames & Johnson. Attorneys and Counsellors at Law. advised Peary
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informed Peary o f the contact, but was unfazed by it. Like Bridgman, he thought the 
matter might disappear. To Peary he wrote: “I assume that Dedrick informed you that he 
had written me concerning his affairs. I replied briefly to his letter, suggesting that if he 
had any claim against the Club he distinctly formulate the same in writing, as his letter to 
me was not precisely in the nature of a demand. His communication was not 
disturbing.” "^ Cannon thought Dedrick wanted his salary, which Peary refused to pay, 
more than he wanted media attention.
Bridgman, too, remained calm about the matter, even when a New York Times 
reporter worried enough to warn him a day early about the AP story that the World 
planned to run. The article was based mostly on Dedrick's letter o f resignation. 
Bridgman informed Peary that he had sent the article and further explanations to the 
PAC's legal counsel firm. One month later, while attending a dinner lecture in 
December, a colleague spoke to Bridgman about Dedrick. Bridgman thought that the 
incident would pass in time, and assured Peary that "at the present time the executive 
committee of the Arctic Club is scratching its head to see how it can get Dedrick safely 
overboard.” To another PAC friend, Bridgman reiterated that "The latest broadside from 
Dedrick...brought no editorial responses whatever from any American paper, and 1 think 
that by this time the American public is thoroughly tired of the whole matter. Peary's 
course has been from the beginning characterized by dignity and consistency, while that 
o f Dedrick seems to be animated by a disordered imagination and an uncontrollable 
desire for notoriety, which...have magnified the incident far beyond what its merits, (if it
that he had a good case against Dedrick for libel, but also urged him to settle the matter privately. 
Cannon to Peary. October 28. 1902. Folder "C." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC.
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ever had any) warrant.”’^
Upon his return to the United States in 1902, Peary had little time for recovery.
He trusted his friends that the Dedrick matter would dissolve, and turned to other 
concerns. When he left in 1898 he had publishers begging for contracts. Two years later, 
however, Frederick A. Stokes, publisher of Northward Over the Great Ice, informed him 
that purchases of his book had stopped altogether. He expressed shock at the lack of 
sales, but asked Pear)' if he could lower the list price in hopes of raising public interest.^^ 
Stokes' problem exemplified the greatest disadvantage to Peary's long absence. Unable 
to maintain his usual flurry o f positive notices and well-placed stories, Peary had trouble 
maintaining his hold on public enthusiasm. Bridgman tended to wait for news before 
contacting publishers. He also did not have ready access to Peary's seemingly limitless 
supply of Arctic souvenirs that helped curry favor. It surprised everyone that the North 
Pole still lay untouched, and Stokes was one o f many who telt the effects.
Other parts of Peary's support base took longer to show cracks. The AGS stood 
by him in remarkably strong fashion. In January of 1902, Chandler Robbins of the AGS 
wrote to Josephine and asked her to reply in confidence as to whether Peary might like to 
become the next president of the organization. The AGS planned to confer another 
award on Peary -the Charles P. Daly Medal— and still they wanted further honors for 
him. By that date, they all knew that Peary had not achieved his goal, so the request was 
a fully informed one. But Robbins believed that "...too much honor cannot be extended 
to him in recognition o f his phenominal [sic] courage, skill, perseverance and self
Bridgman to Peary. November 6; December 29, 1902. Folder "Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman. Sec.." Box 19. 
Letters Received 1900-1902, PFC: Bridgman to J.S. Keltie, December 5, 1902, Folder "Mr. Herbert L. 
Bridgman. Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902, PFC..
Frederick A. Stokes to Peaiy. July 7, 1909, Folder "Unidentified,” Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902,
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sacrifice.” ’^^ Robbins hinted in a letter to Peary, however, that there was more to their 
decision than respect. The group believed that “ ...the administrative ability and the 
wealth o f resources displayed in the conduct o f your admirably planned and difficult 
enterprises eminently fit you to fill with dignity and success the responsible position at 
the head o f this Society.”^^  The AGS realized that Peary was a prolific money-raiser and 
wanted to reap the benefits.
Peary’s favored geographical organizations kept his name before their readers as 
much as possible between 1898 and 1902. The PAC sent the Diana with relief supplies 
for Peary in 1899. A small scientific team went with the ship, and the AGS published the 
brief reports that the researchers sent home before the winter sealed them in.’  ^ Robert 
Stein of the US Geological Survey, who had travelled with Peary before, wrote a letter to 
the PAC that saw publication in the AGS Journal. He wrote o f his successful landing at 
Cape Sabine and asked the PAC to have the relief ship sent out the following year pick 
him up in the same area. He promised to pay for the passage. The Journal also included 
information, supplied by Bridgman, that Peary had spent a useful winter at Fort Conger 
and had collected interesting relics left there by Greely’s men decades earlier and had 
collected them to send home to the US government. Journal printed a letter from
PFC.
Chandler Robbins to Josephine Peary, January 23. 1902; October 26. 1902. Folder "AGS,’' Box 19. 
Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC. Actually, the letter to Josephine came months after the AGS had already 
written to Peary to inform him of both the medal and the impending presidency. The AGS wanted Peary to 
receive the first Daly Medal before he accepted the presidency, believing that it would be awkward for 
them to give the honor to their own president. Perhaps the AGS decided belatedly to include Josephine in 
the decision, since she had been so active in handling Peary's affairs during his absence.
Chandler Robbins to Robert Peary. September 10. 1902. Folder "AGS. ' Box 19. Letters Received 1900- 
1902. PFC.
"The Mission o f the Diana." National Geographic Magazine 10 (July 1899): 273. The NGM followed 
Peary's progress almost as closely as the AGS .Journal. A small scientific party that took advantage o f the 
Diana's trip. Stein intended to explore Ellesmere Land and wanted to stay at least one year. Professor 
William Libbey of Princeton University took along deep-sea dredging tools to investigate Smith Sound. 
Russell Porter, a practiced Arctic traveller and friend o f Peary's, wanted to hunt in Greenland.
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Peary in which he briefly mentioned his winter at Fort Conger, the amputation of his toes, 
which he described as a “mishap,” and his intention to leave the Windward again for Fort 
Conger shortly/'^
Bridgman provided the Journal with a Peary-drawn map and pointed out the 
increased information gathered by Peary in his explorations around Fort Conger. Also, 
and perhaps most significantly, Bridgman reported that the Fram was frozen in fifty 
miles south of Pear}', Sverdrup’s surgeon had died over the winter, and that Sverdrup 
planned the next year to explore the northern and eastern coasts of Greenland. Peary 
alone would aim for the pole.^‘’
Bridgman worked diligently on Peary's behalf during his entire absence.**” The 
AGS served as a willing outlet for the bits of good news that filtered in. Time and again 
Bridgman sent scraps of good news that turned into positive press. For example, the 
Journal created a news brief out o f information provided by Bridgman that Peary had 
found and sent home relics from the 1876 George Nares expedition in Alert and the 
Discovery. It certainly was not the exciting announcement Bridgman hoped to deliver, 
but it kept Peary's name and expedition relevant. According to the Journal. “Both 
sextant and record were tendered to the Lords of the Admiralty by the Peary Arctic Club, 
in accordance with the suggestions o f Mr. Peary, who transmitted them last summer, and
™ .Journal o f  the .-imerican Geographical Society 31(1899): 380.
Journal of'the American Geographical. 31 (1899), 381.
Bridgman to Peary, July 11. 1902. Folder "Herbert L. Bridgman," Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902, 
PFC. Bridgman assured Peary that the public, the Club, and the presses were still behind Peary, despite 
Peary's failure to reach the pole. He explained his method for keeping the AP updated about Peary's 
progress: "My feeling all along has been that the custom of 1899 and 1901, to give the Associated Press, 
immediately upon landing, a full general, connected resume o f the work, such as you will o f course 
recollect, is better than to negotiate with individual papers....Eleven hundred slips are now in as many 
newspaper offices awaiting release by wire immediately upon the departure of the Windward, and I think to 
this policy is perhaps due the general hospitality and respect which the newspapers accord to you and to the 
Club. " Peary received this letter upon his last return to the W i n d w a r d , before his departure for home.
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the response was prompt and appreciative/’*’
After Peary returned to the United States in September 1902, he attended to his 
usual at-home duties. He needed time physically to recover, but he also had a follow-up 
lecture circuit to organize, mounds o f correspondence, and another trip to create.*'
Despite the hardships and openly missed opportunities of the past four years, he intended 
once more to try for the North Pole.
The adjustment was a strange one for all involved. The Bartletts returned to 
Newfoundland, though Peary had already asked Bob to captain his next trip. While Peary 
waded through countless lecture offers and Bridgman scrambled to hold the PAC 
together, Henson finally tried to capitalize on his connections. Henson and Peary, despite 
their total reliance upon each other in the Arctic, still had little in common upon returning 
to the United States. One month after their return to the states. Henson asked Peary to 
write a letter of recommendation for him so that he might be hired by the New York 
Central Railroad as a porter.*^ He successfully landed a buffet car porter position on the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. He did not like the work, however, and said that he planned to 
move to the Pittsburgh line. Still, he asked Peary to keep him in mind for other jobs, and 
said that "1 should be veiy grateful to you if you would let me know of something better 
should you chance to hear anything. I think that you might be able to get a more suitable 
position for me as you know a great many people that have employees."*"* He wrote
Journal o f  the American Geographical Sociel}- 32 ( 1900); 181-182. Harmsvvorth. who had given the 
Windward 10 Peary, oversaw the actual transfer of the artifacts. He was an honorary member o f the PAC. 
*■ Peary also kept up his usual habit of sending Arctic animals to various locales. In the name o f the PAC. 
he sent the New York Zoological Park a walrus, a muskox, and four Eskimo dogs.
Henson to Peary. October 2. 1902. Folder "M. Henson." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC.; 
H.H. Batteron to Peary, December 8. 1902. Folder "P." Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC. Peary 
wrote the letter for him. He received a letter from H. H. Batteron o f the The Pullman Company promising 
to place Henson as soon as possible.
Henson to Pearv. November 8. 1902, Folder "M. Henson." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC.
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again shortly thereafter and said that he had received lecture offers from Atlanta and he 
wanted to oblige. He asked Peary to write some lectures “about your travels to the North 
Pole” for him to deliver. He had also written to Bridgman about this chance, and 
Bridgman promised to send him a thirty-dollar roundtrip ticket to Atlanta.’^"' Audiences 
still wanted to hear about Arctic conditions and adventures, even without descriptions of 
the North Pole.
Future trips, however, remained a hard sell. Bridgman forwarded letters to Peary 
from men who would no longer donate money. Frederick Hyde, a devoted benefactor in 
for four thousand dollars, withdrew his name from the PAC. He explained that “1 was 
willing to make a four years’ contract, as the amount to be contributed and the time were 
definite; but experience shows that in Arctic work both these points are uncertain."**  ^
Other enthusiasts followed suit. “If  I were to consult simply my personal preference, I 
would say certainly, go ahead. 1 do not feel, however, that 1 should further financially 
assist the Club in pushing its work,” wrote Clarence. F. Wyckoff o f the Decauville 
Automobile C o m p a n y . O f  course, Wyckoff had recently been with Peary in the Arctic, 
and the experience killed his enthusiasm for polar work.
H.H. Benedict demanded to know exactly how his money was supposed to help in 
the future. He reminded Bridgman that all original members had been asked to donate no 
more than five thousand dollars, which had by that point all been paid and spent.
Benedict stated his case:
Henson to Peary. December 4. 1902, Folder "M. Henson," Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902, PFC. It 
is difficult to know if Henson ever delivered the lectures. He never mentioned them in his autobiography, 
nor did Peary refer to them in the foreword he wrote to Henson's book.
Frederick Hyde to Bridgman, November 24, 1902, Folder "Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman," Box 19, Letters 
Received 1900-1902, PFC.
Frederick Hyde to Bridgman, November 26. 1902, Folder "Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman," Box 19, Letters 
Received 1900-1902, PFC. He was on the relief expedition o f 1901 to reach Peary.
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I am not now saying that I want to decline to join with the others, but before 
consenting to do so, I should like information upon certain points as, for instance, 
how long Commander Peary thinks he would require to accomplish the final 
result; that is, how many seasons? Second, how much is it going to cost in the 
aggregate, and are we going to get additional members and thus reduce the 
proportion of each member, or would we go on with the Club as it is; also, would 
all the present members continue? These, and possibly other questions I might 
wish to ask before deciding what I would do.***
Benedict’s words summarized the views o f several other men who also either hesitated to
recommit or resigned from the PAC.***’
Bridgman held the group together with promises, assurances, and repetitive
descriptions of fame and glory, but he hid the worst news from Peary. He told Peary
about the several resignations, but he also assured the explorer that Jesup would keep
them afloat financially.*’" Jesup, meanwhile, questioned his ability to continue with the
mission. He told Peary that "if this matter involved work and a great expenditure of
money on my part. 1 could not do it. At the same time. 1 want to place myself in a
hopeful position with my associates, for if 1 do not. I can see very clearly that the whole
undertaking may fail."*” Bridgman wanted to increase PAC membership to fifty, with
annual dues o f one thousand dollars."'
Two eager publishers continued to push for a commitment from Peary. Haskell
Frederick Hyde to Bridgman. November 25, 1902. Folder "Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman." Box 19. Letters 
Received 1900-1902. PFC.
“ ' H.H. Benedict to Bridgman. November 25. 1902, Folder “Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman." Box 19. Letters 
Received 1900-1902, PFC. Things looked so grim that in a letter to Peary about several unrelated points of 
interest, Bridgman included the following insight: "I am going to propose to Mr. Jesup and to Mr. Cannon, 
if the Peary Arctic Club lives, that it be incorporated and put on all fours, as a regular business proposition, 
which would. 1 think, very much facilitate its work."
"" Bridgman to Peary, April 16. 1902, Folder “Mr. Herbert L. Bridgman," Box 19. Letters Received 1900- 
1902, PFC. Bridgman also told Peary that he was working to keep Jesup's expenses as minimal as possible.
Morris K. Jesup to Peary. December 26. 1902. Folder "J." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902, PFC. 
“This matter" to which Jesup referred was the possible purchase o f a ship for Peary's next trip. Jesup 
resented the thought that other PAC members believed that if the expense were too much they inevitably 
thought “ let Mr. Jesup do this: it always has been so." Jesup told Peary that he had told Bridgman of his 
concerns.
Bridgman to Jesup. December 1. 1902. Folder “J." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC.
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wrote several times between 1898 and 1902, each time stating that the next polar 
expedition would succeed and that his house would love to own the story. Even after 
Peary returned disappointed in 1902, Haskell assumed that Peary would try again: “1 
hope you will not give up the search, for 1 believe that you can reach that point and when 
you do, we want to publish the book that you will then write."^" McClure’s magazine 
contacted Peary as soon as possible and negotiated a deal: five hundred dollars for an 
article about the trip, his American record, the tip o f Greenland, and his plans for the next 
attempt.’"*
Peary returned to a different financial environment, which must have buoyed him 
in his efforts to keep the PAC together and to plan another polar trip. Moore wrote to 
him enthusiastically, in awe of the changes for businessmen since 1898. He marvelled 
that
The commercial developments o f this country since you left it have been most 
phenominal [sic]. Fortunes of such gigantic amounts as hardly were dreamed of 
in past years have come to men who little dreamed of them, but have come 
legitimately; and when 1 tell you that John D. Rockefeller to-day is worth more 
than a thousand millions of dollars, and is credited with being the richest man in 
the world...when I tell you that the railroads have been combined to such an 
extent that you would hardly know the map of the railroads of this country; that 
the great shipbuilding plants...have all consolidated...you can gather an idea of 
some of the great industries through consolidation of kindred interests.’^
Jesup’s hesitancy aside, times were better for Peary and the PAC. They needed the good
tidings; Peary's future plans would triple the expense of the last one.
Peary accepted lecture engagements immediately. One of his first, of course, was
before the NGS. His services were rarely free, however, even for those who had been
Charles C. Haskell to Peary, October 22. 1902. Folder "Charles C. Haskell." Box 19. Letters Received 
1900-1902. PFC.
McClure's to Pear). November 18. 1902. Folder "M." Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC. The 
magazine also boldly asked Peary not to make deals with other magazines until after March, so that
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with him for over a decade. The NGS paid him one hundred dollars for the honor. 
Undoubtedly, his audience was well-informed. Bridgman had strategically sent news 
items to both the AGS and the NGS when he could, and both dutifully gave top billing to 
Peary in their respective publications’ periodic snippets of polar miscellania.^^
Bridgman and Peary were surprised by one of their heartiest congratulatory 
letters. The PAC maintained the illusion of close association with other explorers, 
despite their private correspondences. Nansen wrote to Bridgman thanking him for an 
invitation to share a formal dinner with Peary. Nansen declined, but also had 
overflowing praise for his American peer and asked Bridgman to "please give my 
warmest greetings to Peary. ...1 also congratulate the Club on the return of its prominent 
member with such great achievements. 1 do not know what 1 admire most with Peary- the 
indefatigable energy with which he works for his goal, year after year, and in the teeth of 
the most formidable odds, or the never-failing readiness with which he overcomes the 
greatest and most unexpected of difficulties.” Nansen then listed the several 
geographical accomplishments o f Peary's latest trip, and expressed appreciation for the 
further cartographic knowledge of Greenland.^*^ The PAC. having failed to reach the 
pole, had Peary's sighting of the edge of Greenland as a consolation prize. Publicly they 
echoed Nansen's sentiments about the achievements o f the past four years. Privately, the 
only goal mentioned was the pole. The benefits to mapmakers were incidental.
McClure's might have an exclusive.
Charles Moore to Peary, July 2. 1902. Folder "M," Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. PFC.
National Geographic to Peary, December 22. 1902. Folder "N," Box 19, Letters Received 1900-1902, 
PFC.
National Geographic Magazine 10 (October 1899): 414-415. Bridgman liberally praised Peaiy for these 
propaganda pieces. After Peary's first terrible winter, Bridgman nonetheless wrote that "Those who read 
between the lines and who follow matters practically, find in Peary the mental as well as the physical traits, 
making a combination as rare as the work he has undertaken, coupled with a clear head, and a practical, 
definite correlation o f  means to ends, which go far to secure the results desired. "
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Thus ended Peary’s first serious polar quest. He failed to reach the North Pole on 
four separate occasions. He suffered serious enough physical injury that he walked with 
a limp for the rest o f his life. His second child, a daughter, had died in infancy in 1899, 
while he was in the Arctic away from his family. His mother died during his third year 
away, and he received the news in a letter delivered by his relief crew in 1901. Many 
ardent fans withdrew their support in frustration over his limited successes. It was no 
longer enough to survive the Arctic or to be a keen observer. A real race to the North 
Pole was at stake. As Peary planned his future, however, he found much o f value. Not 
one of his competitors, all of whom had as much probability o f reaching the pole as he 
did. had yet beaten him. He had definitively proven the insularity of Greenland, a theory 
on which much of his previous fame rested. His innermost circle of benefactors 
remained loyal. The public still craved details of Arctic travel despite repeated failures 
from international efforts.
Most importantly, the North Pole lay unclaimed. Peary and the PAC officers 
drew together and became even more efficient and organized over the next few years. It 
took three years to put Peary back in the field, but when they did it was an astounding 
plan. Peary left for the North Pole again in 1905 aboard his personally designed, 
expensive, hardy ice-breaker, the Roosevelt. No longer did he have to scour the 
shipyards of Europe and the United States for cheap whalers to carry him through Smith 
Sound and Kane Basin. On the Roosevelt, he smashed his way into a new phase of Arctic 
exploration. The next chapter will examine the height o f the PAC's power.
Fridtjof Nansen to Peary. November I, 1902. Folder "N. ' Box 19. Letters Received 1900-1902. RFC.
189
Chapter Five
“I Would Sometimes Sell my Soul:” The Need for a Ship, 1902-1905
Robert E. Peary returned to the United States in late 1902, but it took him two 
and one-half years to rally for another polar attempt. When he finally returned to the 
Arctic in 1905, he did so at the helm of a magnificent ship built to his own 
specifications. The Roosevelt was the finest ice-breaker ever constructed and it took 
Pear)' further north than any ship had previously sailed. The PAC accepted 
increasing responsibility for management of Peary's fund-raising, equipment needs, 
and media exposure. The geographical organizations that had been so important to 
him. particularly the National Geographic Society (NGS) and the American 
Geographical Society (AGS), followed his progress and reported his achievements. 
Each group, however, decreased its investment in Arctic exploration in efforts to 
become champions o f all geographic accomplishment. American or foreign. Peary 
was still America's most heroic Arctic explorer, but neither the NGS nor the AGS 
could maintain the level o f attention that he needed.
The failures o f the past four years had crushed Peary's confidence, but he kept 
his insecurities private. Historian Wally Herbert believes that this expedition nearly 
broke Peary. The explorer worried that he had been too selfish in pursuit of his goal 
and had hurt his wife, his mother, and his children, all to no avail. Peary wondered if 
he were too old and that he should give up the dream. Herbert argues that the 
extreme devotion between Peary and Josephine helped Peary recover from these 
failures, and that he simply would not quit. ' He was efficient, even brusque, in
' Wally Herbert. The Noose o f  Laurels: The Discoveir of the North Pole (New York: Grafton Books. 
1989). 129. 142-143. 148.
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business dealings. Little o f his personality seeped into his professional 
correspondences about Arctic work. Within a few months of his return to the US, he 
had a plan for his next attempt to reach the pole.
Peary believed that the remaining hurdle for the North Pole trek was in 
selecting the proper overland starting spot, and he still favored the Smith Sound route. 
But finding a good ship was his paramount concern. The Windward was a gift from 
an influential English newspaper magnate, so Peaiy could not afford to vocalize all of 
the ship's faults." The AGS Journal accounts of his unsuccessful 1898-1902 
expeditions mentioned merely that the Windward was frozen in. Only attentive fans 
of Peary realized that the ship's inability to chug past Kane Basin the first winter 
seriously affected the next several years. He was almost three hundred miles ftirther 
south than he planned. Peary endured more winter overland travel than necessary in 
1898-99. and lost most o f his toes to frostbite. He never recovered momentum, and 
his next three polar attempts also failed. The window o f opportunity for overland 
Arctic travel was so small that any extra time might mean success. When Peary left 
the US on the Windward during the summer of 1898. he planned to send the ship 
stateside and expect its return the following summer for re-supply. The ship's poor 
condition and inability to make the roundtrip meant that the PAC had to rent a second
■ E.D. "Departure of the '^ 'm éw d L xà 'Jounui! o f  the American Geographical Society' 30 (1898): 262- 
263. The ship was a gift to Peary from Alfred G. Harmsworth. The journal informed its readers that 
the Windwani"\n her famous trips to and from Franz Joseph Land in connection with the Jackson- 
Harmsworth Expedition... established her reputation for solidity." [Untitled article] Journal o f  the 
American Geographical Society 32 ( 1900): 272. The Windward broke free o f  ice each spring, but was 
in poor condition and could not return stateside for resupply . Samuel Bartlett, the ship's captain, took it 
to Newfoundland for substantial repair. Workers overhauled the engine, installed new propellors. a 
new shaft, and strengthened its hull. The ship gained 1.5 knots in speed, making its speed the 
equivalent o f the Kite, Peary's first Arctic ship. Also. President William McKinley signed the 
necessary paperwork to shift the ship's nationality from English to American origin. The Windward 
became the first American steamer to sail into the Arctic since Hall's 1871 expedition. By 1900. Peary 
had his land bases established, and needed the ship only for eventual transportation home.
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ship in 1899. The unexpected expense explained the PAC’s offers for paid passage 
during the relief trip o f 1901.
As Peary pressed for another chance at the pole, he emphasized his desire for 
a sturdy ice-breaking ship. This had been a problem for him even before the 1898- 
1902 trip. Josephine’s resolution of the same situation in 1894 became his 
introduction to Morris K. Jesup. when Jesup responded to her personal request for 
ship rental funds. The United States' dominance of the North Atlantic whaling 
industry ended as Peary first attempted the pole. As a result, he had difficulty finding 
a ship strong enough to carry him through the Arctic ice. The outdated sailers that he 
converted to steam for exploration were too small and too weak. After 1902, 
however, Peary insisted that this problem was his last obstacle and that if he had a 
ship designed to handle the Arctic elements, he could claim the pole.
Peary was still the only American with the combination o f both a plan and a 
record of accomplishment. He used a route that he believed in, he had Inuit support, 
and he organized his trips well. His physical trauma aside, he and his crews avoided 
the sorts o f grisly Arctic disasters that befell most of his predecessors. He also had a 
new Farthest North record, and he had proven that Greenland was an island. Peary 
had a sterling leadership record. His closest friends, Jesup and Herbert Bridgman, 
stuck with him. Many of his other allies, however, despaired of ever seeing an 
American at the pole. As a result, the explorer spent more time recruiting help. The 
delays associated with begging for money frustrated and outraged America's premier 
explorer. It shocked Peary that numerous wealthy individuals and groups hesitated to 
fund him. All Arctic fans knew that by 1902 it had become an international race to
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reach the North Pole.
In a frank letter to Henry Hyde, president o f  Bowdoin College, Peary 
explained the situation: ‘'Arctic exploration today has a business phase as pronounced 
as its scientific or sentimental phases, and it may be utilized as a business 
proposition.”  ^ As usual, Peary extended beyond explanation into an invitation to fund 
polar work. Peary told Hyde that ‘Hardly a day passes that 1 do not get an editorial 
from some paper saying that this countiy should secure the Pole, and that the 
comparatively small amount o f money (as money goes now-a-days) required, should 
be forthcoming. Suppose that Bowdoin and her friends raised $ 150,000 to purchase a 
ship and fit out the Bowdoin North Polar Expedition." The moment the fact was 
known the name of Bowdoin would be in every paper in the civilzed world.”"* Peary 
emphasized the everlasting fame that Bowdoin might reap if the school donated the 
money.
Peary also stated that the significance of a single institution backing him 
would be remarkable if he reached the North Pole, and almost as rewarding (for 
Bowdoin) if he missed 90 N but instead reached a Farthest North. Before 1903.
Peary almost never mentioned secondary achievements; he emphasized the pole. Yet 
he began suggesting that potential backers could be proud of any significant Arctic 
trophy. Most of his letters to friends sounded more optimistic than any previous spate 
of correspondence, but they suggest he had lost confidence in his ability to win the 
race.
Peary 's past dealings with businessmen had taught him that fame alone could
’ Robert Peary to Henry Hyde. March 25. 1903. Folder "H." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. RFC.
 ^Peaiy to Hyde. March 25. 1903. Folder "H," Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. RFC.
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not attract money. Many benefactors wanted immediate returns on their investments. 
But should Bowdoin give him all-out financing, “ ...as a legitimate and high-grade 
advertisement on a grand scale and world-wide distribution...such an expedition 
might return to Bowdoin and Portland, and the State, nearly, if not quite, dollar for 
dollar of initial expenditure.”*' Peary had no evidence to back up his claim. His 
success with the media, however, had shown him that thoughtful pieces could make 
Bowdoin internationally famous. Despite all of these claims, the explorer played the 
martyr. Nevertheless, exasperated with the need to keep explaining the value o f his 
quest. Peary informed Hyde that “1 have had however too many disappointments to 
be over-sanguine, and...I expect to sow many times on rocky ground; but the 
proposition is now before you.”*
Throughout the fall o f 1902. Peary wrote the usual letters probing for money. 
He was in a rush because he planned to strike again for the pole in 1903. After a few 
months of negative replies. Peary understood that he had another major fund-raising 
campaign before him. He used his one seat of persuasion, the presidency of the 
American Geographical Society (AGS), to personal advantage. Gradually, he moved 
the interests of the Peary Arctic Club (PAC) and the AGS closer together. He wanted 
the scientific reputation of the AGS to be tightly affiliated with the PAC. his major 
source of money. In the end. the PAC's influences, more than anything else, secured 
him another polar attempt.
Peary wrote to Jesup in 1903 and informed his old friend that he wanted to 
sell the three meteorites to the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) for
’ Peary to Hyde, March 25. 1903. Folder "H.’' Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. RFC.
" Peaiy to Hyde. March 25, 1903. Folder "H." Box 7, Letters Sent 1901-1903, RFC.
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$50,000 (total). The AMNH responded that Peary’s asking price was too high.^ Peary 
dumped his concerns onto Jesup: *‘I have done and am still doing all that I can, but it 
is impossible for me to do everything...! have never cared especially for money, but 
now I think I would sometimes sell my soul for the means to do that on which I have 
set my heart, and which I still believe I am capable of doing.”* In another letter to 
Jesup, Peary wrote:. “It would seem (to me at least) a comparatively easy thing for 
the [New York] Yacht Club and the Geographical Society in combination with those 
o f my old friends who would like to see the work brought to successful completion, to 
raise sufficient money to fit out an expedition properly. The probabilities are 
however that anything of this kind, if done at all, will be done too late. The Duke of 
the Abuzzis [sic] has in spite of his success via Franz Josef Land come out frankly in 
favor of the Smith Sound route as the most practicable way to the Pole. It is said that 
he will lead another expedition by that route."^ Peary had too little money for an 
immediate return to the Arctic, and another competitor planned to use the route Peary 
had proven to be superior. It looked as though the United States might forego its last 
chance to be a serious polar contender.
Peary did all he could to raise money by himself. Lecture engagements kept 
him extraordinarily busy. He had so many offers that he occasionally turned them 
over to Bridgman. The explorer always spoke highly of Bridgman and tried 
repeatedly to maneuver the man into his other circles of influence. One group in
’ Lyle Rexer and Rachel Klein. American Museum o f  Natural History: 125 Years o f  Expédition and 
Discover)' (New York: Henry N. Abrams. Inc., 1995). 8 1. Ironically, Josephine Peary sold the three 
meteorites to the AMNH for only $40.000 in 1909. She used them to pay for their children's education.
* Morris K. Jesup to Peary, (1903?], Folder "J." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903, PFC.
" Morris K. Jesup to Peary, April 5, 1903. Folder "J.” Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903, PFC; Beau 
Riffenburgh. The Myth o f  the Explorer: The Press. Sensationalism, and Geographical Discover)' 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994). 160. Italian explorer Luigi Amedeo di Savoia, the Duke of
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Philadelphia offered Peary one hundred dollars for his stories. Peary explained to 
Bridgman that “I have declined with thanks and have referred...to you, giving you a 
proper send-off.” '*^ A few days later, Peary again wrote to Bridgman and related that 
"i may be able to turn over some more lecture work to you, as the requests are 
beginning to come in and it will be entirely impracticable for me to attend to most of 
them.’’"
No longer could Peary devote himself to the cultivation of benefactors, as he 
had done with the scientists and geographers during the 1890’s. Peary never enjoyed 
fund-raising, and he had difficulty starting it again after others handled it while he 
was in the Arctic. He admitted to Jesup that “I cannot solicit interest in my subject 
now as 1 would and could have done five years ago. Wherever the opportunity occurs 
whether in public or in private, as at the Yacht Club, and the Balt. [Baltimore] Geog. 
[Geographical] Society I shall present the matter with such clearness and force as I 
may command. 1 expect to sow many times on rocky ground, but the hundredth time, 
God willing, I shall find fruitful soil.’''" As he had ten years earlier, Peary began to 
cast himself as a lone explorer searching for a few hardy souls willing to exchange 
money for everlasting fame and glory. His personal resolve wavered while he waited 
to see if a plan would develop, but this tactic failed. In the end, his solid reputation 
and the decision to construct a special ship attracted the money.
For the next year, Peary maintained steady contact with only Jesup and 
Bridgman of the original PAC members. He complained to them about his financial
Abruzzi. failed to reach the pole in 1900. But he reached a new Farthest North at 86 34'.
Peary to Herbert L. Bridgman. October I. 1903. Folder "B. Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC. 
"  Peary to Bridgman. October 6. 1903. Folder "B." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
'■ Peary to Jesup. [1903?]. Folder ' J." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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problems, explained in detail his plans for the next trip, and asked them to join him in 
various campaigns for both his Arctic work and the AGS. Finally in late 1903, he 
resumed communication with Henry W. Cannon, another longtime fan and former 
FAC treasurer. He assured Cannon that he had money at his disposal and that 
prospects for the proper outfitting of a ship looked good. Peary asked Cannon if he 
would be willing to pledge the same amount as he had before. He nudged further, 
commenting that “Mr. Jesup still stands ready, as he did last winter, to contribute 
$10,000."''^ The PAC lost Cannon, however. The search for adventurous, wealthy 
men continued.
Peary actually had two personal objectives in mind upon his return to the 
United States in 1902. First, he wanted to buy a ship to carry him north again. 
Second, he worked to increase the prestige o f the AGS. He believed that his personal 
polar quest would benefit from affiliation with the elite geographical society. Both 
the AGS and the NGS had supported Peary over the years, but his ties to the AGS 
were stronger, and his election to the presidency in 1903 solidified this fact. Peary's 
history with numerous scientist members of the AGS bound him to that group. The 
NGS. which had a more inclusive membership, no longer depended upon Peary's 
fame as much as it had in previous years. The National Geographic Magazine 
published photographs, enjoyed a huge circulation, and reveled in tales o f geographic 
adventure and natural history, amateur and professional.''* The NGS continued to
' ’ Peary to Henry Cannon. December 19. 1903. Folder "C.” Box 7, Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
'■* Philip J. Pauly. "The World and All that is in It: The National Geographic Society, 1888-1918,” 
American Quarterly. 31 (Autumn 1979): 517, 521, 524. By 1918 the National Geographic Magazine 
had a circulation o f 500,000. From the beginning, the Magazine was better illustrated and more 
popular with professional geographers than the AGS Bulletin. Gilbert Grosvenor, editor of the 
Magazine after 1899, also worked to make its articles interesting and accessible to the public. The 
Bulletin made no such effort.
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celebrate him and honor his achievements, but he was one of several successful 
American explorers of interest to the NGS.'^ Also, the NGS experimented with other 
ways to showcase geography. The AGS continued to focus specifically on the 
science and methodology of geography. Peary was a superstar o f the smaller, less 
successful AGS.
Peary bragged about increasing the publication rate o f the AGS Bulletin. 
During his presidency, the organization’s magazine began to appear monthly, rather 
than five times per year. He wanted to make the AGS "the same to this Hemisphere 
as the Royal Geographical Society is to the E a s t e r n . " H e  named the most 
prestigious geographical society in the world as the nearest competition o f the AGS, 
significantly overlooking the NGS. Peary maintained affiliation with the NGS and 
gave numerous lectures before its members, but he dreamed o f leading the AGS into 
a position of international prominence without catering to the public.
The NGS funded Arctic expeditions by William Ziegler ( 1903-1905) and Walter Wellman (1898-99, 
1906, 1907. 1909—the last three by dirigible).; "Mr. Ziegler and the National Geographic Society.” 
National Geographic Magazine 14 (August 1903): 250-252. The NGS also funded a scientific team for 
Arctic fan William Ziegler. In 1903, Ziegler organized a scientific voyage to discover the North Pole, 
to be led by Anthony Fiala. The trip looked like the cumbersome expeditions Peary happily gave up 
after the 1890's. The NGS chose William J. Peters o f the US Geological Survey as its scientific 
representative on the trip. The society also organized a Research Committee and created a list of 
experiments for Peters, including pendulum studies o f gravity during the winter. The Research 
Committee had trouble holding meetings, however, due to the members' scheduling conflicts, so the 
committee's chairman, G.K. Gilbert, corresponded with friends at the Weather Bureau, the Coast 
Survey, and with General Greely, and decided from these suggestions what Peters should study. The 
America got stuck in ice for two winters, significantly short o f even a Farthest North record, and 
despite a few scientific observations, achieved almost nothing.
' 'C.D.B. Bryan, The National Geographic Society: iOO Years o f Adventure and Discover}' (New York: 
Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers, 1997), 119-120. In 1906, for example, NGS A/ugur/we editors 
realized the potential o f funding international photographic work and paid for Ion Perdicaris' photos 
and adventure narrative o f travels in Morocco (1906). Increasingly, the magazine devoted space to 
photos and stories o f mundane trips to exotic locales. No longer was the sole focus on identifying and 
defeating the extreme boundaries o f geographical science.
”  Peary to James W. Davidson, February 17, 1904, Folder "D, " Box 8, Letters Sent 1904, PFC; Peary 
to Frank Presbrey, March 28, 1904, Folder "P,” Box 8, Letters Sent 1904, PFC. The Bulletin had over 
three thousand subscribers.
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He also paid close attention to the relative prestige of the various geographical 
clubs. He disliked the Arctic Club because he believed that its membership standards 
were not rigorous enough. Frederick Cook had founded the Arctic Club after his 
disastrous Miranda expedition of 1894. The constitution of the club listed its purpose 
as “To promote Arctic and Antarctic exploration, and good fellowship among its 
members.” '* Peary once wrote to a colleague and dismissed the Arctic Club, 
explaining that “There are good men in the club.. .but the requirements for 
membership were so lax. amounting practically to the ability to pay the two dollars 
for the annual dinner, that a year ago Mrs. Peary and myself requested that our names 
be hereafter omitted from the list o f honorary members.” '^ Peary saw himself as an 
elite geographer and refused to have his name associated with what he viewed as an 
insignificant organization.
By December 1903, Peary found the ideal way to put the AGS under an 
international spotlight. The Eighth International Geographic Congress (IGC) was 
going to be held in the United States in September, 1904. The members of the 
previous IGC, meeting in Berlin four years earlier, had chosen America as the next 
host. The NGS snatched top billing, but one year before the event nobody had yet 
determined the exact site or additional sponsors for the event. No single institution 
could handle the cost alone. Peary wanted the AGS to be a major player in this 
prestigious meeting. O f course, he was an Arctic explorer first, and still planned to
“Constitution and By-Laws of the Arctic Club," January. 1906. Membership cost $2.00 per year. 
Cook was the surgeon on Peary's 1891-92 trip as well as the relief expedition o f 1901. He and Peary 
were not enemies until after their nearly simultaneous announcements o f independent claims o f the 
North Pole in 1909. Pearl's dismissal o f the Arctic Club was not based on personal emnity. Cook tried 
to reach the North Pole in 1894. but required rescue.
' ’ Peary to William Davis. February 16. 1904. Folder "D." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC..
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make a 1904 polar attempt. By early spring o f 1904, with no ship at his disposal, the 
IGC had his full attention.
Once he hatched his plan for the AGS, Peaiy asked his media friends to help. 
In one letter to the New York Mail and Express, he explained: "‘If the American 
Geographical Society of New York City should decide to take a leading part to make 
the Congress a credit to the country and to New York city; will the ‘Mail and 
Express’ join with the other great metropolitan dailies in exerting its influence to 
arouse an interest that will secure a large paying membership in the Congress in New 
York City and vicinity?”"" Peary saw two benefits to such a deal: the first IGC to be 
held in the US would reflect well on the nation and the AGS would not have too 
many costs to bear.
Peary wrote a similar letter to a reporter with the New York Herald. He 
wanted the newspapers to keep the matter "before the public in the proper light to 
arouse public interest, and thus increase the paying membership in the Congress.”"'
In keeping with tradition. Peary flattered the reporter by sending him a copy of his 
daughter's book. Peary was proud of his newspaper connections. He knew that his 
ties trumped those of the AGS. In a letter to Chandler Robbins, secretary of the AGS, 
he stated plainly that "1 have sounded the managers of the principal metropolitan 
dailies (nearly all o f whom I know personally) and they are willing to exert the 
powerful influence o f their papers towards this end.”""
■" Peary to New York Mail and Express. December 7. 1903. Folder ”N.” Box 7. Letters Sent 1901- 
1903. PFC.
■' Peary to Rieck (?). December 10. 1903. Folder "R." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903, PFC. 
Membership cost S5 per person.
■’ Peaiy to Chandler Robbins. December 11. 1903. Folder"R." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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The Arctic remained Peary’s primary objective, despite his excellent media 
work on behalf of the AGS. In a letter to a reporter with the St. Louis Post and 
Dispatch, Peary replied to the man’s query o f what the world might profit from the 
next quarter century of Arctic exploration. Peary had addressed this question in its 
various forms for years. In twenty-five years, wrote Peary, there would be no “’terra 
incognita’ or "mare incognita’ about the North Pole.” Also. “Undoubtedly the South 
Pole will have likewise been attained before then. Events follow with ever increasing 
rapidity, and the South Pole in the light of our present knowledge is a simpler 
problem than the North Pole. In both these directions lie the privilege and the duty of 
this great country. Let us attain the North Pole first. It is our natural northern 
boundry [sic]. Let us first capture the prize and win the race, which the nations of the 
civilized world have been struggling for for nearly four centuries. The prize...is the 
last great geographical prize the earth has to-offer....
He repeated these phrases dozens of times in letters to friends, newspapermen, 
wealthy businessmen, college presidents, museum personnel, and anyone else to 
whom he turned for help. He knew well that the drive for the pole had a long and 
tragic history rooted in the search for the Northwest Passage. Despite the dreariness 
of scraping for money, Peary still found historical value in his quest. He used these 
turns o f phrase to capture the idealism and passion of polar exploration, but he also
- ' Peary to Sr. Louis Post and Dispatch, October 10. 1903. Folder "S.” Box 7, Letters Sent 1901-1903. 
PFC. Peary corresponded with several people in St. Louis throughout 1903 and 1904. The city hosted a 
World's Fair in 1904 and occasionally the event organizers asked for his opinions or help. Peary's 
reference to the North Pole as "our natural northern boundry " was his post-1902 means of referring to 
the geographical significance of his quest. Questions regarding the open polar sea and the northern 
boundary of Greenland were settled. Peary feared that excitement over recent attempts to reach the 
South Pole might detract from the North Pole. The North Pole was physically closer to Americans and 
the region's geography was familiar to them. The South Pole, however, was remote and o f little 
"personal " significance to Americans.
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removed himself from the picture. This habit set him apart from other veteran Arctic 
explorers. Unlike Kane, Hall, or Cook, Peary rarely dwelt on the power and beauty 
of the region. Instead, he noticed only that it was an undiscovered point on the 
planet.
The AGS successfully made itself a part of the IGC management. Most o f the 
nation’s leading geographical groups involved themselves at some level. Peary went 
further, and made it clear that he wanted to be considered for a top leadership position 
at the IGC. His ego almost killed this plan, however. Long before the IGC expected 
to convene, the organizers sought to name the leaders. Professor W J McGee, 
Chairman of the Committee o f Arrangements, asked Peary to serve as president o f the 
US delegation to the congress. There was a glitch, however. McGee wanted General 
Adolphus Greely to be President General, the overall head of the IGC."'* Peary 
refused to serve, explaining that *i regarded my sacrifices in the field o f Geographical 
research equal to and my experience and achievements more extensive than those of 
Gen I Greely. In a purely Geographical assembly 1 do not care to have the stamp of 
inferiority put upon my work by being placed in a position subordinate to GenT 
Greely. It seems rather a pity that Greely should be selected for the distinction of 
being marked as the leading Geographer of this country.’’"^  To drive his point home, 
Peary overstepped the bounds o f courtesy and related the following tidbit: "As an 
officer of high rank said at a dinner in Washington. "Greely enjoys the unique 
distinction o f being the only officer in the entire history o f Arctic Exploration who ate
Greely led the disastrous American scientific expedition of 1881-1884. Based at Fort Conger, the 
men awaited supply ships each spring, not realizing that southerly ice prevented help. Many o f  the 
men starved to death, and others resorted to cannibalism to survive.
Peary to Parish. July 23. 1903. Folder "P." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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his companions and came back to tell about it.’” *^’
Peary had another reason for wanting Greely removed from consideration, 
aside from his private dislike for the man. He preferred to surround himself with 
familiar supporters, and he told McGee that Bridgman should be a part of the IGC. 
Peary reported that Bridgman was '‘the kind of a man to be interested in the subject of 
the Congress and the kind of man whom the Committee [Committee of 
.Arrangements] ought to know.”^^  Peary knew how to combine money with need. He 
saw no harm in pairing the AGS with a generous philanthropist willing to consider 
new interests. The move was also another way that he kept Bridgman close to him 
while he waited for his next opportunity to return to the Arctic.
The IGC resolved the in-fighting by March, 1904. Electors chose Peary as 
president, and he informed Cyrus Adams of the AGS: “The Presidency of the 
Congress is very gratifying to me. and to have severed my connection with the 
American Society would have been a source o f sincere regret to me.'"'* Immediately 
after the election he offered his resignation to the AGS after hearing rumors that some 
AGS members thought that the dual position might compromise him. The AGS 
officers refused his resignation and he viewed his election as a significant coup for 
the AGS. He also recognized the chance to merge his Arctic dreams with the future 
of the AGS. He hoped that the IGC presidency might provide an easy public platform 
for his polar work. He told Jesup that “It is perhaps a plausible assumption, that 
should I be elected to the position, it would not only be a deserved compliment to the
Pear}' to Parish. July 23. 1903. Folder "P." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
Peary to Bridgman. October 20. 1903. Folder "B.” Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
:x Pear} to Cyrus Adams. March 20. 1904. Folder "A." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
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American Geographical Society, but would have a favorable effect upon Arctic 
matters in which we are interested.”^^
Peary worried incessantly about the public image of the PAC. He reminded 
the press that even though the old PAC no longer existed, some of its former 
members continued to pledge support. Peary had hyped the fact that he had federal 
support for this trip (due to a speedy approval of another leave of absence), which led 
to erroneous reports that he had the necessary finances. It infuriated Peary if anyone 
suggested that he had money from the national government, and he stood by his 
private donors. He told Bridgman that “1 will do what lies in my power to raise the 
funds for the expedition, but both you and Mr. Jesup and the others of my friends may 
as well understand now that I shall not beg or urge them any further in the matter. If 
they feel, of their own will, to continue, I shall be only too gratified and pleased. If 
they do not, well and good. Somewhere in this great and rich country I am satisfied 
the money is waiting ready to do this work. If it is not so waiting. - if we are too poor 
as a nation to undertake this thing, also well and good. Let some one else win the 
prize... 1 am done urging my friends in the matter.""*”
Peary lied. He asked everyone he knew for money. In a remarkably open 
letter to James Hall, a favored reporter at the New York Trihum, he listed his 
frustrations. He seethed with the knowledge that he had more public recognition than 
ever before, but still lacked financing. Peary appealed several times to the Carnegie 
Institution for financial aid. Even though he wanted Carnegie's money, he also 
resented the need to ask. Peary saw more value in his polar work than in the random
■ “ Peary to Jesup. February 17. 1904. Folder "J." Box 8, Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
Peaty to Bridgman. October I. 1903. Folder "B. ' Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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generosity of Carnegie. Peary often explained his search for the pole in these terms: 
“ ...success will mean not only the highest degree of present prestige and reputation, 
but an absolutely undying name, which will be remembered when Mr. Carnegie’s 
libraries and Mr. Rockefeller's Universities have been forgotten.” '^ Therefore, it 
grated upon him that he could not get the attention of the Carnegie Institution. In one 
request for money, Peary went so far as to remind the Carnegie of its purpose and that 
his mission fit the bill. He reminded D. C. Gilman, president of the Carnegie 
Institution, that it was “'An institution which shall in the broadest and most liberal 
manner encourage discovery"' and that President Roosevelt had said o f Peary's work 
that "'No better— and I may add. no more characteristically American—work could 
be done."’^ ' Peary knew that the organization had enough money to help, but told 
Hall that “Dr. Gilman has not a half o f Mr. Jesup’s fire and push....further than this, 
the Committee has already largely obligated the current funds of the Institution in 
numerous directions...so that to take up this matter 1 fancy they would have to break 
into the reserve fund. This will probably mean action by the whole Board of 
Trustees, and this again means delay, delay, d e l a y . D e s p i t e  numerous exchanges 
between the Carnegie Institution and Peary, he never convinced the organization that 
Arctic exploration was a worthwhile matter.
Peary also suffered the consequences o f a competitor's failure. The American 
William Ziegler, president o f Royal Baking Powder, sought Arctic fame in 1900. He 
funded meteorologist Evelyn Baldwin's effort to reach the North Pole in the America 
in 1900. Baldwin failed miserably and Ziegler replaced him in 1903 with Anthony
Peaty to John J. McCook. April 18. 1904. Folder "M.” Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
’■ Peary to D.C. Gilman. February 18. 1904. Folder "G.” Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
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Fiala, the ship’s photographer. The expedition failed despite the change of 
commanders, and the ship had to be rescued from the ice in 1905.^ "* Peary realized 
that the publicity associated with the disastrous Baldwin-Ziegler Polar Expedition 
could only hurt him, and he said as much to Hall. “I have felt for some time that 
many men would hesitate to take the matter up for fear of being considered imitators 
of Mr. Ziegler, and beyond this is the idea given by the Baldwin-Ziegler fiasco, that 
the whole Arctic business is more or less o f a fake, to use a slang expression: it is too 
bad.”^^  For years, Peary had explained the significance of Arctic exploration to his 
many audiences in an effort to keep national attention focused on his quest. So 
delicate was his support base, however, that the poor organization o f another well- 
endowed American polar quest could damage his own carefully planned endeavors.
Despite his original plans. Peary spent all o f 1903 in the United States. He 
scoured for money for another polar trip and also placed the AGS as a major force 
behind the Eighth IGC. It was a disappointing year for the explorer, who wanted 
nothing more than to be "at work now, with my loaded sledge and my faithful dogs 
before me. working across the polar ice pack....”^^  The next year, however, found 
him back in top form with a real chance to return to the Arctic.
The tight affiliation with Jesup and Bridgman paid off. The trio, part of a 
small handful o f men who refused to withdraw their support, had managed to keep 
the PAC together throughout 1903. It was the same organization, though most of its
” Peary to James P. Hall. January 8. 1904. Folder "H." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
John Maxtone-Graham, Safe Return Douhtful: The Heroic .4ge o f  Polar Exploration (New York: 
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”  Peary to Hall. January 8. 1904. Folder "H." Box 8, Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
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members were new. and their singular purpose after 1904 was raising the money 
necessary to construct a ship. Peary had repeatedly recited his reasons for Arctic 
exploration and had even condensed them into what he termed his “Polar Creed.” His 
agenda had three main points: the North Pole should be reached, the Smith Sound or 
“American” route was the only practicable one. and the conquest of the pole would 
buoy American pride and patriotism.^^ He emphasized especially the race’s history 
and the international value placed upon this geographical prize. The Navy 
Commander (no longer a lieutenant) sent stories to the press, accepted lecture offers 
for himself and Bridgman, and wrote innumerable letters explaining his situation and 
the immediate need for more money. In almost every plea, he insisted that he had the 
full support of President Roosevelt, the Navy, the media, various scientists, and the 
American people. After a year o f mostly ambivalent responses, his situation finally 
changed.
Jesup believed so strongly in the PAC and its cause that in early 1904 he 
oversaw its incorporation. It existed as a legitimate business in New York state. The 
move shot new energy into the group and gave it more public legitimacy. Also, this 
formality ended Peary's need to explain that he operated without federal funding. It 
did not end the membership drive, however. Instead, it simply gave Peary another 
point for persuasion. He sent a missive to Colonel A. M. Benson, president of the 
Pine Tree State Club, asking him to join the PAC. He announced the PAC's 
incorporation and asked Benson the following: “Is not the project and my aims such 
as to make it worth while for the Pine Tree State Club to raise a thousand dollars 
toward the work, and for you. as its President to become a member of the Peary
’ Form letter from Peaiy to Un-Named Person. Folder “ 1904" Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC
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Arctic Club? Again let me say that only the bigness o f my project leads me to write 
this way. I feel that it is less a solicitation than the presentation of a great 
opportunity.” *^*
The matter of a ship became the dominant issue. Peary never once doubted 
that if he had better transportation he could manage a victorious trip. He expected it 
to cost no more than $150,000 to buy a suitable vessel and upgrade it to his needs. As 
of early 1903, he had eight remaining PAC members, and he required each of them to 
maintain a substantial commitment. Peary meekly told Jesup that he did not expect 
his most generous benefactor to assume the cost yet again. He fully expected these 
few PAC members to step forward with an announcement o f support for a ship 
purchase. He believed that they would promise him at least $35,000. This was barely 
enough to rent a damaged whaler. He needed much more to purchase a quality 
vessel. In a back-handed attempt to ease Jesup's concerns, Peary wrote that "It is 
entirely right and proper that you should be relieved of all work. The might and 
prestige o f your name is enough. 1 am ready to take off my coat and get to work, the 
moment the first slip is determined.”'’'* Peary intimated that Jesup would not be 
needed for another huge last-minute donation, but also could not bring himself to 
relieve Jesup completely.
Peary sometimes cast himself as a noble servant to a higher cause. In one 
early attempt to explain his new trip, he made his needs clear: "I have told the Club 
that I am willing to throw myself into the work for two more years, and make a 
supreme effort which shall crown all past efforts with success, if 1 can have a suitable
Peary to A.M. Benson. April 11. 1904. Folder "B.” Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
Peaiy to Jesup. [1903?]. Folder "J. ' Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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equipment, and by suitable equipment I mean a first-class ship, as this is practically 
the only expensive item of equipment that I require. I want no large pay roll, and no 
expensive and untried items o f outfit. My Eskimos and my dogs cost practically 
nothing. Given a ship of strength and power sufficient to land me with my party and 
supplies at or near Floeberg Beach...! believe that I am justified in saying that I will 
answer for the rest.’"**” Peary explained that he wanted to buy a big (350-400 tons) 
ship and have it reinforced in New York City. He planned to add weight and strength 
to the ship's frame, insert a strong engine, and crunch through the ice without tear of 
cracking her hull. The small, poorly powered whalers that he had used in the past 
often splintered under such pressure if they managed to make it far enough north to 
encounter heavy ice. Peary's last ship, the Windward, was so weak that the captain 
could not blow the steam whistle upon departure in the traditional sailors’ farewell 
because the ship could not spare the energy.'*'
Pear)' estimated the cost of refitting a ship to be at least $100,000; the PAC of 
1903 could only guarantee $30.000.'*" Peary asserted that the PAC could handle it if 
they could increase membership to fifty men willing to donate $2000 each, or one 
hundred men in for $1000 each. Peary pledged himself to the personal recruitment of 
five new members, and other PAC members accepted an equal burden."*  ^ Never one
Pear)' to Un-identifled person. January 11. 1903. Folder "Unidentified. Box 7. Letters Sent 1901- 
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exploration.
Marie Ahnighito Peaiy. The Red Caboose: With Peary in the Arctic (New York: William Morrow & 
Company. 1932). 34-35.
Peary to Un-identified person. January 11. 1903. Folder "Unidentified. Box 7. Letters Sent 1901- 
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Crandall o f  the Masonic Temple. New York City, to join the PAC. He wanted the Masons to join him
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to see himself as pushy, Peary exhibited little grace in his introductory letters. For 
example, to one potential backer he wrote: “This letter is not one of solicitation, it 
rather offers an opportunity. It is no figure of speech but cold fact to say that if I win 
out in this work, the names o f those who made the work possible will be kept through 
the coming centuries floating forever above the forgotten and submerged debris of 
our time and day. The one thing that we remember o f Ferdinand of Spain is that he 
sent Columbus to his life-work. The one thing we remember o f Grinnell of New 
York, that he sent Kane to his great work.”'*'* It stung Peary that potential donors let 
money obscure the everlasting fame of this Arctic endeavor, and he often resorted to 
bravado.
His focus on the ship became unexpectedly easier when the US Navy granted 
his request for leave. The gesture pleased Peary not only because it was one less 
hassle, but because it meant that he had the full cooperation (if not funding) of the 
national government. As he told Bridgman. "1 am perhaps justified in a certain 
feeling of gratification that I have been able to settle this question o f leave single- 
handed. and what six years ago would have been regarded as an absolute 
impossibility, have secured the unqualified approval o f the Department and of the 
Administration for my project...the expedition will go North backed by the prestige 
and approval o f the National Administration.'"*^
and to agree to represent all out-of-town lodges in the PAC. Peary had received fast funding from his 
“brothers" at Kane Lodge. The Kane Lodge chairman. Samuel Ball, sent out circulars asking all 
"brothers" to contribute to Peary's cause. That success prompted Peary to contact the larger Mason 
organization. He hoped that their internal network would save him time and mailing expenses. The 
New York City Masons declined to join.
^  Peary to Un-ldentified Person. January 11. 1903. Folder "Unidentified. Box 7. Letters Sent 1901- 
1903. PFC.
45 Peary to Bridgman, September 9. 1903. Folder "8 ."  Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
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This was a high point for Peary, who had never had an easy relationship with 
the Navy regarding his continual leaves of absence. He saw it as the last necessary 
step to win over skittish backers. He informed Bridgman that “If this were England 
and a British Lord of the Admiralty wrote as Secretary Darling has written and 
conveyed the approval o f the King as Secretary Darling has conveyed the approval of 
President Roosevelt, there would be a dozen men eager to assume the financial part of 
the expedition. 1 can not believe that we are any slower over here than over there.’'"*^
Peary felt so confident o f Darling's support that he thought he might be able 
to secure ships previously out of his reach. Three ships associated with the Greely 
fiasco, the Alert, the Thetis, and the Bear belonged to the Treasury Department, 
which had a rocky past with the Navy Department. Peary believed that Darling was 
so interested in the matter that he might be able to make one available to Peary for 
refitting.^^ Peary's excitement over this turn of events was short-lived. Within a 
month, he had to look elsewhere for a ship. Bridgman learned that Darling’s ability 
to intervene extended only to a possibility of having some of the machinery refitting 
of the ship done at federal expense.
In early 1904, Peary gave up the idea of finding a ship that he could fix for his 
own purposes. For months he had attempted to purchase of the Gauss, a fine ship 
used in Antarctic exploration. He never considered using one o f the ships he had 
used in years past, though they were still active. During the whaling season of 1904. 
the Windward, the Erik, and the Diana carried crews to the Davis Straits region.'*’*
Peary to Bridgman, September 9. 1903. Folder "B." Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903. PFC.
Peary to Bridgman. September 9. 1903. Folder B.' Box 7. Letters Sent 1901-1903, PFC.
Alfred Basil Lubbock. The Arctic li'/talers (Glasgoww: Brown, Son & Ferguson, Ltd., 1937), 445- 
446.
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Peary, however, was willing to skip an exploring season rather than use one of these 
outdated ships. The Gauss had a strong hull, but also a weak engine that Peary knew 
needed replacement. He figured the cost of refitting alone to be “between fifty and 
seventy-five thousand dollars.” too high for consideration. He ended the negotiations 
with the following thought: “As a matter o f fact, finding that it is apparently 
impossible for me to secure such strongly built hull as I desire at any reasonable 
price, I am now preparing plans o f my own for a new ship which 1 shall have built.” '^^  
This hope rejuvenated him. For over ten years he had explained that the ship 
mattered more than almost anything else in order for his overland plans to work. He 
still did not have enough money either to buy or to construct one. but the cost of 
buying was high enough that he already knew he needed to double or triple his usual 
expedition fund. The decision to construct changed none of the financial 
considerations, but it took Peary to a new plateau in the history of Arctic exploration. 
It was the first major piece of equipment, machinery, or transportation engineered 
specifically to carry an American into the Arctic Ocean. And for the first time in his 
Arctic career, he had good timing. The American shipbuilding industr>' was prepared 
for the order. Several deeply loyal members of the PAC offered substantial funding 
so that Peary could have his ship. On the condition that Peary raise $25.000 on his 
own. Jesup. General Thomas Hubbard, and George Crocker (president of Southern 
Pacific Railroad) each gave him $50.000.^"
Peary lo Gatjens & Jarke. February 6. 1904. Folder "G." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904, PFC.
Herbert. The Noose, 158: The shipbuilder. Captain Charles Dix. agreed to buy the timber himself 
and allow Peary to repay him later; Harold Norwood. Bartlett: The Great Explorer (Toronto: 
Doubleday Canada Limited. 1977). 59. Several other PAC members contributed lesser amounts.: 
Robert A. Bartlett. The Log o f  Boh Bartlett: The True Story o f  Forty Years o f  Seafaring and 
Exploration (New York; (3.P. Putnam's Sons. 1928). 161. Peaiy went deeper into personal debt, and 
also pawned some o f his wife's possessions to cover some costs.
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Peary chose McKay & Dix Shipyard in Bucksport, Maine as the construction 
site because Maine hosted the nation’s finest shipyards. After the 1870’s, when the 
United States whaling industry swung from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans and 
eastern shipping needs changed, the shipbuilding industry shifted from Connecticut to 
Maine. The connection between Peary and the United States whaling industry 
partially explains why he could not have built an American ice-breaker earlier in his 
career. The ships he used most often, the Windward, the Erik, and the Diana, were 
older whaling ships that he rented for his exploratory trips, which was the usual 
custom for most non-commercial Arctic travelers. Originally designed as sailing 
ships, each vessel had weak auxiliary engines added later, when steam power was 
possible. For example, the Windward first sailed in 1860 and received its engine in 
1867. And the whaling crew of the Diana spent the winter of 1866 iced in near 
Baffin Bay because the sailing ship’s puny 30 h.p. engine could not fight through the 
unusually thick seasonal ice. When Peary used these same ships during the 1890‘s, 
he updated, repaired, or replaced thirty-year-old equipment. And the American 
whaling industry’s coastal shift forced most shipyards to decrease continual 
production o f new whalers and to build merchant vessels instead. Therefore, the 
choice of available ships on the eastern seaboard during the late nineteenth century 
was weak. The Greenland right whale had been hunted almost to extinction by 1908, 
the year of the last successful American whaling season. The old whaling fleet fell 
into disuse, though some of them were recalled to service during World War 1.
■ ' Lance E. Davis. Robert E. Gallman. Karin Gleiter. In Pursuit o f  Leviathan: Technology'. Institutions. 
Productivity', and Profits in .■\merican Whaling. 1816-191)6 (Chicago and London; University of 
Chicago Press. 1997). 269-278: Lubbock. 387.450.471. The Erik was built in 1865 (533 tons), and a 
German ship sank it in 1918.
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The United States whaling industry converted to steam simultaneously with 
the discovery o f new fisheries in the Pacific. After the 1880’s, however, increasing 
numbers of Atlantic whalers were built to order. It often cost less to construct a new 
ship than to convert an older one. The Maine shipbuilding industry experienced a 
minor boom filling orders for whalers.^"
More than that, however, Maine shipyards were enjoying federal and state 
incentives to boost their industry, which had struggled since the Civil War. Until the 
1890’s. American shipbuilding faced tough competition from England due to high 
import duties on steel and some kinds o f timber. In addition, the federal government 
assigned a special "internal revenue tax” that significantly increased the cost of each 
ship. For example, "it was claimed that the builder of a 1.000-ton ship paid about 
$10,000 in taxes." Responding to a Congressional report about the state o f American 
shipbuilding, the federal government eased restrictions, reducing the cost o f each 
ship. By 1894. all shipbuilding items were duty free.^^ Maine's shipyards were able 
to take advantage of these changes more than others, because the state had "'the best 
local timber supply available on the Atlantic seaboard, skilled master builders steeped 
in the traditions of shipbuilding, and a good labor supply not strongly affected by the 
industrialization of the age....'" In addition. Maine shipyards almost all operated 
under the direction of a master workman and a small, skilled crew. They did not copy 
builders in other states that used larger, poorly skilled workforces and more 
machinery. Maine might have had the best timber, but there was so little of it left in
’’Davis. Gallman. and Gleiter. ht Pursuit. 269-278.
5.>’William Avery Baker, A Maritime History' o f  Bath. Maine and the Kennebec River Region 2
volumes (Bath. Maine: Marine Research Society ofBath. 1973). I: 510. 517. The internal tax was 2%
on hulls and 3-5% on marine enaines.
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shipbuilding regions that most shipyards imported their lumber from other parts o f the 
country. Approximately two-thirds o f a ship’s cost was its materials, so the wood 
type made a difference. The yellow pine that Peary wanted, for example, was a 
popular choice that had to be imported from the South.''"*
For his builders, Peary designed a ship that was special, even by Arctic 
standards. He wanted the vessel to be as strong as possible, and dismissed the usual 
concern of substantial coal consumption. He planned to take as much coal as 
necessary, even giving up space normally devoted to crew housing to store the fuel.
He wanted to "...insure, as far as human provision can insure, my successful 
accomplishment o f a distance of about 350 miles of ice encumbered navigation."’' '  
With every cent committed to ship construction, Peary still did not have 
enough money to organize the rest o f the expedition. But the solidity of the PAC 
increased his resolve. Once he decided to build his own ship, he had all of his 
necessities met. He bragged that it would be built on American land by an American 
company. The explorer composed a list o f wealthy men to whom the PAC sent 
circulars asking for membership. The list included members of the New York Yacht 
Club, the AGS, and high-profile families like the Astors, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, 
Goulds, and at least twenty other names.'*’
The applications for membership revolved around a detailed description o f the 
ship. Nobody could deny that it was ".. .the first ship ever built in the Western 
Hemisphere for Arctic Discovery, and will be the ablest ever built anywhere for this
Baker. X Maritime History, 2: 639. 791, 792.
”  Peary to Malcolm J. Mollan. February 17. 1904. Folder "M." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904, RFC. 
Peary to Jesup. December 9. 1904. Folder "J.” Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. RFC.
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purpose.”^^  It was extraordinarily strong and a staggering 1500 tons. Peary used 
yellow pine and white oak, reinforced the entire body with cross beams, steel bolts 
and plating, and wrought-iron piping. He designed it so that the ship would withstand 
severe ice pressure by rising above it if grabbed by underwater ice, and it had a 1200 
h.p. engine. The narrow hull and powerful engines made her ideally suited for Arctic 
work. Also, she "...presents a complete reversal of pervious custom in Arctic and 
Antarctic ships, in that instead o f being a sailing ship with puny auxiliary engines, she 
will be a powerful steamer with merely auxiliary sail power."'** In 1880, the average 
cost for a ship built in Bath, Maine shipyards using white oak and iron bolts was $45 
per ton. Peary's ship was built over twenty years later (in a neighboring town), but 
even with expected cost increases the price would not have approached Peary’s 
eventual payment. The added steel and iron reinforcements, however, increased costs 
considerably. The Roosevelt was rugged and powerful, and gave Peary a huge 
advantage over any other Arctic expedition in history. Predictably. Peary found a 
way to turn the ship's unique design to monetary advantage. To raise funds for the 
E.M.C. Seminar)' in Bucksport. the Roosevelt's home port, Peary donated wood from 
the ship's keel to be fashioned into souvenirs with pictures of the vessel. Captain 
Bartlett, himself, and the builder.'"'
Peary looked more like his old self after the PAC incorporated and his ship 
went under construction. He knew that within a year he would have another chance 
to reach the North Pole. He invited a lew scientists and tourists to join him, and
Peaiy Arctic Club. Objects o f  the Ciiih, Plan o f  Campaign. Description o f  New Ship (New York: 
Printed by the Lotus Press. 1905). 2 1.
Peary Arctic Club. Objects. 20; B a k e r . Maritime. 2: 791.
The Bowdoin Orient. Volume 34. November 25. 1904. 194.
216
planned to leave any takers on Cape Sabine, then push further north with his own ship 
and let his auxilary ship return the assorted travelers to the United States after a few 
months. It certainly would be the most predictable expedition of his career, as he 
explained: “The voyage entails no risk, hardships, or discomforts, more than a trip to 
the North Cape.” '^*
Like every other Arctic expedition he led, Peary needed money up until the 
moment of departure and had to give in to the popular aspects of his quest. He sold 
tours o f the Roosevelt and once again used his Eskimo dogs to attract paying 
audiences.**' The Arctic explorer had more personal notoriety than ever before, but he 
also needed more money and could not overlook any opportunity to earn it.
After two years of continuous scheming to be able to return to the North Pole, 
Peary relaxed. He watched his ship built in Maine, making sure that it met his 
expectations.^' He also oversaw the successful meeting of the Eighth IGC in 
September in Washington. DC. Peary delivered the opening remarks to the 
conference attendees, a significant coup after the trouble he took to win the position. 
The entire affair was a success, and its organizers shuttled guests to American 
highlights including Niagara Falls, the St. Louis World's Fair, and Philadelphia.*’^
"" Peary to Frank Presbrey, March 28. 1904. Folder "P." Box 8. Letters Sent 1904. PFC.
Herbert. The Noose. 160.
Edward P. Stafford. Penn- and his Promised Land: The Story o f  a Love Affair Between a Man and 
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summers at his favorite retreat. The locality afforded him easy access to the ship building site.
Marie Anighito Peaty Stafford. "Geographical Society o f Pennsylvania: History 1891-i960.” 
(Philadelphia: Geographical Society o f  Pennsylvania. I960): 20. Robert W. Rydell. All the World's a 
Fair: lisions o f  Empire at American International Expositions, /«f 76-79/6 (Chicago: University o f 
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The AGS basked in the praise, as did Peary.
Years of desperation had taught Peary how to handle opportunity. He took 
full advantage of a chance to speak before a well-informed, prestigious audience. He 
opened the proceedings in Washington, DC, welcomed the delegates several days 
later in New York, and hosted another reception in St. Louis during the two-week 
conference. Peary's talk focused on the excitement, use. and need for further polar 
exploration. He dared the geographers to be content with information already 
available. The president declared that “The fact of my personal interest in the polar 
field does not affect the truth of the broad statement that there is no longer any great 
pioneer work of geographical discovery to be accomplished except at the apices of 
the earth, at the North and South Poles.” Naturally, he believed that the North Pole 
should take precedence, believing that it had “ ...a  place in history, in literature, in 
sentiment, if you will, which the South Pole will never hold.”^^
Peary opened the conference, attended every major event, and in his closing 
remarks made public for the first time his details for another attempt on the pole. The 
gestures made a difference. The IGC attendees passed several resolutions calling for 
closer attention to a few geographical areas. Polar exploration received special 
mention: "The Congress recognizes that the Arctic regions possess a more immediate 
interest for the people of North America and expressed the confident hope that the 
expeditions now being prepared will be so supported as to secure early and complete
village, a Native American area, an Ainu enclave, and an Arctic peoples showcase, among others. 
Peary had some contact with fair organizers throughout 1903. but did not directly influence the 
presentation o f the Arctic exhibit.
Robert E. Peary. "Address by Commander Robert E. Peary. U.S.N.." National Geographic 
Magazine 20 (October 1904): 389-390.
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success.”^^  The IGC was a resounding success for its president. After it closed,
Peary devoted the next few months to serious organization o f his proposed trip to the 
North Pole.
A highlight of this period included a visit to Bowdoin College, his alma mater. 
The student newspaper, the OrienU began in 1904 to follow the developing story 
about his visit. He agreed to give a lecture in May, 1905, and an article announcing 
the date encouraged the students to support him: ‘The news that Commander Robert 
E. Peary is to lecture before the college is received with genuine pleasure. The 
national attention that he has drawn to himself during the past few years has made 
him the most interesting figure among our alumni. Every one is proud of his name 
and the fame he brings to Bowdoin...We should give him a rousing reception and fill 
old Memorial to the doors.’"^ ’^ After the lecture, the paper summarized the talk, noting 
that the audience seemed particularly impressed by Peary's stereopticon slides and a 
description of the Roosevelt. He explained that the ship would, hopefully, place him 
within five hundred miles of the pole, which he would cover on foot with dog sleds. 
He first showed “a series of the different types of sailing craft used during the past 
years by famous explorers," in order to emphasize the distinction of his ice-breaker. 
Peary also told the Bowdoin students that he had three reasons to expect victory this 
time. He had a good ship, experience, and control over his Inuit helpers. He 
explained that the Inuits would "obey me absolutely, and with their aid and the aid of 
those magnificent creatures, the dogs, 1 am in a better position to make the fight than
"Resolutions Adopted by the Eighth International Geographic Congress. September, 1904.” National 
Geographic Magazine 20 (October 1904): 4 16.425. During the conference, at an AGS dinner 
reception, Peary boasted about his ship. He also received the Gold Medal o f the Société de 
Géographie of Paris.
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any of my predecessors.”
Peary did not impress everyone, however. The Orient editor wrote to several 
of Peary’s classmates before his visit, looking for further insight into the famous 
alum. Alfred Burton, who graduated in 1878, one year behind Peary, and was also a 
scientist on Peary’s 1896 Arctic trip, wrote a flattering article about his friend. But 
George L. Thompson, a classmate of the explorer, recalled little about their shared 
college days, and remarked that ”1 cannot quite understand how one can put aside all 
that I consider desirable in life, in order to discover a pole which, 1 have no doubt 
when found, will be a disappointment and probably not suitable to hang the 'stars and 
stripes' to. So here's to Commander Peary, "May he and his family live long and 
posper [sic]’ and may he achieve his heart’s desire.” Nevertheless, the Bowdoin 
students appreciated Peary’s lecture, and the Orient proclaimed that it "marked the 
height o f all instructive and entertaining events of the year.” *^ Despite Thompson, 
the rest of Peary’s classmates appreciated him. W.C. Greene proposed setting up a 
mock North Pole in front of the Bowdoin chapel at the 30’’’ reunion of the class o f 
1877 to honor "what one classmate has done for Arctic exploration.”*’'^
In July, 1905, Peary guided the Roosevelt (named for his hero and in gratitude 
for his support) out of New York City and returned to the Arctic. A crowd of 
appreciative fans waved good-bye, and a few rode the heavy ship a while before 
Peary pulled away from the local bay. Henry G. Bryant, President of the Philadelphia 
Geographical Society, Angelo Heilprin, a scientist and devoted friend for over ten
The Bowdoin Orient, 34, October 28, 1904, 149; Volume 35. May 5. 1905.23. 
The Bowdoin Orient, 34. May 19, 1905,41-42.
The Bowdoin Orient, 34. May 19. 1905.43.45.
The Bowdoin Orient, 34. March 2. 1906.285.
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years, Josephine Peary, Madison Grant, President of the New York Zoological 
Society, and others enjoyed sending Peary off in style. Peary, thinking this was his 
last Arctic trip, allowed his guests to meander all over his special ship, and he 
answered every harbor ship's farewell blast with a courteous three-whistle reply. It 
was as close as he had ever come to a party atmosphere in his departures.^'’ Later, he 
barely contained his bitterness when he recounted the silent reception he endured 
when he returned empty-handed.^'
Despite the advantages of the Roosevelt, Peary failed again. His ship took 
him as far north as he dreamed it would, but the extra boost did little good. He 
enountered overwhelming pressure ridges and another open lead that prevented much 
overland progress.^" A high percentage o f his dogs died, and the expedition members 
barely escaped starvation as they struggled back to the ship. He earned the 
satisfaction of a new Farthest North at 87 6 ', a feat which by itself made this one trip 
of more lasting historical value than the previous four-year venture.^'’ (See Appendix, 
Figurs 1. 6)
Peary never hesitated about trying again. As soon as several repairs could be 
made to the Roosevelt, he planned to claim the North Pole. While he waited, he 
cheered himself with another Bowdoin connection. Traveling by train from his home
"Commander Pear>'s Start for the Arctic.” Bulletin o f  the Geographical Society o f  Philadelphia 5 
(September 1905): 484.
"Nearest the Pole." National Geographic Magazine 18 (July 1907): 448. Not one person met the 
ship.
A "lead" is an open lane o f water in the ice. If the lead is too wide, one must wait for the water to 
re-freeze. It is the Arctic explorer's worst hurdle. Encountering an open lead on the way to the North 
Pole forces the people and dogs to lose valuable time, as well as use their rationed food and water.
And hitting one open lead means that there may be others further north. Hitting open leads on the 
return journey can be especially dangerous because the people and dogs were likely to be exhausted, 
food supplies low. and there could be no hope o f rescue.
"Nearest the Pole," 449.
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in Maine to New York, Peary stopped in Brunswick to address a crowd of students: “I 
could not resist coming out to see you, boys. I am very deeply pleased and proud at 
this greeting. It is gratifying to find that Bowdoin students recognize the achievement 
of reaching the farthest north that has been reached by any man during three centuries 
of endeavor.” He continued speaking, but he “was interrupted by frequent cheers, 
and when he had finished, the students took up the yell 'Bully for Peary,' and kept it 
up until the train had pulled out." '^*
Peary overcame enormous pressures and disappointments after 1902 in order 
to organize this expedition. He knew the value of his quest and he once again found 
the interested parties who could help him achieve it. Several men had already 
donated significant sums of money to help him, and despite Peary’s hardships a few 
of them stuck by him. Tum-of-the-century geographers responded to him because he 
exploited their professional desires to fill blank spaces on maps and to describe all 
locales, however remote. Several prominent societies competed for prestige during 
the early stages o f the organization of geography, and Peary seized the moment. He 
saw the scientists’ needs and invited them to join him in the excitement of reaching a 
grand geographical prize. As Peary's fame grew and the pole still eluded him. he 
focused more attention on the institutions and philanthropists devoted to the field than 
he did to the individual scientists. He put national pride at stake and forced these 
same supporters to consider the shame of losing the accolades of history to another 
country. He mentioned these objectives despite repeated failures and 
disappointments. He was not a scientist, but geographers held him in such high
Bowdoin Orient., 36. December 7. 1906. 176. Peaiy could address the Bowdoin crowd as "boys” 
because women were not admitted until 1972.
regard that they elected him president of two important academic societies. He made 
Americans feel proud o f his work even though he operated best alone and 
acknowledged the wealthy men and corporations that backed him far more often than 
those who actually sledged through the Arctic with him. Through persistence, 
arrogance, and desperation, he kept a handful of people involved and insisted that he 
could win the race to the North Pole.
Conclusion
When Peary announced that he had stood on top of the planet on April 6,1909, a 
media frenzy broke out to unravel a mystery. His telegraph message stating “Stars and 
Stripes nailed to the Pole” reached American newspapers just days after American 
Frederick Cook declared that he had reached the North Pole on April 21, 1908. Cook 
claimed that his return joumey had delayed his announcement for months, and both men 
released victorious declarations in September, 1909. Had Peary’s American rival 
preceded him? Had both men actually been to the North Pole? Had one, or both, lied?
The matter remains unresolved.
In any case, Peary’s 1908-1909 Arctic trip was his last, and he spent the rest of his 
life defending his name and reputation. The National Geographic Society (NGS), the 
American Geographical Society (AGS), and the Royal Geographic Society (RGS) 
supported Peary’s claim over Cook’s. Neither man produced indisputable proof, but 
Peary won the support of the public as well as most scientists. In 1911 he appeared 
before a Congressional subcommittee that recognized his discovery of the North Pole, 
and the US Navy promoted him to Admiral.' The controversy tainted Peary, however, 
and he died in 1920 at the relatively young age of 65. In the last years of his life, he 
watched the race to the South Pole. It makes no difference whether Peary reached the 
North Pole. His career deserves attention for its larger connections to American science, 
exploration, and nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century.
Peary needed several things in order to be a successful American Arctic explorer. 
He required money: to rent a ship, pay a crew, and buy supplies and trade goods. He
' Robert M. Bryce, Cook Jc Peary: The Polar Controversy, Resolved (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1997), 516-517.
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needed reliable transportation: the Arctic is treacherous for ships, making it difficult even 
to place a person far enough North for exploration opportunities. In addition, Peary 
found it necessary to have an informed audience for his work. Reaching the North Pole 
first obsessed him, but it was a pointless dream until he found people who valued the 
quest enough to help him secure money and transportation. After twenty-six years, these 
three requirements merged, and Peary claimed victory.
Peary benefited from America’s fascination with the West. His immediate 
predecessors Elisha Kent Kane, Charles Francis Hall, and Adolphus W. Greely had failed 
to make the Arctic a region of enduring national interest. By 1890, finding the North 
Pole seemed a crazed daredevil’s endeavor. But Peary realized that his Arctic frontier 
overlapped with scientific considerations of the American West. His ability to turn 
certain American scientific traits to his advantage gave him two things he needed— an 
audience and money. Peary led his first independent Arctic trip in 1891, a time when 
several American scientific fields, such as geography and anthropology, were 
professionalizing. These scientists formed professional organizations, restricted 
membership to those who had field-specific training, and identified as clearly as possible 
the goals of their independent specialties. Geographers, for example, paid close attention 
to the shrinking list of remote spots on the planet not yet discovered by mankind, and 
placed special professional value on studies of these areas. The North and South Poles 
topped the list.
Academically trained scientists distanced themselves from amateur generalists. 
This first generation of professional scientists affiliated themselves with colleges and 
universities, museums, and research institutions. Unlike the amateur hobbyists who 
preceded them, this generation of academics secured employment on the basis o f their
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career training. The scientists’ capabilities for travel and fieldwork, therefore, depended 
upon the relative interests of their host institutions.
At the same time, these scientific groups were the last of a successive wave of 
explorers of the American West. During the nineteenth century, explorers, traders, 
settlers, the military, and scientists moved across the American West. Each group of 
people traveled for different reasons and placed its own value upon the land, its 
resources, and potential development of the West. As a result, the West reflected 
corresponding cultural trends. Often, through this continual process of exploration, the 
same areas were seen as empty wastelands, mining bonanzas, farmland, American Indian 
homelands and battlefields, and scientific laboratories. The federal government often 
sent scientists with military expeditions in order to determine the most complete value of 
an area, as well as maintain military usefulness during periods of peace. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, military necessity for most of the West had faded. The 
scientist explorers of the region became instead civilians affiliated with various federal 
agencies, especially the Department of the Interior and the US Geological Survey 
(USGS), or an increasing number of private ones, such as the American Museum of 
Natural History (AMNH). Professional organizations gave these scientists ways to 
communicate and identify each other, though internal squabbles over the purposes of 
their work remained. Geologists disagreed, for example, over whether to assign value 
and recommend potential courses of development in unsettled regions of the West, or 
collect all information, regardless of cultural use, for later, more objective analysis.
Peary faced a similar problem with the Arctic. American Arctic exploration had 
moved briefly and unremarkably through several phases by the time he led his first 
expedition. Hall first searched for England’s John Franklin, a hero lost in 1845 during
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the international contest to find the Northwest Passage. Kane searched for Franklin, and 
also tried for the next great polar prize, the North Pole. Greely led an American 
expedition that recognized the merits of both the Northwest Passage and the North Pole, 
yet pushed also for a broader, scientific, collaborative approach for Arctic exploration.
All failed. Therefore, when Peary began his quest to discover the North Pole, he changed 
the cultural perception of the Arctic for Americans. He explained the Arctic as a new 
frontier that his countrymen should want to claim. Peaiy's Arctic frontier was 
simultaneously a cartographic challenge; a workshop for anthropologists, botanists, 
geologists, and meteorologists; a means to uplift the Inuits, an international race, and a 
worthwhile test of human endurance.
Peary capitalized on late nineteenth-century trends of studies of the American 
West. He knew that professional scientists following the traditions established by the 
likes of John Wesley Powell of the Smithsonian Institution and Mathew Fountain Maury 
of the US Coast Survey were the dominant influences over material gathered in the West. 
Powell oversaw the direction of ethnological material about American Indians at the 
Smithsonian, thus affecting not only the public's reception of the distilled information, 
but steering also the course of federal American Indian policy. The new generation of 
professional scientists directed cultural perceptions of the American West. In a similar 
manner, Franz Boas at the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) managed the 
material that his teams of collectors sent to the institution in a race to preserve native 
cultures before they became extinct. The belief that a deadline loomed for collection of 
authentic native artifacts affected public displays, world's fair themes, and the alliances 
of museum curators. Morris K. Jesup, curator of the AMNH, provided thousands of 
dollars for anthropological fieldworkers to fill his specially built exhibit halls with
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physical evidence from native communities around the world. Peary gave the AMNH the 
nation’s foremost collection of Arctic goods. He sent meteorites (still on display today), 
animal skins, stuffed animals, Inuit tools and clothing, burial items, plaster casts, 
photographs, and incredibly, live Inuits.
Boas and Peary certainly influenced each other’s careers. But Peary did not rely 
solely on the opportunities available through the director of anthropology at a major 
research museum. Equally important to Peary was the network of communication that 
evolved among professional scientists. Organizations like the NGS and the AGS gave 
scientists the chance to correspond, meet, and discuss current scholarship trends, but they 
could not finance the travel necessary' for geographical fieldwork. Peary, a trained 
engineer, joined both the NGS and the AGS, and networked among the geographers and 
other assorted scientist members. He crafted a simple plan: in exchange for paid 
passage, Peary delivered scientists to pre-arranged Arctic destinations, continued further 
northward for personal exploration goals, retrieved the fieldworkers after two to three 
months, and returned stateside with them. The opportunity to conduct studies or make 
collections in the remote Arctic guaranteed the scientists publishing opportunities and 
some measure of professional acclaim. In addition, because the scientists usually asked 
their host schools or institutions for the necessary travel fees, Peary was spared the need 
to find one well-endowed, interested party.
Peary spent the majority of his stateside time between trips corresponding with 
scientists he met or heard about through professional organizations. He disliked the 
work, but the repetitive explanations eventually helped. Often, he knew that the scientists 
were interested, but that they were unsure how to explain their passenger expenses to 
their employers or patrons. Peary crafted the arguments for them, explaining again and
228
again the multiple American interests in the Arctic frontier. These personal connections 
made him a focal point within the NGS and the AGS. He held leadership positions in 
both organizations and published frequently in their respective publications. By 1900, 
the messages in his private communications had turned into the American scientific 
community’s mission statement for the Arctic frontier.
Peary might have funded his entire Arctic career in this fashion, but it proved 
impractical for two reasons. First, Peary resented the annual returns to the United States, 
and believed that he might win the pole if he wintered in the Arctic. The chance to re­
group in the Arctic and suffer, fewer distractions and delays held obvious attractions. 
Wintering over, however, made it less likely that he could coordinate, supervise, or 
provide for the safe return of teams of scientists. Second, a multi-year attempt required 
more money. The plan depended upon being able to rent and supply a ship and annual 
re-supply ships, as well as feed and equip a crew for an extended period of time.
Fortunately for the explorer, his years of contacts with the scientists helped him 
afford the change. A group of wealthy businessmen and philanthropists with interests in 
American science, most of whom had previously helped Peary, formed an organization 
devoted singly to placing him at 90 N. The Peary Arctic Club (PAC) started in 1898, and 
thanks to its incorporation Peary conducted a four-year campaign (1898-1902), as well as 
two additional extraordinarily expensive expeditions. The PAC members valued their 
donations much as they did other philanthropic gestures: as signs of goodwill, devotion to 
progress, and a place in history. By 1900, Peary had successfully bound national pride to 
the polar quest. In addition, Peary maintained exploring tradition by naming new 
landmark features after his best supporters. For example, Peary discovered and named
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Cape Morris Jesup, on the northeast coast of Greenland, during one of his roundtrip 
crossings of the island.
The formation of the PAG helped Peary resolve the last of his three Arctic 
problems—a ship. Only a handful of men remained committed to the PAC from 1898 to 
1909 (Jesup and Herbert Bridgman, most significantly), though a larger group of people 
joined for at least one of the three campaigns. Recruiting new PAC members, and 
emphasizing victory to committed ones, occupied significant amounts of Peary’s inter­
trip time, as did the bygone campaigns to find passenger scientists. After 1902, however, 
Peary stopped lamenting the problems of ship rental, and declared that success hinged on 
the purchase or construction of an ice-breaker ship. For each preceding trip, Peary had 
sailed North on small, inadequately equipped ships that could not handle the extreme ice 
pressure. As a result, Peary had never been able to sail as far north as he desired, making 
it necessary for him to risk extended overland travel. Before 1898, the scientists’ 
passenger fees barely paid for even the smallest and weakest of the off-season, re-fitted 
whaling ships available as choices.
Despite the PAC’s foundation in 1898, Peary relied completely on rented ships 
for his failed four-year venture. The PAC’s extra income made annual re-supply a 
slightly lesser burden, but it could not yet address the larger problem—the United States 
had inadequate transportation for its best Arctic explorer. Peary used weak sailing ships, 
in an age of steam power, because the United States dominated the world whaling 
industry. American whaling companies made fortunes in sales of whale oil and whale 
bone products from Canada’s eastern Arctic during the late nineteenth century. During 
the 1880’s, however, Americans discovered a huge, lucrative whale feeding ground off 
the coast of Alaska, and national whaling interests swung toward the western Arctic. The
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best American shipbuilders were still on the East coast, but the powerful steamers they 
began constructing left for whaling seasons in the Pacific Ocean. The only ships 
available for rent by a desperate Arctic explorer were older, outdated sailing whalers.
The PAC believed Peary’s assertion that a fine ice-breaker was the lone remaining 
obstacle to North Pole success, and in 1905 a few members pledged enough money for 
Peary to build America’s first Arctic ship— the Roosevelt. Two trips later, Peary claimed 
victory.
The United States was ill-prepared for Peary’s vision, but he addressed the 
problems well enough to be remembered by some accounts as the “Discoverer o f the 
North Pole.’’ Peary capitalized on trends within the American scientific community to 
win a support base of explorer-scientists. Through the academics’ networks of 
organization, he met wealthier men equally as interested in his descriptions of an Arctic 
frontier. He became a significant symbol of progress and American capabilities within 
the ranks of the scientists and their professional organizations, which gave him 
opportunities unavailable to other explorers. His campaign increased the scientific 
organizations’ prestige, and in turn their support pumped cultural value into an 
historically dangerous, questionable goal. He never returned to the Arctic after 1909, so 
his particular vision for the national and scientific merits of Arctic exploration ended 
abruptly upon his supposed victory. But during his lifetime, Peary turned the Arctic into 
a cultural frontier of greater value than his individual obsession, a remarkable feat for any 
explorer.
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The following illustrations appear courtesy of the History of Science Collections, 
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Figure 1. Frontispiece. Albert Operti’s rendition of Peary’s Farthest North
record, 1906.
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Figure 2. “The North Polar Regions.”
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Figure 3. “The Polar Regions, Showing the Routes and Explorations of 
Robert E. Peary, U.S.N.” North is at left.
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Figure 4. Detail of Figure 3, “The Polar Regions,” showing the area of the
northwest passage expeditions.
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Figure 5. Detail of Figure 3, “The Polar Regions,” Peary’s American route.
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?Figure 6. Detail of Figure 3, “The Polar Regions,” showing northern
locales on the American route. North is at left.
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IFigure 7. Detail of Figure 3, “The Polar Regions,” showing northeast
Greenland. North is at left.
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